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Demand for developing indigenous capability for policy analy-
sis has grown in Asia and Latin America but remains weak and
unstable in Africa.  Strategies for developing such capability
depend on strengths and attitudes of government and private
sectors.
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After reviewing donor experience in building  take coordinated, long-term efforts to build that
capability for policy analysis, Paul, Steedman,  capability.
and Sutton conclude that:
- Suitable incentives are provided for profes-
- Capability and demand for policy research  sionals, particularly in semi-autonomous centers.
and advice continue to be weak and unstable in
Africa, where there are few well-trained macro-  *  Steps are taken to stimulate government de-
economists and where governments have a  mand for policy analysis.
problem retai,iing competent analysts.
D  Donors support a few rather than too many
Capability and demand for policy analysis  institutions.
have grown in Asia and Latin America. In some
countries, a few economists and related profes-  Strategies for developing indigenous capa-
sionals have significantly improved economic  bilities for policy analysis will vary from
policy formulation.  country to country.  In countries where non-
govemment clientele and sources of support are
Autonomous (arn's  length) centers for  limited but government is interested, the initial
policy analysis are increasingly influential in  focus should be on strengthening government
building policy capability in Asia and Latin  capability. Countries where there is demand for
America, but less so in sub-Saharan Africa.  policy analysis in both the government .nd
Foreign assistance has provided critical support  private sector may be ripe for arm's length
for these centers.  centers for policy analysis.  If such centers are
not appropriate,  private sector associations
Success in building policy capability will  could help set up policy analysis units.  In
depend upon the extent to which:  countries where the private sector is weak,
academic institutions with close links to govem-
Donors and recipient governments under-  ment may help create some local capability.
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Many  developing  countries  have  undertaken  wide  rarging  policy
reforms  to  accelerate  the  process  of structural  adjustment  in the  wake of the
economic  crisis  of the  1980s. The  pace and  complexity  of reforms  have  no
doubt  strained  the  limited  capacitiss  of their  governments  and  in  particular
their  ability  to generate,  analyze  and  evaluate  policy  options  and  to
negotiate  with donors  on the  nature  and  scope  of desirable  and  feasible  policy
reforms. Nowhere  is  this  capacity  constraint  more  evident  than  in Sub-Saharan
African  countries  where  international  donors  and  expatriate  advisers  have
provided  much  of the  required  "policy  analysis"  in support  of macroeconomic
reforms. While  there  may  be no alternative  to external  assistance  in  times  of
crisis,  there  is  no doubt  that  the  long-term  sustainability  of reforms  will  be
aided  by the  creation  of at least  a modest  level  of indigenous  capacity  for
policy  analysis  in these  countries. Policy  analysis  is  defined  here as the
task  of analyzing  and  evaluating  public  policy  options  in the  context  of given
goals  for  choice  by policymakers  or  other  relevant  actors.
The  usefulness  of  policy  analysis  is  by no means  limited  to
macroeconomic  management. It is  equally  relevant  to sectoral  and
program-related  policy  issues. The  scope  and tools  of policy  analysis  can
therefore  be adapted  to the  needs  of a  variety  of policy  concerns. As will  be
explained  below,  while  economics  is the  dominant  building  block,  otherdisciplines  and  perspectives  have  also  been drawn  upon in the  course  of the
evolution  of this  field.'  The  analysis  of  policy  options,  for  example,  is
aided  by the  use  of quantitati-  e  modeling  and  statistical  methods. The
political  and  institutional.  implications  of the  options  are  legitimate  inputs
for  their  evaluation.  More specifically,  policy  analysis  must take  into
account  the  implementability  of the  alternatives  under  review,  thus  bringing
in  a managerial  dimension  to the  process. Policy  analysis  thus  entails  much
more  than  the  use  of economics. This  multi-disciplinary  perspective  has
relevance  to the  analysis  of  macroeconomic  as  well  as sectoral  policy  issues.
This  paper  attempt.s  to  examine  the  concept  and  scope  of  policy
analysis  and  to distill  the  lessons  of experience  in  building  the  capacity  for
policy  analysis  in a number  of developing  countries  over the  past  three
decades. It does  not  purport  to  be a comprehensive  review,  but rather  an
assessment  of  what  selected  donors  who  have  been  active  in this  field  have
learned  about  capacity  building  in  policy  analysis  in  Africa,  Asia and  Latin
America  and  which  illustrate  different  types  of country  contexts. 2 Its
findings  will  be of interest  not  only  to Bank  staff,  but  also to  developing
1 Graduate  curricula  for  policy  analysis  in  American  Universities  generally
consist of (1) economic theory  and analysis; (2) quantitative  methodology
including  mathematical  programming,  modeling  and  statistics;  (3)  the  political
and  institutional  environment  of policy formation  and  implementation;  (4)
behavioral  and  non-behavioral  decision  making  and  implementatio.a  strategies  and
processes;  and  (5)  program  management,  control  and  evaluat'on.  Courses  on  ethics
and  values  are  also  becoming  popular.
2  Several  governments  have on their  own taken  steps  to strengthen  their
policy-making  and analytic  processes.  Data on such indigenous  efforts  are
scanty. This  paper  has  not  assessed  their  experiences  and impact,  but concede
that  the  subject  warrants  special  attention.3-
country  governments  and  donor  agencies.  Those  who wish  to  revisit  the  problem
of  capacity  building  or  to  design  new  strategies  for  strengthening  policy
analytic  skills  in  a  deOeloping  country  or  region  may wish  to  review  these
lessons  of  donor  experience  before  embarking  or  new  initiatives.
The  experiences  summarized  in  the  paper  were  first  reviewed  as
part  of  a  study  on  "Capacity  Building  for  Policy  Analysis  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa"  which  was  initiated  by  the  Public  Sector  Management  Unit  of  the  World
Bank  in  1986  in  collaboration  with  the  two  Africa  Regions  and  the  Economic
Development  Institute.$  The  impulse  for  the  study  was  the  growing  concern  in
the  Bank  about  the  limited  impact  of  project  lending  on  institutional
development  in  Africa  and  the  need  to  develop  longer  term  multi-donor  support
to facilitate  sustainable  development  for  which  indigenous  capacity  for  policy
analysis  and  management  is  an  important  prerequisite.  The  original  plan  was
to review  donor  experiences  in  this  field,  to  consult  with  Sub-Saharan  African
leaders  and  scholars  on  their  perceptions  of  and  experiences  with  the  problems
of  capacity  building,  and  to  prepare  an  action  program  for  strengthening  the
capacity  for  policy  analysis  in  the  region  through  a  process  of  African  and
donor  participation.  Following  the  Bank's  reorganization,  however,  the
project  has  been  transferred  to  the  Africa  Region.
3  This  initiative  was  triggered  by  a  presentation  on  "capacity  building  and
the  sustainability  of  development  in  Africa"  by  Samuel  Paul  at  the  OPS Senior
Management  Retreat  (World  lanlk)  held  in  December  1985.  In  January  1989,  the
Bank's  Africa  Region  (p.st-reorganization)  convened  a  meeting  of  donor
representatives  to  exchang  ideas  on  an  action  program  for  "Capacity  Building
for  Policy  Analysis  and  kcinomic  Management.'- 4 -
The  two  reviews  of capacity  building  experiences  in  different
regions  prepared  for  this  study  - one  on  Asia  and  Latin  America  by Francis
Sutton  and  the  other  on Sub-Saharan  Africa  by navid  Steedman  - are appended  to
this  paper. Sutton  examines  the  capacity  building  experiences  in  countries
with  widely  varying  characteristics.  His  paper  deals  with policy  analytic  as
well as  public  management  capacity  building  experiences  and is  broader  in
scope  than  the  paper  by Steedman  which  focuses  more specifically  on policy
analytic  capacity  building  in  a  more limited  set  of  country  contexts. The
latter  paper  is largely  on t'.e  donor  experiences  in  Africa  in  creating  such
capacity  outside  of government.4  This is  not  to downplay  the  efforts  made  to
date  to strengthen  policy  analytic  skills  within  African  governments.  They
have  not,  however,  been as intensive  and  long  term  in  their  scope  as those
attempted  in  Asia.  The  World  Bank,  for  example,  has taken  the  initiative  in
recent  years  to examine  this  problem  and  to  provide  technical  assistance  in
several  countries  to strengthen  their  capacity  for  macroeconomic  policy
formulation  and  financial  management. Collaborative  research  projects  have
been funded  by the  Bank  which  have  provided  useful  opportunities  for
developing  country  experts  to gain  experience  in  policy  analytic  work.
Furthermore,  through  the  Economic  Development  Institute's  (EDI)  senior  policy
seminars  and  other  collaborative  training  programs  with  partner  institutions
in  borrower  countries,  the  Bank  has sensitized  a  number  of officials  of  many
governments  on the  importance  and  relevance  of  policy  analysis. Most of these
'  A third  paper  prepared  for  the  study  by Shanta  Devarajan  was  a  "disguised
case study"  of a specific  intervention  by a donor  in a  developing  country  to
strengthen  its  policy  analytic  capacity. The  case study  "Transferring  Policy
Analytic  Capability  to Sub-Saharan  Africa" is available  separately  for those
interested.interventions,  however,  are  still  fairly  recent  and  have  not, for  the  most
part,  focused  on the  long  term  strengthening  of institutional  capacity  for
policy  analysis  in  the  broad  sense  of the  term. This  paper  has  not  examined
these  recent  Bank  interventions  as it  is too  early  to seek  evidence  on theii 
outcomes  and  impact  on  capacity  building.
This  paper  is divided  into  thret  parts. The  first  section  will
examine  the  concept,  scope  and  limitations  of  policy  analysis. This is
followed  by a discussion  of the  factors  that  should  be taken  into  account  in
deciding  when to intervene  to strengthen  policy  analytic  capacity  in a
country. The last  section  summarizes  the  major  lessons  of donor  experience  in
policy  analytic  capacity  building  in  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America. Details
of these  experiences  are  provided  in  the  appendices  to the  paper.
I.  Policy  Analysis: Nature.  Scope  and  Limits
The  domain  of  policy  analysis  is the  choice  among  well-defined
policy  alternatives  in furtherance  of complex  but  compatible  goals. The
discipline  that  has contributed  most  to the  policy  choice  is economics  which
is  concerned  with choosing  among  alternative  actions  to achieve  optimally  a
given  mix of objectives.  As noted  earlier,  policy  analysis  has relevance  to  a
wide  range  of issues  at the  macroeconomic  level,  and  at the  level  of
individual  sectors  and  programs  of action. At the  macro  level,  for  example,
economics  is the  dominant  discipline  for  the  analysis  of fiscal,  monetary  and
trade  policies. The executi've  branch  (Ministries  of Finance,  Planning,  etc.)-6-
in  most  governments  has groups  of economic  and  financial  experts  to design,
review  and  evaluate  such  policies. In  both  developed  anid  developing
countries,  there  are  autonomous  institutions  outside  of government  which
provide  macroeconomic  policy  analysis  and  advice  to  government  a!geztcies  and
other  clients. At the  sectoral  level  and  to  a lesser  extent  at the
macroeconomic  level,  economics  has interacted  with  other  disciplines  to
generate  and evaluate  the  relevant  policy  alternatives.  Thus technology,
sociology,  political  science,  etc.,  have  had some  insights  to  enrich  the
policy  analysis  relevant  to agricultural  programs,  and  pricing  and investment
issues. The  same  is true  of sectors  such  as energy,  defense,  health  and
education. It  was in  the  context  of defense  policy  and  the  choice  of  weapon
systems  in the  1960s  that  policy  analysis  attracted  significant  attention  in
the  U.S.A.  Interdisciplinary  analysis  with  economics  as the  lead  discipline
has  been applied  extensively  also  to a  variety  of social  programs  in some
countries.  s
There  are  multiple  sources  of  policy  analysis  and  policymaking
within  governments.  Not all  policies  are  necessarily  well  articulated  nor  is
policy  analysis  left  solely  to  government  economists  or other  professional
"policy  analysts." Some  of the  major  policies  of governments  may  be enshrined
in the  constitutions  of the  countries  concerned. A statement  in  the
constitution  that  univers4l  primary  education  will  be provided  is  a
declaration  of policy. It is the  law  which  in  many  cases  gives  the  first
5  Interdisciplinary  analysis  through collaboration  between different
specialties  has  by  no  means  been  easy. See  Raymond  Vernon,  "Swan  Song,"  Journal
of Policy  Analysis  and  Management,  Summer,  1985,  p. 577..I.  ,  - 7-
intimation  of "policy." Legislation  on land  reform  or nationalization  may
signal  major  policy  shifts  without  being  preceded  by well-analyzed  or
articulated  policy  statements.  Often,  policy  is  made  by the  courts  through
'thdir  verdicts  which  ask  governments  to follow  certain  directives.  The
judicial  process,  however,  is  often  unable  to formulate  and  to consider  issues
in straightforward  policy  terms,  and  has a  restricted  choice  of instruments
through  which  to enforce  its  decisions.6  More often  than  not,  specific  policy
statements  originate  from  the  executive  branch  of  governments  (e.g.,
industrial  policy,  technology  or energy  policy,  etc.)  Policy  statements  may
remain  aspirational,  as  when they  are  enshrined  in the  constitution,  but their
effectiveness  can  be sabotaged  through  executive  action  or inaction. 7
The  potential  and  the  scope  of  policy  analysis  are  clearly
affected  by the  multiple  sources  of and  influences  on  policymaking. It is  not
that  economics  or other  disciplines  underlying  policy  analysis  are  not
relevant  to policymaking.  Rather,  the  processes  of policymaking  and the  state
of demand  for  policy  analysis  within  governments  are  such  that  the  scope  for  a
systematic  analysis  and  evaluation  of policy  options  may  remain  limited. As a
result,  there  is  considerable  variability  among  countries  with  respect  to the
extent  to  which  formal  policy  analysis  is  utilized  by governments.  It is  fair
to say  that  in dealing  with  certain  standard  macroeconomic  problems,  quite  a
few  governments  undertake  policy  analysis  at least  up to a  modest  level  of
6  Thomas  Schelling,  "Policy  Analysis  as a Science  of Choice,"  in R. S.
Ganapathy,  et. al., Public  Policy  and  Policy  Analysis  in India,  Sage,  London,
1935,  p. 22.
7  S. Guhan,  "Towards  a Policy  for  Analysis,"  Ibid,  p. 258.- -8-
technical  sophistication.  The  fact  that  donors  are  the  major  providers  of
this  service  in  many  LDCs  shows  that  their  governments  are  yet  to attain  even
this  modest  level. But  even in  the  more  developed  countries,  it  has  not  been
easy to institutionalize  policy  analysis  within  the  government  hierarchy. In
the  U. F., for  example,  much  progress  was  made in the  1970s  to create  the
,capacity  for  systematic  policy  analysis  within  the  government. Following  the
recommendations  of the  Fulton  Commission,  policy  analysis  and  planning  units
were  created  in  most  departments  of the  British  Government  and  a  Policy  Unit
was  established  in zhe  Prime  Minister's  Office  in  1974. The  bureaucracy,
however,  was  not fully  supportive  of this  initiative.  Nor  have academic
centers  or scholars  been  as active  in  policy  relevant  research  in the  U. K. as
their  counterparts  in the  U. S.  A.
Analysis.  Values.  and  Interests
The  weak  demand  for  policy  analysis  within  governments  is  only  in
part explained  by the  lack  of understanding  on the  part of the  policy-making
elites  (politicians,  bureaucrats,  etc.)  of the  utility  of  policy  analysis.
Their  indifference  to  policy  analysis  may  also  be due  in  part to the  poor
quality  of available  policy  analysis. The  problem  of  poor  understanding,  of
course,  can  be overcome  to a large  extent  through  the  education  of
policymakers  and their  sensitization  to the  benefits  of policymaking.  The
quality  problem,  on the  one  hand,  calls  for  the  upgradation  of the  analytical
and  communication  skills  of policy  advisers. It is  not  clear,  however,  that
the  demand  problem  facing  policy  analysis  will  I. adequately  resolved  through-9-
these  measures. Even  when  policymakers  are  instructed  in  the  use  of policy
analysis,  they  may  not  wish to let  the  choice  of options  te guided  by
analytical  inputs  in  certain  critical  cases. Analysis  may  reduce  the  area  of
igrorance  and  yet  may  be given  a  back seat  as other  more  weighty  factors  are
given  priority. The experierie  of  both developed  and  developing  countries  has
shown  that  while  policy  analysis  has  been  effectively  used  in the  context  of
relatively  small  policy  concerns,  it  has  been  much less  influential  in the
resolution  of  major  national  policy  problems. This  paradox  deserves  a  word  of
explanation.
In the  final  analysis,  all  policy  choices  are  political  choices.
Choices  tend  to affect  different  interest  groups  in  society  differently.
Their  perspectives  on  policy  issues  and  their  preferred  ways to deal  with  them
therefore  tend to  vary a great  deal. These  differences  in  turn  reflect  the
conflicts  in the  objectives  that  different  interest  groups  including
policymakers  would  like  to achieve  when faced  with  a policy  problem. Analysis
is  helpful  when  a consensus  on objectives  exists  or  when  routine  policy
problems  have to  be dealt  with.  When  grand  policy  problems  emerge  and
unusually  important  directional  changes  must  be navigated,  it is  unlikely  that
leaders  will leave  the  choices  to  be driven  by technical  analysis  alone. This
is  not to denigrate  the  usefulness  of  policy  analytic  insights,  but to
emphasize  that  large  policy  issues  are  matters  less  of-uncertainty  than  of
genuine  conflict  about  which  way to  go.  These  are  situations  where  intuition
tends  to take  over  and  analysis  is given  a subsidiary  role. To quote  Thomas
Schelling:- 10  -
"When  values  conflict,  analysis  cannot  resolve  them. Analysis  may
be good  at helping  an individual  choose  in the  light  of  his own
values. Analysis  may  be good  at  helping  like-minded  individuals
with  compatible  values  choose  the  best  means  of achieving  dommonly
held objectives.  But  when the  goal  is in dispute,  there  may  be
little  that  analysis  can  do.  True,  if compromise  is  desperately
needed  there  is  an 'integrative'  function  for  analysis:  sorting
out  those  compromfses  that  minimize  the  sacrifices  that  need to  be
made  by both sides. But there  are  disputes  in  which  the  partisans
would  rather  risk  all-to  win  all than  to compromise,  because  the
compromises  are  merely  intermediate  and  not  superior  points;  there
are  disputes  in  which  some  crucial  participants  prefer  non-
reconciliation  to any  compromise  that  might  resolve  the  issue;  and
there  are  even  disputes  that  are  most  readily  compromised  if  a
little  deception,  even  self-deception,  can  be enjoyed. Analysis
that  spotlights  the  points  in  dispute  can  even inhibit  the  process
by which  old  posit.ons  are  abandoned,  reversals  are  rationalized,
and  wishes  can  color  results." 8
Grand  policy  problems  in the  U. S.  A. pertaining  to  national
defense,  racial  integration,  drugs,  etc.,  are  cases  in  which  policy  analysis
has  not  made a  major  impact. Similarly,  good  policy  analysis  has  been  done  on
energy  alternatives  in  several  countries. Yet,  political  decisions  in  this
field  have seldom  been  affected  by the  careful  analysis  of  policy  options.
Policies  concerning  the  economic  role  of  expatriate/ethnic  minorities,
subsidies,  debt,  divestiture,  etc.,  are  issues  which  get  caught  in the
incompatibility  of the  beliefs  and  values  of the  participants  involved.
Analysis  can  be used,  for  example,  to  show  that  expatriate  investments  and
services  could  conrribute  more to the  growth  of a  country. In some  cases,
political  leaders  may  not  lack  the  knowledge  of the  costs  and  benefits
involved. Yet they  may  not  opt  for  what  appears  to  be a rational  choice
because  of a conflict  of interests  and  values. Analysis  can  shed  only  partial
8  Schelling;  oR.  ci$.  p. 22.- 11  -
light  on the  means  for  the  resolution  of the  inLompatibility  problem  and  the
generation  of imaginative  policy  alternatives  for  consideration  by the  key
actors  in  decision  making.
Technical  experts  in  policy  analysis  are  likely  to  highlight  the
"rational  choice"  dimension  of their  subject,  ignoring  the  problems  of  values
and  conflicts. In the  real  world,  however,  the  relevance  and  value  of
analysis  will  perhaps  be much  greater  when  viewed  as a  paradigm  of conflict.
The  type  of analysis  that  identifies  and  assesses  policy  options  need  not
necessarily  be the  kind that  can  resolve  or  win a  policy  conflict.9  This is
because  the  analysis  of the  interests  and  the  participants  in  a policy
conflict  may  be as important  as the  analysis  of the  issue. While in  principle
the  policy  analyst  can  be an impartial  advisor  who evaluates  alternative
policy  options  for  decisionmakers  to choose  from,  in reality  he or she  may  not
remain  a neutral  person,  but  may  use  analysis  to  understand  both the  issues
and  interests,  make  a choice  for  himself/herself  consistent  with  his/her
values,  and  act  as a participant  in the  dispute. In  such  cases,  policy
analysis  plays  the  role  of an instrument  in a  contest.
Multiple  Sources  of Analysis
The limits  to  policy  analysis  highlight  the  importance  of building
multiple  sourcqs  for  generating  such  analysis.  There  are  three  major
institutional  sources  which  are found  in  many  countries. These  are  in  house
9  IhLd,  p.  27.12 -
units  for  policy  analysis  within  government  agencies,  private  sector
associations  or foundations  as a source  of policy  analysis  or advice,  and
autonomous  centers  of policy  analysis. Since  government  is the  primary  user
of policy  analysis  and  advice,  it is customary  to give  priority  to the
building  of  policy  analytic  capacity  within  governments.  Special  attention  is
given,  for  example,  to the  creation  of  policy  analysis  units  in the  ministries
of finance  and  planning  which  deal  with  macroeconomic  problems. Training  in
policy  analysis  is often  given  to  staff  in  technical  or sector  ministries  to
improve  sector  policy  choices. Policymakers  in  these  ministries  are  provided
opportunities  to  understand  and  appreciate  the  usefulness  of  policy  analysis,
and  to  create  effective  demand  for  analysis. These  strategies  are  no doubt
valuable  in  enhancing  the  government's  role  as generator  and  user of  policy
analysis. To the  extent,  however,  that  conflicts  of  values  and  objectives
limit  the  receptivity  to  policy  analysis  and the  interplay  of interests  tend
to  bias the  types  of analysis  and  advice  sought  and  encouraged  in  unforeseen
ways,  there  is  a case  for  building  the  capacity  for  policy  analysis  outside
the  government  also.  Sources  of analysis  independent  of government  are  more
likely  to focus  on certain  incompatibilities  and  conflicts  than  "captive
analysts"  within  the  government. Interest  groups  not  well  represented  within
government  are  more inclined  to  undertake  policy  analysis  and  highlight
options  neglected  by the  government,  but  which  further  the.ir  cause. Multiple
perspectives  on  policy  analysis  *nd  options  are  thus  encouraged  in a
pluralistic  setting  leading  to  a more  balanced  assessment  of policy  problems
and the  choices  involved.- 13 .
Multiple  sources  of policy  analysis  deserve  support  for  yet
another  reason. Government  sponsored  policy  analysis  and  research  will
naturally  focus  on policy  issues  as defined  by the  sponsor. Governments
typically  think  of a problem  as something  to  be solved  and  disposed  of.
Problems,  it is  believed,  can  be solved  through  the  implementation  of policies
and  programs  which  have  a "pre-ordained  beginning,  middle  and  end."La  These
interventions  enable  the  government  to  engage  in  periodic  bursts  of  activity.
They  are,  however,  no  substitute  for  the  continuous  doctrinal  battle  required
within  the  political  system  to influence  the  speed  and  direction  of economic
and  social  change. The  grand  policy  problems  of poverty,  unemployment,
liberalization,  etc.  are  seldom  resolved  through  one-shot  programs. They  call
for  continuous  doctrinal  struggles,  challenges  and  reassessments  of issues  and
options  which  are  best left  to institutions  with a  mission  and the  needed
autonomy  to pursue  these  tasks. The  interdependence  of  policy  issues  and
interests  is a  major  argument  in  favor  of the  creation  of indigenous  capacity
for  policy  analysis  within  a  country. Analysts  who  have a stake  in their
society  and  who are  directly  affected  by the  developments  therein  are  better
placed  to engage  in  a  process  of continuous  questioning  and  analysis  than
external  advisors. They  will  have  greater  credibility  too  though  the  extent
to  which  an adversarial  or advocacy  role  vis-a-vis  the  government  is tolerated
will  vary from  one  'regime  to  another.
10  K. Hope-,  "Indicators  of the State  of Society,"  in M. Bulmer  (ed.),
Social  Policy  Research,  Macmillan,  London,  1978.- 14  -
Role  of the  Private  Sector
Organized  private  sector  groups  and  autonomous  academic
institutions  are  two  important  options  for  generating  alternative  policy
analysis  and  advice  outside  of the  government. In  many  countries,  private
sector  associations  play this  role  by creating  research  units  to  analyze
policy  problems  of interest  to their  constituents.  Chambers  of Commerce  and
manufacturer  assoeiations  in  some  countries  have  modest  policy  research  units
to  analyze  current  issues  and to inform  the  government  and  the  public  at
large.  In  some  cases,  such  associations  have set  up relatively  autonomous  and
broad-based  research  centers  to  promote  policy  analysis. In  all  cases,
however,  private  sector  sponsorship  will  have an inevitable  influence  on the
types  of issues  selected  for  analysis  and  the  options  considered  and  promoted.
The initiative  for  creating  autonomous  centers  for  policy  research
may  come from  a variety  of sources  such  as the  private  sector,  academic
groups,  the  public  sector  and  external  donors. Even  when a government
supports  or  sponsors  such  centers,  it is  considered  prudent  to minimize  their
dependence  on governmen.t  funds  so that  there  is no threat  to their  autonomy.
Endowments,  contract  earnings,  membership  fees  and  other  diversified  sources
of finarrce  are  sought  to encourage  genuine  policy  research  and  to reduce  the
risk  of the  centers  being  captured  by powerful  interest  groups. Unlike
private  sector  associations,  autonomous  centers  (also  called  arms-length
institutions  for  policy  analysis)  may  have  greater  success  in influencing
public  opinion  and  policy-making  groups  in  government  because  of their  lack  of
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ties  to  particular  interest  groups. Needless  to say  that  such  autonomous
institutions  for  policy  analysis  will flourish  only  in  countries  which
encourage  pluralism  and  where  policymakers  seek  multiple  and  critical
perspectives  on  major  policy  problems. In some  countries,  they  also  provide  a
base from  which  intellectuals  in  opposition  parties  can function  when they  are
out  of  power.
II.  The  Timing  of  Capacity  Building  Interventions
The Importance  of  ;ountrv  Contexts
The analysis  and  design  of  public  policy  are  the  pre-eminent  tasks
of Government. Strengthening  policy  analytic  capacity,  therefore,  entails  the
development  of the  necessary  skills  and  the  resources  and  organizational
support  to sustain  them  within  government.  If  policy  analytic  capacity
exists  in  proximity  to  policymakers  and  there  is  continuing  interaction
between  the latter  and  their  policy  analysts,  the  chances  are that  analysis
and  advice  will  be better  utilized  by governments  (e.g.,  for  macroeconomic
management  or sectoral  policy  decisions).  Accessibility  and  confidentiality
(partly  because  of the  nature  of the  data involved)  are  important  reasons  why
policy  analysis  as an on-going  function  is  usually  internalized  within  -
government. In  many  countries,  therefore,  measures  to  strengthen  policy
analytic  capacity  are initiated  by and  focused  on governments.  -Donors  have
invariably  supported  such  efforts  in  a number  of  developing  countries.- 16.-
In reality,  however,  the  strategies  for  developing  policy  analytic
capacity  may  vary  depending  on country  contexts  and  characteristics.  In
countries  with a fairly  stable  and  competent  civil  service  and  a willingness
and ability  to attract  and  utilize  skilled  manpower,  direct  interventions  to
create  policy  analytic  capacity  within  government  tend  to  yield  satisfactory
results. This indeed  has  been  the  experience  of  countries  like  India,
Pakistan,  and  South  Korea  over  the  past  three  decades. In  countries  with a
less  developed  civil  service  system  and  relatively  unfavorable  conditions  for
retaining  skilled  manpower  in the  public  sector,  measures  to strengthen  policy
analytic  capacity  within  governments  are  unlikely  to  make  a  major  impact
except  over a  very long  period  and  when systemic  reforms  are  effected. Here
is  a case for  indirect  interventions  such  as augmenting  the  supply  of  policy
analytic  Uls  from  outside  sources  to government  and  encouraging  the  latter
to  utilize  such  capacity  in the  short  and  medium  term. This  situation  is
typical  of  many Sub-Saharan  African  countries  and  countries  like  Indonesia  in
Asia.  External  consultants,  technical  assistance  to  ministries,  and  to some
extent  good local  institutions  outside  of government  could  play  a modest  gap
filling  role in  a context  where  government  capacity  remains  weak  and the
internalization  of the  policy  analytic  function  continues  to  be a slow
process.
Then there  are  countries  which  have the  skilled  manpower  for
policy  analysis,  hut  the  political  system  discourages  stability  in  .the  civil
service  and renders  the  institutionalization  of  policy  analytic  skills  within
government  extremely  difficult. For  example,  if  a critical  mass  of civil- 17 -
servants  move in  and  out  of governments  along  with  their  political  masters,
continuity  will  be a problem  in  the  bureaucracy. To the  extent  policymakers
are  receptive,  it is  possible  for  autonomous  or semi-autonomous  indigenous
policy  research  centers  to compensate  for  this  gap.  Such  centers  could
undertake  policy  analytic  work to  stimulate  public  debates  or at the  request
of governments  to  provide  advice  to  ministers  and  other  policymakers  on a
regular  basis. When the  conditions  for  strengthening  governmental  capacity
for  policy  analysis  do  not  obtain,  second  best solutions  and  adaptations  of
this  kind  may  have  to  be resorted  to.  This  has  happened  in  Latin  American
countries  and to  some  extent  in a few  Asian  countries,  but  much less  in
Africa.
There  can  be many  shades  in  between  these  three  types  of
interventions.  The  point,  however,  is  that  countries  differ  in the  kinds  of
gaps they  face in  terms  of  policy  analytic  capacity  and  in the  factors
underlying  these  gaps. The strategies  for  strengthening  their  policy  analytic
capacities,  therefore,  need  to  be tailored  to fit  the  national  contexts.
Direct  interventions  to institutionalize  policy  analytic  skills  within
governments  may  not  be feasible  or appropriate  under  certain  conditions. In
such  cases,  search  for  alternative  approaches  will  be entirely  in  order  even
though  it  would  appear  as if  capacity  building  within  government  is  being
neglected.- 18 -
Supply  of Policy  Analytic  Skills
Successful  capacity  building  for  policy  analysis  requires  a
matching  of the  supply  of and  demand  for  policy  analytic  skills  within  the
country. It is  possible,  for instance,  to invest  in the  training  and
development  of personnel  for  policy  analysis  for  a government  as indeed
international  donors  have  done in  some  cases. The  utilization  of such trained
personnel  and  their  impact  on policymaking,  however,  may remain  negligible
simply  because  there  is  no effective  demand  for  their  skills  from  government.
On the  other  hand,  in recent  years,  some  governments  have sought  policy
analysis  and  advice  (often  in the  face  of severe  economic  crises  and  at the
instance  of external  donors)  only  to find  that  the  requisite  competence  is  not
available  locally. Both  are  examples  of a mismatch  of demand  and  supply
conditions  and  highlight  the  need for  attending  to  both factors  as part  of a
capacity building strategy.  -
The  supply  of policy  analysis  is likely  to  be influenced  by three
factors. First  of all,  the  facilities  for  the  training  and  development  of
policy  analysts  should  be adequate  and  of an acceptable  quality  so that  the
required  manpower  is available  to  respond  to the  demand  for  policy  analytic
work.  In the  absence  of indigenous  facilities,  it is  possible  to  bridge  the
gap  through  training  abroad  which  is  one  of the  major  uses of technical
assistance.  This,  of course,  is  an expensive  alternative  and  is difficult  to
sustain  in the  long  run. Hence,  the  importance  of strengthening  the  local
higher  education  and  secondary  school  (if  necessary)  systems  and  in  particular- 19  -
the  teaching  of core  subjects  such  as  economics  which  are  relevant  to the
training  of policy  analysts. Second,  clusters  of trained  personnel  are
required  to provide  good  policy  analysis  on a sustained  basis. Team  work  and
interaction  within  groups  are  essential  for  grappling  with complex  policy
issues. This  underscores  the  need  for  a  minimum  scale  of operation  (size)  on
the  supply  side  and the  importance  of adequate  institutional  arrangements  to
ensure  it irrespective  of  whether  policy  analysis  is done  within  government  or
without. This is  not  to say  that  individual  policy  analysts  have  no role  to
play.  The  point  is that  in  addition  to technical  competence,  there  is  an
obvious  need for  a minimum  of institutional  memory,  infrastructure,  reasonable
compensation  systems,  and  continuity.  Third,  the  supply  of  policy  analysis  is
certainly  influenced  by the  demand  for  it. An environment  which  seeks  and
encourages  policy  advice  will  attract  and  retain  better  people  for  policy
analysi"i.  One  should  not,  however,  conclude  from  this  that  demand  will  create
its  own  supply! Improvements  in  higher  education  and  the  creation  of  policy
analysis  clusters  and  their  institutionalization  call  for  deliberate  and
strategic  interventions.  The demand  factor  will  certainly  facilitate  the
process,  but  need  not necessarily  trigger  the  actions  required  except  over  a
very long  period.
The  Demand  Factor
The factors  influencing  the  demand  for  policy  analysis  are
relatively  more  complex  and  difficult  to  manipulate. The  role  of economic  and
financial  crises  as a demand  augmenting  factor  htas  already  been  noted. But- 20 -
the  risk  is that  the  demand  might  vanisk  when the  crisis  is  over. There  is
clearly  a need to  go beyond  such  transient  phenomena  in  search  of factors
capable  of creating  sustained  demand  for  policy  analysis.
Probably  the  most  critical  factor  on the  demand  side is  the
receptivity  of the  political  regime  to  external  advice  and  its  willingness  to
take  key  decisions  aided  by policy  analysis. Where  the  political  leadership
is reluctant  to  consider  policy  options  or to  drati  upon  technical  expertise  to
improve  its  decisions,  the  demand  for  policy  analysis  will remain  weak.  An
open  and  pluralistic  society,  as noted  above,  is  more likely  to  encourage  the
use of  policy  analysis  although  ignorance  and  indifference  on the  part  of the
political  leaders  in such  societies  may  limit  its  scope. On the  other  hand,
even  a less  open  and  dictatorial  regime  may  create  demand.  for  policy  analysis
because  the  leadership  seeks  and  utilizes  it.  The  key issue  then  is  whether
the  top  policymakers  are  inclined  to  be  willing  clients  for  policy  analysis.
Second,  the  utilization  of  policy  analysis  and  hence  the  demand  for it in
government  will  be aided  by the  presence  of senior  civil  servants  or
technocrats  who understand  and  encourage  policy  analysts  and  mediate  between
political  leaders  and  specialists.  Policy  analysis  units  and  their  trained
personnel  sometimes  remain  underutilized  within  governments  because  of the
absence  of such  mediators  and  catalysts. Even  when the  political  regime  is
supportive  of the  use  of  policy  analysis,  the "technocratic  intermediary"  is a
factor  which  in its  own  right  can  influence  effective  demand. The  existence
of a critical  mass  of these  intermediaries  reinforced  by a receptive  political
leadership  is  a propitious  condition  for  the  utilization  of policy  analysis.0  - 21-
They  may  also  play  a useful  role  in sensitizing  politicians  to the  utility  of
policy  analysis  and interpreting  the  results  of analysis  to them. Third,  the
presence  of an informed  and  questioning  public  is  a positive  influence  on the
demand  for  poiicy  analysis. Apart  from  the  government,  it is the  academic
community,  the  press,  the  political  opposition  and  organized  private  sector
groups  which  could  stimulate  policy  debates  in  a society  and  create  the  demand
for  policy  analysis  in the  process. These  interest  groups  can  act  as
alternative  sources  of demand  for  policy  analysis  even  when the  government  is
not  an active  source. They  can  play  this  role,  however,  only  under  political
regimes  that  tolerate  if  not  encourage  their  participation.
Ideally,  capacity  building  for  policy  analysis  in  a country  should
be initiated  only  when there  is  evidence  that  the  factors  influencing  demand
and  supply  are in  reasonable  balance. It is seldom,  however,  that  a perfect
demand-supply  match  will emerge  inma  real  world  situation. Demand  conditions
certainly  are  more  unpredictable  and  difficult  to  plan.  The  creation  of
suitable  conditions  for  the  supply  of policy  analysis  are  somewhat  more
amenable  to  planning,  but  will  take  time  to  fructify. If the  prospects  for
the  political  tolerance  to  policy  analysis  are  reasonably  bright  in  a country,
there  is  a case  for  initiating  action  to strengthen  the  stpply  side  in
anticipation  of demand  emerging  with  a lag. Donors  with  a long-term  record  of
capacity  building  in the  developing  world  confirm  the  value  of "anticipatory
action,"  and  believe  that  willingness  to  stay  on and  support  capacity  buildingE  - 22-
efforts  in spite  of  vicissitudes  of demand  is  an important  precondition  for
effectiveness.
III. The  Lessons  of Donor  Experience
The  three  different,  but  complementary  institutional  alternatives
for  generating  policy  analysis  outlined  above  (government,  private  sector
organizations  and  autonomous  centers)  exist  in  varying  degrees  in the
developing  world. Their  effectiveness  and  their  capacity  to survive  and  grow
have  been significantly  lower  in  some  countries  than  others. The  political
turmoil  and  economic  decline  which  have  plagued  much of Sub-Saharan  Africa  in
recent  decades,  for  example,  have  weakened  the  limited  capacities  for  policy
analysis  which  existed  in  parts  of that.region.  Consequently,  institution&l
disruption  in  this  field  has  been  more  severe  in  Africa  than  in  other  regions
of the  developing  world. A review  of the  Asian,  Latin  American  and  African
experiences  in capacity  building  and  the  lessons  learned  by bilateral  donors
and  private  foundations  in  the  process  leads  to  the  following  conclusions:
1.  Political  Factors  Inhibiting  Demand  and  Capacity  Building
Political  instability,  lack  of demand  from  government  sources  for
policy  analysis,  and  a  weak and  unstable  bureaucracy  were  well  known  features
(in  varying  degrees)  of several  Latin  American  countries,  and  some  Asian
countries  like  Indonesia.  Military  governments  and/dictatorships  have  been  a
feature  of several  Asian  and  Latin  American  countries  (e.g.,  Pakistan,- 23 -
Indonesia,  Korea  and  the  Philippines  in  Asia,  and  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,
etc.,  in Latin  America). The  political  changes  and instability  that  have
marked  recent  history  in several  of these  countries  made  the
institutionalization  of  policy  analytic  capacity  within  governments  a
difficult  and  slow  process. In general,  the  preoccupation  with  national
security  concerns  and intolerance  of opposition  were  not  conducive  to capacity
building  in  most  of these  countries  though  in  some  cases  the  creation  of arm's
length  policy  analysis  centers  was supported  or tolerated  by governments.  In
general,  however,  sovereignty  required  not only  that  policy  be determined  by
national  leaders  but that  the  apparatus  of government  be kept  or  brought  into
indigenous  hands  and that  national  or indigenous  control  be established  over
those  parts  of the  economy  felt  to  be essential  to  national  sovereignty  and
dignity. Development  policy  and  receptivity  to  advice  have thus  been  subject
to powerful  constraints  by concerns  over  autonomy  and  fears  of  exteinal
influence  and  control. The search  for  and  commitment  to the  creation  of
capacities  for  policy  analysis  have  been subject  to  prior  conditions  from
these  concerns. Replacement  of  expatriates  and  extensions  of national  control
thus  were  requisites  of "development"  quite  independent  of their  significance
for  economic  growth. In spite  of these  problems,  notable  progress  was  made in
several  Asian  and  Latin  American  countries  to  build  policy  analytic  capacity
both  within  governments  and  outside.
In Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  demand  for  policy  research  and  advice
continues  to  be weak  and  unstable  in the  political  context  of the  region.
Government,  donors  and  the  private  sector  are  the  three  major  categories  of- 24 -
clients  for  policy  analysis. The  private  sector  as a client  and  source  of
support  (industry  groups,  development  professionals,  opposition  parties  and
interest  groups,  etc.)  is  virtually  undeveloped  or unable  to  be active  in  most
countries. Governments,  which  operate  in  a difficult  and  mostly  politically
authoritarian  environment,  have seldom  been  active  on the  demand  side.
Furthermore,  the  uncertain  political  climate  in  many  countries  has encouraged
economic  researchers  to  avoid  controversial  macro  policy  reform  issues  and  to
concentrate  on  micro-level  problems. Of the  three,  it is  donors,  and  the
international  lending  agencies  in  particular,  which  have stepped  up the  demand
for  policy  analysis  in  most countries. Since  some  of them  are  also involved
in setting  the  research  agenda  and  hiring  consultants  (often  expatriates)  for
the  government,  this  process  promotes  a form  of international  production  and
consumption  of  policy  analysis,  often  bypassing  government  agencies  and  other
potential  local  providers  of research  in the  country  concerned. Where  donors
have  worked  closely  with  governments  or local  professionals  and  used their
limited  capacities  for  collaborative  policy  analysis,  there  is some  evidence
of demand  and  capacity  being  developed,  albeit  slowly. Government's  demand
for  and involvement  in  policy  work in  several  cases  could  thus  be traced  to
the  influence  of donors.
2.  Constraints  on the  Supplv  of Skills
The  supply  of  well-trained  economists  was  a  major  problem  in  Latin
America,  Indonesia  and  Korea. Only three  decades  ago,  university  standards  in
most  Latin  countries  were  considered  to  be extremely  low. Korea  had only  six- 25 -
western  trained  Ph.Ds.  in  economics  in  1969  and  Indonesia  had  hardly  any  at
the  time  of independence.  Even  under  authoritarian  regimes,  however,  these
countries  invested  in the  training  of economists  and  other  professionals.  As
a result,  the  supply  of  professional  skills  has increased  significantly  over
the  past  two  decades  in  countries  such  as  Korea,  India,  Pakistan  and  the
Philippines.  In spite  of the  instability  and  uncertain  legitimacy  of Latin
American  governments  at the  beginning  of the  sixties  and  their  poor  equipment
for  the  tasks  of  policymaking  and  development  as noted  above,  the  efforts  of
recent  decades  have  brought  notable  increases  in  professional  competence,  both
within  and  outside  these  governments,  amid  many  continuing  deficiencies.  The
growth  of  professional  economic  competence  for  policymaking  has  been
particularly  notable  and  has  been much  dependent  on training  abroad,  and in
some  countries  through  tha  rise  of strong  research  and  graduate-level  training
centers.
The  emergence  and  usefulness  of these  centers  in  Latin  America
have  depended  on a number  of  conditions: (1)  the  relative  openness  and
fluidity  of governments;  (2)  private  sectors  strong  enough  to  provide  support
for  both training  and  research  activities;  (3)  the  growth  of a cadre  of
economists  and  other  social  scientists  to  provide  the  necessary  talent,
combined  with (4)  a tolerance  for  social  science  publication  of considerable
critical  diversity;  and (5)  substantial  international  support,  both financial
and intellectual,  coming  from  diverse  sources  (Sweden,  Canada,  the
Netherlands,  etc.,  as  well as from  the  United  States). In addition  to their'
contributions  through  research,  policy  analysis,  public  debate,  and training,26 -
these  institutions  have  provided  reservoirs  of talent  which  have from  time  to
time  been  brought  into  public  service. Their  flourishing  has in  turn  been
dependent  on strong  national  economic  growth,  the  continuing  rise  of
educational  levels,  and  professional  competencies  in government  and  elsewhere.
Skill  constraints  continue  to  be severe  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
though  some  of the  African  universities  were ahead  of simi'.ar  institutions  in
Asia and  Latin  America  in the  sixties. The  most important  among  these
constraints  is  the  limited  supply  of  well-trained  macro-economists  in  the
region. Talented  individuals  do exist  in several  countries. Within  the
profession,  the  supply  of agricult'xral  economists  is  somewhat  better  than  that
of macro-economists.  This,  in  part,  reflects  the  greater  attention  donors  and
governments  had  given  in  earlier  years  to sector  related  as against  macro-
economic  issues. The  preoccupation  with  macro  level  issues  is  relatively
recent  for  many  donors  as well  as governments.  There  is  a sudden  burst  of
demand  for  macro-economic  analysis  in several  countries,  but  without  a
matching  supply  of competent  persons  to  work in this  area.  Donors  who are
presently  supporting  macro-economic  work  do not  provide  any  core  funding  for
institutions  engaged  in  economics  teaching  and  research. The supply  problem
is further  exacerbated  by the  bureaucratic  and  organizational  constraints  on
the  working  of institutions  engaged  in economics  teaching  and  research. Our
review  of donor  experiences  confirms  that  the  physical  deterioration  of their
facilities  and  equipment,  and  inefficiencies  in the  management  of funds  and
services  such  as accounting  have  made  it difficult  for  the  staff  to carry  out
their  normal  duties  satisfactorily.  Some  donors  have  proceeded  to  bypass- 27 -
these  barriers  by directly  providing  such  services  to those  engaged  in their
research  projects.
3.  Autonomous  Policy  Research  Centers  as a  Relatively  Recent  Phenomenon
Several  arm's  length  policy  research  centers  have  been established
in  Asia and  Latin  America  over  the  past  30  years. Demand  for  their  services
have moved  up and  down in  many Latin  American  countries. But  some  of them
(e.g.,  Chile,  Argentina  and  Brazil)  had  private  (non-governmental)  sectors
which  provided  alternative  sources  of  support  and  a diversity  of clientele.
The  need to  supplement  analysis  of  policy  issues  in  operating  ministries  by
research  from  other  sources  has  been almost  universally  recognized,  and  has
grown  with  understanding  of the  complexity  of development  problems  and  of
current  economic  management. Such  research  has  been sought  in  various
arrangements,  some  closely  integrated  with  government  and some  more  clearly
independent..  The forms  have  depended  on such  contextual  factors  as the  extent
of the  private  sector,  the  tolerance  of government  for  independent
institutions,  the  stability  of universities,  and  the  extent  of international
assistance. In general,  the  private  sector  has  been  more  active  in  sponsoring
and  supporting  such  research  in  Latin  America  than  in  Asia.
The  effective  utilization  of outside  research  and  policy  analysis
by government  has depended  upon several  conditions: (a)  The  capacity  and
readiness  of civil  servants  to  use  ideas  and  analysis  generated  elsewhere.
Much  potentially  useful  work  has  been ignored,  neglected  or rejected. An28 -
effective  research  institute  needs  counterparts  who  understand  and  value  its
work.  (b)  Some  autonomy  or approach  to an "arms-length"  relationship  between
research  institutes  and  operating  ministries  is  needed. It  has  been achieved
in  quite  authoritarian  settings  where  personal  leadership  by trusted  and
respected  figures  existed,  and  where  diversified  funding  and  active  linkages
to international  agencies  and  professionals  reinforced  the  autonomy  and
quality  of work of institutes.  As in any  field  of intellectual  endeavor,  the
maintenance  of  quality  depends  importantly  on international  standards  and
stimulation,  which  may  be expected  to  be particularly  important  for  small
countries. (c)  A vigorous  private  sector  can  be very  helpful  though  it  may
render  the  retention  of research  staff  more difficult. But  there  have  been
instances  in  Asia  where  this  has  not  been  critically  important.
Full-scale  universities  largely  devoted  to undergraduate
instruction  have  been  less  propitious  settings  for  policy  research  and
advanced  training  than  more  selective  institutions  emphasizing  graduate
training. Instances  are  El Colegio  de  Mexico,  the  Vargas  Foundation  in
Brazil,  the  institutes  of management  in India  and the  Philippines. There  are,
however,  examples  of effective  developments  within  major  universities,  given
strong  leadership  and support  from  both domestic  and  international  sources
(the  Instituto  de Pesquisas  Economicas  (PE)  at the  University  of Sao  Paulo,
the  School  of Economics  in the  University  of the  Philippines).
Fewer  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  have arm's  length  (autonomous)
policy  analysis  centers  whose  advice  is sought  by governments.  Nigeria,  Ivory  -29 -
Coast,  and  Kenya  are  examples  of  countries  which  have such  centers. The
extent  to  which  they  are  utilized  by governments  varies  a  great  deal.  Even
when set  up as arm's  length  centers,  they  may  be dependent  on governments  for
their  core  financing. This  clearly  sets  limits  to their  autonomy.
University-based  centers  for  policy  analysis  are  even  more rare  in  Africa.
The  Economic  Research  Bureau  of the  University  of Dar-es-Salaam  in  Tanzania  is
one  of the  few  in this  category  and  is  known  for  its  active  advisory  role in
relation  to the  government.  That there  is  no strong  private  sector  in  most  of
the  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  is  probably  one  of the  reasons  for  the
limited  number  and  quality  of their  arm's  length  institutions.  Diverse
sources  of sponsorship  and  finance  are  hard to  come  by.  In this  regard,
Africa  is  closer  to  Indonesia  which  also  did  not  have  the  benefit  of a
supportive  private  sector. Policy  related  capacity  building  in Indonesia  has
been mostly  within  government,  often  at the  cost  of arm's  length  institutions
(universities,  for  example).
4.  External  Assistance  and  Sustainability
External  assistance  has  played  a  critical  role  in  the  capacity
building  for  policy  analysis  in the  developing  world. The  beginnings  of  most
of the  institutions  reviewed  in-the  appendices  to this  paper  or the  training
of the  professionals  to  staff  them  have  been  dependent  on external  aid.  In
many instances,  there  has  been  rapid  progress  away  from  dependence  on external
financial  support. In  other  cases  much  more  protracted  dependence  on such
support  has existed  or new  needs  have  arisen  because  of  political  conditions30-
and instabilities.  Countries  like  Indonesia  that  began  with  very thin  cadres
of  professionally  trained  talent  have felt  the  need for  lang  support. In
Latin  America,  many of the  private  and independent  research  institutes  have
had long  struggles  in finding  adequate  local  support,  particularly  if they
took  critical  views  of  prevailing  government  policy  and  embraced  fields  other
t0-n  economics. Argentina  and  Chile  have shown  such  conditions  in recent
years.
Important  as external  financial  support  has  been,  it  may  be more
readily  reduced  than  the  international  professional  contacts  which  it
initially  fostered,  and  which  are  often  difficult  to  maintain  without  it.  The
importance  of these  contacts  in  the  development  of most  of the  Asian  and  Latin
American  institutions  we have  surveyed  cannot  be overemphasized  and  the
influence  of overseas  training  has  been  very great. The  phasing  of
development  assistance  is  always  subject  to  uncertainties  and  criticisms  of
inducing  protracted  dependency  are  familiar. But  at least  for  the  high
quality  performance  of research  institutes  it  would  appear  that  long-term
capacity  to  maintain  international  professional  relations  is  needed,  and  that
it  readily  cannot  be sustained  with local  resources  alone. There  have
sometimes  been  doubts  about  the  consequences  of these  relationships  in
promoting  brain.  drain  or excessive  attention  to international  audiences  at the
expense  of local  relevance.
Whatever  the  level  and  extent  of external  assistance,  it  has
typically  been found  that  there  is  a serious  problem  of sustaining  the  staffs- 31 -
of institutions  that  are  the  targets  of effort. In sope  of the  Asian
countries,  some  donors  were repeatedly  distressed  at the  continuing  need to
train  new  generations  of  professionals.  A similar  instability  has  marked  the
staffing  of Latin  American  institutions,  either  because  of departures  to
international  organizations  or to other  positions  in  Latin  America. In some
other  places  (Korea,  Indonesia)  the  problems  of replacement  seem  to  have  been
less  serious,  but there  was  a growing  realization  that  substantially  larger
numbers  of  people  must  be trained  than  the  scale  of the  relevant  institutions
would  suggest. Much of the  early  effort  in  counterpart  training  through
technical  assistance  was frustrated  by rotation  and  instability,  as  have
carefully  tailored  programs  of academic  and  professional  training. The
retention  of good  professionals  is  much  helped  by national  progress  and
incentives  (as  Korean  and  Brazilian  experiences  have shown)  and  one  must
expect  the  challenge  to  be pa-  ticularly  severe  where  there  is  economic
stagnation  or deterioration.  The latter  has clearly  been  a major  barrier-to
the  retention  of  high quality  professionals  in government  in  many  African
countries.
5.  Lessons  for  Developing  Countries
The  Asian  and  Latin  American  approaches  to coping  with the  task  of
capacity  building  for  policy  analysis  have several  other  lessons  for  all
developing  countries.- 32 -
(a)  Small  numbers  of competent  econ.omists  and  other  professionals  can
make  major  differences  in the  quality  of economic  policy
formulation. Even  small  countries  can  afford  to assemble  the
requisite  nuiters  of such professionals.  Problems  of  brain  drain
and  turnover  mean that  numbers  of  highly  trained  professionals  in
excess  of a feasible  minimum  are  required. Planning  for  some
wastage  and  turnover  of trained  personnel  is in  order.  In  order
to develop  competent  professionals,  overseas  training  is  often
needed  and  most  certainly  in  the  initial  stages  of capacity
building.
(b)  Consider&ble  investment  in the  training  of economists  (abroad)  and
other  professionals  was  made for  long  periods  by Asian  and  Latin
American  countries. Malaysia,  Korea,  Pakistan,  Indonesia  and
India  in  Asia,  and  Brazil,  Mexico  and  Chile  in Latin  America  have
had continuing  programs  for  training  a  variety  of  professionals
abroad  as  well as in local  institutions.  Some  of the  more
successful  among  the  trainees  have since  headed  policy  advisory
services  within  their  governments  or  have  become  leaders  of
autonomous  policy  research  centers.
(c)  A large  array  of specialized  skills,  in  economics  and  other
fields,  is  needed  for  sound  development.  Such  competencies  have
been  only  slowly  acquired  and  it  has  not  been easy  to incorporate
them  effectively  in  public  services  that  have  been  slow  to reward- 33  -
them  satisfactorily.  In this  context,  many countries  have found
it  useful  to establish  autonomous  (arm's  length)  centers  and  to
provide  incentives  to attract  and  retain  well  trained
professionals  on their  staff. For  a long  time,  many  Korean  Ph.Ds
did  not return  to their  homeland  after  training  in the  U. S.  It
was the  establishment  of the  Korean  Development  Institute  (KDI)  in
1971  and its  favorable  environment  that  attracted  the  first  set  of
economists  back.  There  are  many  similar  examples  in India,  the
Philippines,  Pakistan  and  Latin  America.
(d)  Long term  twinning  arrangements  were  extensively  used  for  capacity
building  in  both government  and  arm's  length  institutions.  The
Indonesian  Government  has  had a  continuing  relationship  with the
Harvard  Institute  of International  Development  (HIID). Several
Indian  institutes  have  had long  term  twinning  arrangements.  KDI
was  assisted  by HIID  for  several  years. The  point  is that
capacity  building  was  viewed  as a long  term  effort  with a good
deal  of continuity  and  intensive  supervision  by collaborators
built into  the  process.
(e)  The  experience  of  many developing  countries  shows  that  there  will
be ups and  downs  in the  effectiveness  of any  efforts  to  strengthen
the  capacity  for  policy  analysis  and  management. Institutions
that  were influential  in  one  period  suffer  decline  in  others.
Governments  and  donors  should  not  discouraged  if  restoration  and34 -
renewal  are  regularly  needed.
(f)  The international  donor  community  has  at its  disposal  a broad
spectrum  of instruments  which  can  be brought  to  bear to improve
and sustain  policy  analysis  institutions.  Donor  coordination  is
needed,  however,  to ensure  that  each  agency  uses  effectively  its
own  comparative  advantage  and  that  donor  activities  do not  operate
at cross  purposes. Pooling  of resources  also  promotes
intellectual  pluralism  within  the  recipient  institution.
Conditions  for  Success
The  experience  of  multilateral  and  bilateral  donors  and  private
foundations  in  the  developing world  also  highlight  important  lessons  and
conditions  for  success  which  would  be useful  in  planning  future  strategies  for
policy  analytic  capacity  building.
1)  Long-term  coordinated  commitments  by the  donor  and  rec!pient  are
crucial. The  required  support  may  well  have  to be stretched  over  decades.
Successful  long-term  initiatives  often  take  the  form  of quasi-permanent
twinning  arrangements  through  the  medium  of the'  donor  to  create  institutional
linkages,  trust  and  stability.
2)  While  professional  commitment  on the  part  of the  staff  is
important,  incentives  can  be a  major  reinforcement  to attract  and  retain  them.-35 . ,
There  are  several  examples  of the  use  of incentives  (e.g.,  salaries,
consulting  income,  good  housing,  better  work  environment)  in  arm's  length
institutions.  The  device  of semi-autonomous  institutions  has  been found  to
facilitate  this  process.
3)  Stimulation  of the  demand  for  policy  analysis  should  be a  part of
the  program  of institutional  development.  Grants  for  policy  research  within
ministries  and  other  key  public  agencies,  seminars  to  disseminate  findings  of
research  in  which  government  officials  and  political  leaders  are  invited  to
participate  and  aid  projects  with  built  in  policy  analysis  and  evaluation
components  which  will  stimulate  government  agencies  to seek  research  inputs
from  scholars  and  consultants  are  mechanisms  for  mobilizing  the  demand  for
policy  analysis. This is  clearly  a long-term  effort;  one  should  not  be
disappointed  if the  response  is  slow  and short-term  policy  impact  is limited.
4)  Foreign  technical  assistance  to  advise  on government  policy
remains  essential. It  should  be used  to improve  the  policy-making  process  and
not to  make  policy  (though  the  latter  may  be justified  in some  cases).
Technical  assistance  seems  to  have  worked  better  when it is  part  of a twinning
arrangement. The twinning  route,  however,  is  more appropriate  in  the initial
phase  of an institution's  development,  but  may slow  down  the  volume  and  pace
of technical  assistance  to the  recipient  countries. This  may  well  be the
optimal  course  to  follow.-36-'
*)  Donor  impact  has  been greater  when their  resources  have  been
concentrated  on a small  number  of institutions.  It is only  countries  with  a
reasonably  developed  private  sector  (with  non-governmental  clientele  and
sources  of support)  that  can  sustai1h  arm's  length  centers  of excellence  in
policy  analysis. This  may  make it difficult  for  the  very small  countries  to
establish  their  own  arm's  length  centers. Some  of the  centers  in  the  larger
countries  could  play  a regional  role  even  if they  are  de iL3e  national
institutions.  I
Looking  Ahead:  Strategic  Options
The strategies  for  developing  indigenous  capacity  for  policy  analysis
will  naturally  vary from  one  country  to  another. The  reviews  of the
experiences  of different  regions  summarized  above,  however,  signal  the  major
options  which  merit  the  attention  of developing  countries  as they  plan their
future  strategies.
1)  In countries  where  non-governmental  clientele  and  sources  of
support  are  limited,  but government  is interested,  the  initial  focus  should  be
on strengthening  policy  analytic  capacity  within  government.  This,  however,
is unlikely  to  be achieved  through  ad  hoc technical  assistance.  A more  viable
alternative  is to go for  long-term  twinning  arrangements  which  incorporate
technical  assistance  with suitable  external  organizations  especially  in the
early  phase  of development.- 37  -
2)  In  countries  where  there  is  evidence  of demand  for  policy  analysis
in government  and in the  private  sector,  the  time  may  be ripe  for  establishing
arm's  length  centers  for  policy  analvsis. Even  when the  government  demand  for
policy  advice  is  weak,  if  private  sector  interest  is strong,  arm's  length
centers  could  be set  up under  private  auspices. Some  of these  centers  should
play  a regional  role  too  in  relation  to the  smaller  countries  in the  region.
A developed  private  sector  signifies  the  existence  of  multiple  clientele  and
sources  of support. Even  if  government  demand  falls,  other  clients  may
continue  to sustain  such  centers.
3)  If,  on the  other  hand,  the  time  is  not  ripe  for  the  creation  of
autonomous  or arm's  length  centers,  policy  analysis  units  could  be set  up
under  the  auspices  of  private  sector  associations.  As noted  earlier,  they  are
likely  to  be influenced  by the  perspectives  and  priorities  of their  sponsors.
Nevertheless,  they  could  play a  useful  role  in generating  and  articulating
other  policy  options  which  tend  to  be ignored  when government  is  the  only
source  and  client  of policy  analysis.
4)  In countries  where  the  private  sector  is  weak,  it  may  be in order
to create  some  local  capacity  for  policy  analysis  through  a diversification  of
other  academic  institutions  which  have  close  links  with government.  In the
Francophone  African  countries,  the  Regional  Schools  of Statistics  and
Economics  are  suitable  candidates  for  such  diversification.  In  other
countries,  selected  management  institutes  or university  economics  departments
could  be strengthened  in the  field  of policy  analysis. Though  these-38-
institutions  are  often  fully  funded  by the  state,  they  are  one  step  removed
from  the  captive  status  of the  in  house  units  of ministries. In general,  they
tend  to  be somewhat  less  subject  to  political  interference.  These
institutions  may also  make a  positive  impact  on the  supply  side  through  the
training  of economists  or  other  related  specialists.- 39 -
APPENDIX  A
ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN  EXPERIENCES
Introduction
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to review  the  experiences  of  Asian
and  Lati...  American  governments  in training  cadres  cf skilled  policy  analysts,
particularly  economists,  and in  building  institutions  capable  of providing
sophisticated  policy  analysis  and  advice. It  emphasizes  in  particular  the
experience  of the  Ford  Foundation  in  this  regard  and  highlights  the
development  of  both individual  competencies  and  ij'stitutional  strengths  in
countries  such  as  Korea,  Indonesia,  Pakistan,  India,  Brazil  and  Mexico. It
discusses  the  emergence  of analytical  capabilities  wit',in  governments,  arms-
length  institutions  such  as  universities  or independent  research  centers  and
within  management  institutes  that  serve  primarily  the  private  sector.
After  reviewing  the  Asian  and  Latin  American  contexts  in  parts  1
and 2, in  part 3 the  study  describes  particular  programs  and institutions  and
part  4 analyzes  the  role  of external  assistance.  The last  section  sets  forth
in  summary  form  the  major  conclusions  derived  from  the  Asian  and  Latin
American  experiences.
In  any  society,  policy  is  made  at many  levels  and in  many types  of
organizations.  We are  here  particularly  concerned  with  national  policies  of
the  broader  sorts,  and  particularly  with economic  and  development  policies.40 -
We must therefore  be concerned  with  the  nature  of the  institution  that  bears
these  responsibilities,  viz.  with the  national  government. Effective  policy
formation  by a  national  government  evidently  depends  on a nation's  political
coherence  and  stability,  the  leadership  and  the  competence  it  possesses. Not
much can  legitimately  be done  by outsiders  about  qualities  of leadership,
stability,  and  political  coherence,  especially  if the  outsiders  are  those
whose  accreditation  is to development.  They  can  at  best  prudently  assess
these  qualities  and  adjust  their  strategies  accordingly. Competencies,  on the
other  hand,  typically  rest  on  professional  training  and  experience  in
technical,  scientific,  legal  or other  fields. The  provision  of training  and
help in  shaping  institutions  have  of course  typically  been  within  the  proper
concerns  of external  development  assistance.
It is important  to remember  that the  developing  nations  of our
time  have been  at least  as  marked  by their  insistence  on national  sovereignty
as by their  aspirations  to development.  Sovereignty  has  required  not  only
that  policy  be determined  by national  leaders  but  that  the  apparatus  of
government  be kept  or brought  into  indigenous  hands  and  that  national  or
indigenous  control  be established  over  those  parts  of the  economy  felt  to  be
essential  to  national  sovereignty  and  dignity. Development  policy  and
practice  have thus  been subject  to  powerful  constraints  by concerns  over
autonomy  and  fears  of external  influence  and  control. Capacities  for  policy
formation  and  execution  have  been subject  to prior  conditions  from  these
concerns. It was  not  only in  Africa  that  new  nations  came  to independence
with their  government  services  largely  directed  by colonial  officers,  both- 41 -
civil  and  military,  and  with large  parts  of their  economy  under  foreign
control. Replacement  of expatriates  and  extensions  of  national  control  thus
were  requisites  of "development"  quite  independent  of their  significance  for
economic  growth.
The fact  that  many  of the  Asian  countries  share  a  history  of
colonialism  provides  a promising  startLng  point  for  examining  their
experience.  Latin  American  countries,  long  independent,  had  different
starting  points  in the  development  era  and  require  separate  treatment,  but  we
shall  see  that  they  have  had  commonalities  with other  regions  in  building
capacities  for  development.
I.  The  ex-colonial  countries  in  Asia
Colonies  were characteristically  governed  by authoritarian
bureaucracies  that  zealously  promoted  their  power  and  prestige. Relatively
quite  small  cadres  of colonials  were,  after-initial  conquests  or
"pacifications,"  able to  maintain  law  and  order  over  extensive  domains  and
large  populations. An aura  of majesty  to government  and  a caste-like
ascendancy  of its  alien  officers  over  the  subject  populations  were  bases  of
authority. Colonial  services  were  patterned  in  many  respects  on  the services
of the  home countries  but  were  not  subject  to  comparably  close  political
control  from  these  countries. Entry  qualifications  differed  somewhat  between
the  British  and (European)  continental  services  but in  neither  case  was there
strong  technical  specialization  in the  higher  administrative  classes. A- 42 -
liberal,  classical  university  education  served  on the  British  side,  a
basically  legal  education  on the  continental  side.  In some  cases,  as in the
British  Sudan  Service  or in the  Dutch  and  French  colonial  services  there  was
special  preparation  for  dealing  with exotic  peoples. But there  was resistance
to technical  specialization  as a claim  to  high station  (of  the  sort  that  was
beginning  to appear  in the  United  States). There  was little  or not  provision
for  "lateral  entry"  and  minimal  dependence  on in-service  training.  1 The
Japanese  colonial  administration  in  Korea  and  Taiwan  had similar  features  with
a strongly  legalistic  emphasis  in  qualification  for  the  higher  levels  of the
civil  service. 2
The  changes  that  have taken  place  in European  bureaucracies  since
World  War  II were  not  much  advanced  by the  time  former  colonies  were coming  to
independence.  In Britain,  the  Fulton  Commission  of 1966-68  proposed
increasing  opportunities  for  the  entry  and  advancement  of specialists,  and
molding  of a special  class  of  economic  and  financial  administrators.  In
France,  the  traditional  position-of  the  grandes  ecoles  and  the  higher
technical  corps  in  the  civil  service  has  long  assured  a strong  position  for
1  Cf.  The Civil  Service,  vol. 1 Report  of the  Committee,  1966-68. Chairman:
Lord  Fulton,  London,  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  Cmnd.  3638,  reprint  1970.
This famous  report  notes in  particular  (para.  36,  p. 17):  "The  Civil  Service
has been slow to recognize  the  benefits  that  would flow from a much larger
recruitment  of  particular categories  such as  accountants,  statisticians,
economists,  and  research  officers  and  their  employment  in  positions  of greater
responsibility. For example,  while there  were 106 economists  in the Civil
Service  in  1967,  there  were  only 19 in  1963."
2  Hahn-Been  Lee,  Korea:  Time. Change  and  Administration,  Honolulu  (Ejst-West
Center),  1968.- 43 -
engineers  and others  with  basically  scientific  training  in the  higher  reaches
of French  government.  With the  gradual  evolution  toward  higher  fractions  of
the  ecoles'  students  choosing  a  program  that  combines  economics  and  management
with  a high standard  of mathematical  education,  there  is something  of a
convergence  with  patterns  that  emerged  in the  public  policy  programs  of the
United  States  in the  1970s. In quite  different  ways,  as dictated  by national
traditions  and starting  points,  the  two  principal  models  of ex-colonial
governments  have thus  moved  toward  patterns  that  give  great  regard  to
professional  specializations,  to  numeracy,  and  to economic  competencies.  But
these  movements  came  rather  late  for  influence  on  what the  newly  independent
countries  inherited.
The insulation  of colonial  bureaucracies  from  their  surrounding
societies  enhanced  the  general  tendency  of  bureaucracies  to  closure. The
senior  permanent  civil  services  of Europe  and  Japan  have  been  proudly  self-
confident  at  home and  their  ethos  was  carried  to the  colonies. Elite
permanent  civil  services  are  wuch  more  inclined  than  more  open  and  fluid
bureaucracies  to trust  to internal  studies  of  problems  and  policies. The
flourishing  of policy  study  institutes  and  "think  tanks"  in  the  United  States
has  undoubtedly  been  related  to the  weakness  and  impermanence  of the  senior
civil  service. In  contrast,  one  has  heard  a  chef  de cabinet  at the  Matignon
deploring  the  difficulty  of getting  French  civil  servants  to read  anything
produced  "outside". It  seems  plausible  that  the  notorious  difficulty  in
getting  the  civil  services  of ex-British  colonies  to pay  attention  to the
researches  and  writings  of academics  in  their  countries  continues  British-44-
-civil  servants'  mistrust  of 'impractical'  academics. Colonial  bureaucracies,
being  staffed  in their  lower  orders  by nationals,  were  much less  insulated  at
the  bottom  than  at the  top. Thick  hedges  were typically  set  up against  this
channel  of influence  or corruption.  When  Nehru  brought  in Paul  Appleby  from
the  United  States  to  advise  on  ways the  Indian  civil  services  might  be adapted
to the  needs  of a developing  country,  Appleby  told  him that  the  Indian
government  should  get  rid  of didactic  and  confining  rules  of  business,  the
diseconomies  of  meticulous  financial  control,  and  the  absence  of effective
administrative  delegation  that  Appleby  found  "astonishing". 3
The  coming  of independence  meant  a  profound  change  in the
orientations  and insulation  of the  inherited  bureaucracies.  Acquiring  the
apparatus  of  national  government  was the  initial  great  prize  of independence.
How this  acquisition  came  about  varied  greatly  depending  on the  state  of
indigenization  of government  and  on the  degree  of disruption  surrounding
independence.  But everywhere  the  prestige  and  authority  of government  was
initially  very  high  and  enhanced  by its  now  being  the  great  symbol  and
expression  of independence.
Writing  of Indonesia,  Feith  remarks  on "the  overwhelming  power  of
*government"  in colonial  times  and  goes  on to describe  its  enhancement  through
and  after  the  troubled  period  from  Sukarno's  and  Hatta's  1945  proclamation  of
3  A summary  of  Appleby's  Report  and  its  impact  may  be found  in  A.  H.  Hanson,  The
Process  of  Planning/A  Study  of  India's  5  Year  Plans.  1950-1964,  Oxford  University
Press'  1966.  Quotation  from  p. 281.- 45 -
the  Republic  of Indonesia,  through  the  armed.struggle  against  the  Dutch  in  the
late  1940s  to the  eventual  establishment  of independence  in 1950.4 This
extraordinary  dominance  of government  in Indonesia  rested  (as  it  has in  most
African  countries)  on the  weakness  of  powers  outside  government.  The,e  was
effectively  no national  bourgeoisie. Economic  power  lay  in  Western-owned
firms,  mostly  Dutch,  Indonesian  business  being  small  and  dependent  on
government,  while  the  Chinese  were constrained.  And there  were  no large
Indonesian  landowners. It is  small  wonder  that  the  Indonesian  bureaucracy
quickly  grew  to a size  that  dismayed  government  leaders  who  made repeated  but
ineffectual  attempts  to reduce  it  by as much  as 50  percent;  it  was  also  very
thin  at the  top  in indigenous  experience  and  competencies  (it  has  been
calculated  that  there  were  still  15,700  Dutch  civil  servants  in 1950).  5  The
Dutch  having  failed  to anticipate  an earl-,  end  to their  power,  there  was
little  preparation  of Indonesians  for  positions  requiring  higb competencies.
As Bernhard  Dahm  summarized,  "When-this  state  came  into  being,  it suffered
from  an almost  total  lack  of skilled  personnel  to  replace  the  Dutch  in such
4  Herbert  Feith,  The  Decline  of Constitutional  Democracy  in  Indonesia,  Ithaca
(Cornell)  1962,  p. 103. "With  the  Revolution  and  the  achievement  of  independence
the  role  of government  became  even  more  dominant...  It  remained  by far  the  most
important  employer  of  persons  of modern  education. It  was  now  government  that.
bestowed  almost  all  prestigeful  social  roles...  To be a government  servant  in
1950  was not only a matter  of high prestige  as it had been all through  the
century. It  was seen  as  being  literally  in  the  service  of the  nation,  as  being
part  of the  spearhead  of  national  progress.'
s  Feith,  OR.  cit.  pp.  82-83,  p. 306.- 46 -
fields  as administration,  finance,  economics  and transport.n6  It took  the
better  part of two  decades  to  begin  to remedy  these  deficiencies. In the
meantime  the  bureaucracy  continued  to grow. Geertz  wrote  in 1956  that  "The
bureaucracy  and  the  educational  system  are  locked  in  a self-perpetuating  cycle
of distention."  7  Far from  being  an insulated  bureaucracy,  it  was subject  to
contending  pressures  from  the  army,  political  parties,  and  national
leadership,  was frequently  divided  in  loyalties  and  attachments  but could  also
resist  efforts  at controlling  it.
Under  Sukarno's  "guided  democracy,"  1957-1965,  a great  part  of the
executive  power  of government,  particularly  in  the  outer  provinces  was taken
over  by the  military.8  Economic  disorder  mounted,  with the  expulsion  of
Chinese  traders  from the  rural  areas,  mounting  inflation  and  unbalanced
governmental  budgets. Under  the  parliamentary  democracy  of the  early  1950s
there  had  been  a continuation  of  Dutch  financial  expertise  in the  government,
but  after  1957  there  was little  expatriate  help and  Sukarno's  inattention  to
economic  matters  gave  little  encouragement  to such  national  competencies  as
existed. Fortunately  for  the  future,  the  need for  building  Indonesian
competencies  had  been  early  recognized,  notably  by Dr.  Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo,  who served  as Director  of the  National  Planning  Bureau  and
6  Bernhard  Dahm, History  of Indonesia  in the Twentieth  Century,  New York,
Praeger,  1971,  p. 161.
7  Quoted  by Fieth,  op.  cit.,  p. 397.
8  Dahm,  op.  cit.,  p. 197.- 47 -
Minister  of Finance  ir  governments  of the  1950-53  period  and  as the  first  Dean
of the  Faculty  of Economics  of the  University  of Indonesia,  established  in
1950.  Sumitro  selected  and  attracted  an  unusually  able  group  of young  men to
this  Faculty  and  as early  as 1951  sought  foreign  aid  for  the  building  of this
Faculty  and  the  overseas  training  of its  staff. The  results  of these  efforts
and the  achievements  of Sumitro's  proteges  under  the  Suharto  government  after
1966  will  engage  our  attention  in  Parts  3  and  4 of this  paper.
Elsewhere  in  Asia,  experience  varied  widely,  with Burma  and
Indochina  suffering  disruptions  like  Indonesia  and the  India  sub-continent,
despite  the  agonies  of Partition,  showing  smoother  transitions  from  colonial
to independent  governments.  Making  the  apparatus  of government  serve  the
national  political  leadership  everywhere  brought  decisive  changes;  the
bureaucracy  was now  to serve  the  people,  not  to  be the  authoritarian  agent  of
foreign  power. Demands  for  radical  char.ge  in the  character  of government  were
prominent  in the  nationalist  movements,  but  practice  differed  widely. In
India,  Nehru  and  other  leaders  resisted  the  Gandhian  vision  of a radically
different  civil  service,  preserving  the  inherited  structure  and  even  retaining
British  officers  where  no suitable  nationals  were  yet  available. Pakistan,
with a  more formidable  task,  proceeded  similarly. Burma,  on the  other  hand,
had its  colonial  service  disrupted  by the  Japanese  invasion,  and  after  the  War
its  new government  decided  to  dismiss  all  British  officials  at independence
(at  the  beginning  of 1948).9 As in Indonesia,  there  was  a vast  expansion  of
9  Hugh Tinker,  The Union of.  Burma,  Oxford  University  Press for the Royal
Institute  of International  Affairs,  1957  describes  U Nu's  aspiration  to  replace
an authoritarian  administration  by a democratic  one, responsive  to the  people
and  their  leaders. But  by 1956,  he found,  "The  framework  of the  old 'colonial- 48 -
the  civil  service  to  more than  three  times  its  preindependence  size,  the
principal  sources  of recruitment,  according  to Tinker  10,  being  the  large-
scale  promotion  of  head clerks  to officer  rank  and the  addit'.toe1  of many
'political'  civil  servants. Efforts  were sustained  to  recruit  a  non-political
higher  civil  service,  but sharply  diminished  financial  rewards,  uncertainties
about  the  future,  and the  powers  of political  bosses  reduced  the  attractions
of these  positions.
The  Republic  of  Korea  is  another  country  that  began its  history  of
independence  with the  dissolution  of colonialism  and  had to struggle  through
the  costly  and  destructive  war  of 1950-1953. The  first  decade  and  a  half
after  1945  was marked  by great  iocial  change  under  the  impact  of educational
expansion,  land  reform,  urbanization  and  inflation. A stable  and
authoritarian  political  regime  under  Syngman  Rhee  emerged  in  1948  and  lasted
until  it  was  overthrown  in  the  bloodless  revolution  of April  1960. The
Japanese  had  left  a structure  of government  in  which  the  higher  civil  service
was  qualified  through  a highly  legalistic  set  of examinations.  As the  civil
service  grew  after  independence  it depended  initially  on cadres  of limited
education  and  higher  ranks  were  mostly  recruited  by promotion  from  clerical
administration'  still  stands...  and  yet  the  meaning,  the  spirit  has  gone  out  of
it  all.  The talk is all  of.a  new, democratic  system;  but by the  middle  1950s
the  new  democratic  administration  was still  largely  a  dream."
10  OR.  cit., pt. 156.Z  49  **10
ranks. 1l  Despite  extraordinary  expansion  of  university  education  in the
1950s,  there  was  only  a slow  infusion  of better  educated  talent  and  the
traditional  legalistic  qualifications  acted  as a  barrier. The  massive  U. S.
aid  of this  period  (over  $3  billion  6etween  1949  and 1961  in  economic
assistance  and  more than  $7  billion  in  military  assistance  12  brought
extensive  overseas  training  opportunities  and  nbew  conceptions  in training  for
and  practice  of  public  affairs. By the  time  of the  April  Revolution  there
were  many  beginnings  in  building  new  competencies,  both  civil  and  military,
and in the  reorientation  of government  to development  purposes. The Financial
Stabilization  Plan  of 1957  and  the  establishment  of the  Economic  Development
Council,  which.began  preparation  of a Three-Year  Plan  were important
milestones  in this  change.
Whatever  the  conditions  in  particular  countries,  the  inherited
structure  of colonial  government  had to  undergo  profound  stresses  and  major
changes  to  evolve  Into  a national  government.  The  national  movements  that
brought  independance  were great  upwellings  of popular  sentiment  that  were
difficult  either  to sustain  or contain  when the  goal  of throwing  off  alien
rule  had  been achieved. Ideals  of self-determination  and  democracy  involved  a
permissiveness  that  made  political  coherence  everywhere  precarious  once  the
struggle-  against  colonial  domination  was  over.  The  resulting  difficulties  in
Lee,  op.  cit.,  pp.  104  ff.
12  U.  S.  Overseas  Loans  and  Grants  and  Assistance  from  International
Organizations/Obligations  and Loan  Authorizations,  July 1, 1945-September  20,
1982,  Office  of Planning  and  Budgeting,  USAID,  CONG-R-0105,  p. 74.-50-
holding  countries  together  hardly  need  recital;  Indonesia  fought  a  civil  war
in the  1950s;  Burma  has  yet to  gain full  control  .f its  territory;  Pakistan
split  in 1971;  Sri  Lanka  is  embroiled  in  a persisting  communal  strife;  and
India  has  been  persistently  troubled  by linguistic  and  communal  dissensions.
In such  circumstances  the  orderly  representation  of interests  and  loyalties  in
parliamentary  democracy  has  proven  tb  be fragile  or impossible,  and  other
means  of  maintaining  political  coherence  have  been sought  and  used.  In
Indonesia,  Korea,  Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  and  Burma,  popular  leaders  have  been
replaced  by military  governments  as another  response  to the  difficulty  of
political  coherence. The  challenge  of establishing  stable  and  legitimate
government  has  been formidably  elevated  by the  high expectations  freedom  and
aspirations  to  development  brought. Governments  were  moved  to proclaim  and
undertake  larger  responsibilities  than  they  could  readily  bear and  the
movements  that  brought  independence  were  not readily  transformed  into
effective  governments. Leaders  of the  new  governments  were supported  by
narties  and  loyal  compagnons  de route  serving  as  ministers  and  political
leaders. The  competencies  that  could  mobilize  independence  movements  were  not
necessarily  those  that  made  for  the  orderly  and  effective  leadership  of
government. The Indonesians  came  to distinguish  the  "administrators"  from  the
"solidarity  makers"  and  similar  distinctions  were  present  everywhere.
The  departing  colonial  powers  sought  to establish  forms  of
government  in  which  there  was a clear  distinction  between  the  functions  of
ministers  and  political  leadership  on the  one  had  and  those  of neutral
professional  bureaucracy  (based  on the  old  colonial  bureaucracy)  on.  the  other.- 51  -
Where  the  United  States  had  a dominant  influence,  as in  Korea,  it  attempted  a
similar  set  of distinctions.  But  everywhere  they  became  blurred  and  strained
as  we have seen  for  Indonesia. Ministers  who  were "solidarity  makers"  found
incomprehensible  the  limitations  on their  authority  imposed  by the  classic
hierarchical  distribution  of authority  in  a  bureaucracy,  and  the  entrance  of
large  numbers  of new  civil  servants  under  political  sponsorship  eroded  the
autonomy  of the  bureaucracies.  The  need for  executive  competence  at
ministerial  levels  also  led  to the  rise  of civil  servants  into  political
roles. Hahn-Been  Lee  has described  this  process  in the  evolution  of Syngman
RheG's  Korean  governments  of the  1950s,  showing  a sharp  rise  of former  civil
servants  in the  cabinets  as that  decade  progressed.I
3
Policy  formation  in any  government  depends  on a complex  interplay
of political  leadership,  administrative  competence  and  specialized  talent. As
we have seen,  the  heritage  of colonial  government  included  a self-confident
officialdom  with  prestigious  places  for  financial  officers  who  were  typically
however  without  specialized  economic  training. Independent  governments  did
not immediately  replace  such  officers  but  surrounded  and  supplemented  them
with  other  makers  of policy.
Ambitions  for  development  called  for  new capacities  in
policymaking  and  government,  many  of which  focused  in the  early  years  on
national  plins  and  their  implementation.  India  became  an important  model  for
1  Hahn-Been  Lee,  02.  cit.,  Table  28,  p. 97 and  accompanying  text.- 52 -
other  countries,  and  Nehru's  planning  commission  attracted  attention  around
the  world.  Planning  had a great  vogue,  indeed  so  much so that  Ian  Little
complains  that  it  had rather  too  much  attention  as compared  with  current
economic  management  and  policy.  1 Planning  agencies  of one  sort  or another
were set  up everywhere,  usually  with  substantial  technical  assistance  since
most countries  were ill-supplied  with  economists  and  other  needed  specialists.
These  agencies  became  sources  of  new ideas  and lnfluences  that  spread
throughout  governments.  The  Pakistan  Planning  Commission,  particularly  as it
grew  under  Ayub  Khan's  regime,  is a  notable  example. Professor  Khalid  Sayeed
said  of it:
"The  Commission  has a staff  of over  one  hund'red  technical  and
economic  experts,  which  means  that  in terms  of numbers  and  quality
of expertness  it is  vastly  superior  to  any  other  government
department...  the  Planning  Commission  has  steadily  penetrated  the
bureaucratic  structure  and  is represented  on every  important
economic  decision-making  body of government.""
The Pakistan  Commission  was  built  up  with extensive  assistance  from  the
Harvard  Development  Advisory  Service,  which  concerned  itself  from  the  first
with  matters  of organization  and  management. Thus  reports  were  produced  in
1953  on The  Improvement  of Public  Administration  and  in 1955  on Reorientation
of the  Pakistan  Government  for  National  Development,  both  by American  experts
14  I. M. D. Little,  Economic  DeveloRment/  Theory,  Policy  and International
Relations,  New  York (Basic  Books),  1982,  p. 316.
1' Khalid  Sayeed,  The  Political  System  of  Pakistan,  Boston,  1967,  pp.  149,  150.- 53 .
in  public  administration."6  The Indian  Planning  Commission  was the  initial
locus  of the  community  development  program  with its  profound  implications  for
tha  character  of administration,  and  the  Five  Year Plans  typically  included
plans  on administration--thus  a chapter  on "Administration  and  Plan
Implementation"  in the  Third  Plan.
Along  with  early  enthusiasm  for  planning  went convictions  of the
need for  administrative  training  that  was  much  encouraged  by confidence,  then
reigning  particularly  in the  United  States,  that  there  existed  a teachable
"science"  of public  administration.  Institutes  of public  administration  were
set  up in  most  countries  with  extensive  assistance  from  the  United  States,  the
United  Nations,  and  elsewhere.  A great  deal  of academic  and  professional
attention  was devoted  to these  institutions  and to the  subjects  they  dealt
with.  A field  called  "development  administration"  emerged  and  flourished  for
a time. Many  different  approaches  to the  improvement  of administration  were
tried  in  addition  to governmental  institutes  of administration;  some  of these
stressed  pre-service  acLdemic  preparation,  other  in-serve  training,
consultation  and  research. Ambitious  plans  for  systematic  preparation  and
regular  schemes  of  continuing  training  were  seldom  in fact  followed
systematically.  But  a considerable  body  of experience  was acquired,  some  of
which  will  be reviewed  in  Parts  3  and  4.
16  The former  paper  was  by Rowland  Egger,  the  latter  by Bernard  Gladieux;  both
were produced  in  Karachi,  in 1953  and  1955  respectively.- 54 -
The  effort  to  bring  better  competencies  in policy  formation  and
execution  to  national  governments  created  a strong  demand  for  economists  and
for  their  integration  into  government  services. The initial  enthusiasm  for
planning  gave  economists  voices  in  government  which  have  survived  the  "crisis
of  planning"  and  growing  realism  about  its  necessary  limitations.  There  have
been great  ups and  downs  as in the  fate  of the  Pakistan  Planning  Commission  in
the  fall  of  Ayub and  the  breakaway  of Bangladesh,  or in the  emergence  of
Indonesian  economists  from  academe  under  Suharto's  government  to take  over  six
ministries  and  at least  ten  sub-cabinet  posts. 17 But  whatever  the  unrealities
of  hopes  for  rational  planning,  economic  policy  problems  have remained  urgent
and  endemic. More sophisticated  views  of the  making  of policy  and  day-to-day
decisions  in the  governments  of developing  countries  have  made the  place  of
economic  analysis  look  more intricately  intertwined  with  political
pressures.' 8 An evolution  from  medium-term  planning  to more  emphasis  on
current  economic  management  has  hardly  reduced  the  demands  for  economic
competencies,  and  the  provision  of such  competencies  has  posed  problems  that
extended  beyond  the  government  services  themselves.  The  prospects  of well-
rewarded  careers  for  economists  in government  have  been difficult  to sustain
without  some  attachments,  academic  or  otherwise  outside  government. In a 1975
survey,  John  Lewis  found  that  "the  place  of  economics  in  the  Government  of
17  Figures  from  Malcolm  Gillis,  "Economics  in  Indonesia  and  the  Ford  Foundation"
1975,  Report  No.  002515,  Ford  Foundation  Archives,  p. 3.
18  Cf. Tony Killick, "The Possibilities  of Development  Planning,"  Oxford
Economic  Papers,  v. 28 #  2, July 1976,  pp. 161-184,  for a good retrospective
analysis.55  -
India  is  not  more in doubt  than  it is  in the  U. S.  government"  but that  there
were serious  problems  in the  Indian  Economic  Service  and the  state  of academic
and  research  certers  were important  to it.  "9  The Indonesian  economists  who
went  to  work for  Suharto's  government  kept  their  academic  appointments.  One
might  readily  suggest  reasons  why the  economic  competencies  of Asian
governments  have  needed  a milieu  outside  government  to sustain  them  but it  may
suffice  here to  point  to its  existence  and  evident  importance.
There  were  numerous  stimuli  in the  1950s  and  1960s  to  make
provision  outside  government  for  research  and  analysis  which it  was thought
could  better  be done  in some  independence.  The  heavy  American  influence
brought  the  experience  of  American  universities  and  research  centers  in
supplying  analysis  and  policy  guides. There  was  also  a patriotic  desire  on
the  part of academics  and  other  professionals  to contribute  to the  development
of their  own  countries. Hence,  one  found  Sumitro  promoting  an Institute  for
Economic  and  Social  Research  in the  University  of Indonesia  from  the  start  of
its  Faculty  of Economics;  a  Pakistan  Institute  of Development  Economics  was
set  up, and in  India  a  National  Council  of  Applied  Economic  Research  and  much
else.  The  utility  and  significance  of such  external  sources  of research  and
analysis  depended  of course  on their  quality,  but  also  on the  receptivity  of
governments  to  what they  had to offer. Such  receptivity  has  varied  greatly,
depending  on leadership  and the  quality  of governmental  staffing. In India,
Nehru  encouraged  an openness  to ideas  from  outside  government  and  indeed  a
19  John  P. Lewis,  "The  Ford  Foundation  and  Indian  Economics"  1975,  Report  No.
003144,  FFA,  pp. 15-20.- 56 -
restless  search  for  ideas,  which  withered  noticeably  under  his successor. In
Indonesia,  the  polarization  of Sukarno's  era  led  to ideological  assaults  on
"liberal"  or "Western-oriented"  economics  (1961)  which  effectively  cut  off
such  influences  for  a time. The  qualifications  of civil  servant  staffs  have
been an important  source  of the  influence  of the  Korean  Development  Institute,
and  the  PIDE  depended  on the  attention  of Planning  Commission  staff  for  the
influence  it  has, from  time  to time,  had.
In general,  the  sense  of independent  governments  that  they  were
facing  new  developmental  challenges  encouraged  greater  openness  to the  wider
world  than  the  colonial  bureaucracies  had felt  necessary. While  there  has
been detectable  lingering  of the  old  closure  there  has  been  much loosening  by
the  new  influences  that  independence  brought. Generalizing  over the  great
variety  of Asian  experience  is  hazardous,  but one  may distinguish  two  major
influences:
1)  the  susceptibility  of national  bureaucracies  to their  societies
and in  particular  to their  political  leadership;  and
2)  the  political  changes  and instability  that  have  marked  recent
history  in  many  of these  countries.
The insulation  from  local  influence  which  a colonial  bureaucracy
could  maintain  was obviously  neither  appropriate  or possible  in  independence.
Responsiveness  to  national  leadership  and  to  popular  demand  brought  pressures- 57 -
that  were difficult  to  manage  and  have  led  to characterization  of some
governments  as "soft"  states. Any formal  organizational  structure  is  enmeshed
in an  envelope  of  more  personalized  relationships  in  any  society  and  in
societies  with strongly  traditional  and  particularistic  character  they  have  a
pervasive  character. In  recent  years  there  has  been a  vigorous  growth  of
study-of  patron-client  relationships  and  demonstration  of their  importance
across  the  world. 20 Many  studies  have shown  the  extent  to  which  patron-client
relationships  characterize  the  structure  and  functioning  of governments  in
developing  countries. They  are familiar  as  a source  of corruption,  nepotism,
and  cliques,  but also  affect  governments  in  more  diffuse  and  less  remarked-on
ways.  They  have long  been familiar  in  Latin  America,  as we discuss  below,  and
their  prominence  elsewhere  in  post-independence  governments  brings  a sort  of
convergence  in character  with  ex-colonial  governments. The  consequences  for
government  functioning  differ  markedly;  some  patrons  have promoted
technocratic  clients  who  have "modernized"  governments;  others  have favored
less  competent  types. But in  general  they  have imposed  constraints  on the
workings  of government  by universalistic  rules  "without  regard  for  persons."
The emergence  of  military  governments  in  Indonesia,  Korea,  Pakistan,  Burma,
and  elsewhere  is clearly  related  to the  relative  advancement  of their
disciplined,  conformity  to general  rules  of  conduct  as compared  with  civilian
s.tructures.  They  have of course  been penetrated  by patron-client
relationships  but their  relative  insulation  from  many  pressures  has  given  them
*20  Cf.  S. N. Eisenstadt  and  Louis  Roniger,  "Patron-Client  Relations  as a  Model
of Structuring  Social  Exchange,"  Comgarative  Studies  in Societv  and History,
1980,  pp'.  42-77,  with an  abundant  bibliography.- 58 -
some  of the  strengths  colonial  bureaucracies  once  had.  The  capacity  of
military  governments  to resist  special  interests  and  to carry  through  with
national  policies  has  been evident  in  Asia  as in  other  parts  of the  world. 2 1
One  needs  to remember  the  problems  of stability  that  have appeared
in Asian  ex-colonial  governments  to remember  the  inevitable  concerns  of
governments  to remain  in  power  whatever  they  are  accomplishing.  The  capacity
to  make and  execute  policy  must  be constrained  by the  needs  of security  and
demands  for  loyalty  and  conformity  flow  from  these  concerns. Constraints  on
the  open  discussion  of  public  policies  are  severe  throughout  nearly  all  the
countries  we have  been  considering  with inevitable  consequences  for  the  way
policy  is  made.
II.  Latin  American  Contexts
It  was  already  apparent  in the  Bretton  Woods  negotiations  and in
the  Havana  conference  on the  ill-fated  International  Trade  Organization  that
Latin  American  countries  would  identify  themselves  quickly  and  readily  as
"developing'  though  it  was  evident  that  some  of them  were  notably  "advanced"
in comparison  with  countries  emerging  from  colonial  rule. There  have  been,  in
addition  to the  Latin  American  countries,  a  very  miscellaneous  group  of
21  Cf.  Stephan  Haggar,  "The  Newly  Industrializing  Countries  in  the  International
System,  " World Politics,  pp. 344-370.  This review  article  argues  that the
independence  of the political  elite was critical  to the rationalization  of
economic  policymaking  in South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore,  "and  even HongKong,
where  economic  policymaking  has been in the  hands  of an independent  colonial
bureaucracy,"  p.  352.- 59 -
independent  countries  ranging  from  such  little  developed  cases  as Ethiopia,
Nepal,  or Saudi  Arabia,  through  the  varied  conditions  of Thailand,  Turkey,
mainland  China,  and  Iran. The display  of common  views  which  appeared  in the
U. N. and  other  international  contexts  have  suggested  commonalities  in  their
interests  and situations.  But  they  presented  quite  different  starting  points
for  development  and  hence  for  the  matters  of  policy  formation  and  management
which  particularly  concern  us in this  paper. The  Latin  American  countries,
for  all  their  diversity,  displayed  some  common  features  which  we must try  to
analyze  as a basis  for  understanding  the  relevance  of development  experience
in that  part  of the  world.
In contrast  to the  recently  ex-colonial  countries,  the  Latin
American  countries  came  into  the  development  era  with  structures  of government
that  were relatively  much  more  open  and  fluid,  with  bureaucracies  lacking  the
prestige  of the  colonial  bureaucracies,  and  with long  traditions  of  personal
and  particularistic  leadership  of governments.  Relatively  speaking,  the
private  sectors  of the  Latin  American  countries  were stronger  and  more
powerful,  whether  in the  older  hacienda  patterns  or from  the international
commerce  and  industrialization  which  had developed  in  the  first  half  of the
20th  century.
When  vigorous  development  programs  began  to  emerge  at the
beginning  of the  1960s  in  Latin  America  there  was a spate  of conferring,
writing,  and  project  development  on the  nature  and  structure  of Latin  American
governments. In 1963,  the  Advanced  School  of Public  Administration  in- 60  -
Colombia  organized  a conference  on "Public  Administration  in  Developing
Countries"  in  collaboration  with the  Brookings  Institution  of Washington,
which  published  the  proceedings.2 Introducing  the  conference,  the  director
of the  Colombian  School  (ESAP),  Guillermo  Nannetti,  spoke  of bringing
"organizational  discipline  to  a disorderly  continent"...  "creating  a civil
service  structure  and  teaching  public  administration." 23 But  then  came  Frank
Tannenbaum,  Professor  of Latin  American  History  at Columbia  University  who
told  the  conference  somberly  how  difficult  he thought  this  task  would  be.  He
argued  that  before  worrying  about  the  efficiency  of  government,  one  had  to  ask
wihat  stability  government  had and  what legitimacy  as representative  of all  the
people. He thought  the  problem  of legitimacy  was, "for  the  most  part,
unresolved"  with lingering  traditions  of government  resting  on personal  and
party  loyalties  and lacking  the  support  of general  consensus. The  effect  was
to  put a great  premium  on strong  personal  loyalties  with resulting
centralization  of  power  around  dominant  leaders. One important  result  of this
search  for  loyalty  was  administrative  instability  with  whole  retinues  of
followers  moving  in  and  out  of government,  or from  ministry  to  ministry.
22  Ed.  Martin  Kriesberg,  Public  Administration  in Developing  Countries,  The
Brookings  Institution,  Washington,  D. C.,  1965,  pp.  viii  +  198.
23  olp  .cit.,  p.2- 61 -
"They  really  move as a group  and  not  necessarily  as individuals." 2'
Tannenbaum  thought  these  patterns  inevitable  in "an  authoritarian  society
ruled  by small  groups  of tightly  knit families"  and  that  an "industrial
milieu,  with almost  infinitely  varied  openings  for  individual  careers"  was a
necoasary  prerequisite  for  a successful  civil  service  with  a merit  system.
The  strong  interests  of USAID  &nd  the  Ford  Foundation  in  Latin
America  in  the  1960s  brought  forth  many  hopeful  efforts  at improviig
government,  but starting  from  critical  assessments.  Thus  Professor  John  Honey
of the  Maxwell  School,  writing  in 1968,  found  low  prestige  and  pay in  Latin
American  governments,  and  despite  some  good  legislation  on the  books  an
effective  lack  of a civil  service  system  like  those  in Europe  or the  United
States.3  Commentaries  on  Honey's  analysis  and  prescriptions  were  supplied  by
Ford  Foundation  officers  working  in  various  countries  of Latin  America  at the
time.  Peter  Bell  described  the  vast  Brazilian  public  services  which  he
estimated  included  nearly  one  million  federal  employees  plus  those  in
regi.  'al,  21 states  and  more  than  4,000  municipal  administrations.  "Nearly  90
percent  of those  presently  engaged  in  public  administration  were admitted
outside  of the  legally  compulsory  examination  system  and  thereby  continue  to
24  Ibid,  pp. 38-39. Tannenbaum  cities  his Mexican  experience  on this  point.
For  evidence  that  the  situation  there  did  not  change  substantially  in the  next
years  see  the  comments  by Lawrence  Graham  on  Frederick  C.  Turner's  paper,  on  pp.
189-190  in  eds. William  P.  Glad  and  Stanley  R.  Ross,  Criticas  Constructivas  del
Sistema  Politico  Mexicanoi  Critiques  of the  Mexican  Political  System,  Austin
(University  of  Texas  Press),  1973.
25  John C. Honey,  Toward  Strategies  for  Public  Administration  DeveIonment  in
Latin  America,  Syracuse  University  Press,  1968.- 62 -
be suspect  of nepotism,  favoritism,  and  clientelism.n 26 He described  the
problems  of low  wages,  absenteeism  (citing  a  Bahia  study  showing  that  30
percent  of those  on the  public  payrolls  never  appeared  at work, 27 slow
procedures,  and  a long  history  of unrewarded  efforts  at administrative  reform.
But  he was also  able  to  point  to  strong  points,  as in the  emergence  of an
elite  of economists  under  the  Castelo  Branco  and  Costa  e Silva  governments.
In Chile,  Richard  Feynel  described  a government  that  embraced  a  higher
percentage  of the  employed  than  any  other  Latin  America  countries,  but  paid
them  badly  and  lacked  a  promotion  system  based  on  merit. 28  For  Peru,  James
Himes  wrote  of "the  indifferent  or  negative  attitudes  which  citizens  have
toward  the  public  service  and  the  extreme  scarcity  of high-level  human
resources  in the  public  service." He thought  these  to  be "basic  problems  that
are  holding  governments  behind  in the  development  process." Like  others  he
was able  to  point  to some  promising  starts,  notably  in the  Banco  %.entral  de
Reserva  del  Peru,  but  generally  he found  a "weakness  or absence  of  pre-service
and  in-service  training  for  public  administration  in  Peru." 29 Writing  on
26  Ibid,  p. 90.
27  Ibid,  p.  91.
28  Ibid,  p. 137.
29  Ibid,  pp. 153,  147- 63 -
Venezuela,  George  Sutija  reported  a recent  study  that  showed  a  very low  regard
for  the  250,000  public  employees  in  the  country.30
In an era  when government  was unquestioned  as the  prime  agent  of
development,  the  situation  in  Latin  America  thus  presented  many difficulties
and  contrasts  to the  situation  in  many  ex-colonial  countries  (including
African  ones). There  were,  however,  certain  advantages  which  the  openness  and
fluidity  of Latin  American  governments  possessed. It  was possible  to look  to
the  replacement  of ill-qualified  public  employees  by new  and  better  trained
ones  and the  viability  of autonomous  or private  institutions  gave  places  for
the  development  of talents  outside  government.  A heavy  U. S. influence  had
long  been felt  in  Latin  America,  and  grew  in the  efforts  of the  Alliance  for
Progress. It  brought  strong  emphases  on educational  development,
administrative  reforms,  and  new  scientific  and technical  competencies,
particularly  in  economics. Whatever  the  ambivalence  and  the  endemic  mistrust
of Yankee  imperialism,  these  concerns  were  enthusiastically  shared  by Latin
Americans  and  brought  rapid  changes  in the  1960s  and  1970s. Efforts  proceeded
on nearly  every  front,  from  the  educational  system,  through  specific  training
efforts  in  management,  public  and  private,  to the  reshaping  of government
agencies  and  policy  formation.
The 1960s  were  years  of great  confidence  in  universities  and  the
"modernization"  of Latin  American  universities  became  a vigorously  pursued
30  bid,  p. 158.- 64 -
objective. The  predominately  legal  education  of  civil  servants  made law
faculties  a subject  of particular  concern  and  attention,  generating  much'
enthusiasm,  controversy,  and  the  pondering  that  characterized  the  "law  and
development"  movement.3 1 The  basic  and  applied  sciences,  particularly
agricultural,  got  much  attention,  and  there  were  vigorous  efforts,
particularly  by the  Ford  Foundation  and  AID, in  building  the  social  sciences.
Relative  to  aid  efforts  in  other  parts  of the  world,  universities  in  Latin
America  got  particularly  full  attention,  in  part  because  direct  efforts  in
technical  assistance  and institution-building  within  governments  looked
.relatively  difficult. But there  were  many difficulties  in the  way of  making
Latin  American  universities  founts  of competence  for  development.  Traditions
of  university  autonomy  and  their  politicalization  made for  distant  and
mistrustful  relationships  with governments;  low  faculty  salaries  and  their
erosion  by inflation,  factionalism,  and  other  causes  made  the  growth  of  high
quality  education  slow  and  uncertain. More  hopeful  possibilities  were to  be
found  in  research  institutions,  sometimes  associated  with  universities  but
often  independent  of them,  and in training  abroad.
Economics  had  pride  of place  among  the  social  sciences  and  efforts
.were  made  both to develop  the  field  in  Latin  American  institutions  and to
31  Cf.  James Gardner,  Legal  ImDerialism/American  Lawyers  and Foreign  Aid in
Latin  American,  Madison (Univ.  of Wisconsin  Press)  1980 for a rather  overly
critical  account. Jorge  Balan,  "Social  Sciences  in  the  Periphery:  Perspectives
on the  Latin  American  Case,"  ch. 9, pp. 211-247  in eds.  Lawrence  D. Stifel,
Ralph  K.  Davidson  and  James  S.  Coleman,  Social  Sciences  and  Public  Policy  in  the
Develoning  World.  Lexingtoti  Mass (Heath)  1982,  provides  a very instructive
account  of university  reform  in  Latin  America.- 65 -
provide  graduate  training  abroad,  mostly  in the  United  States. The urge  to
development  was  producing  a strong  demand  for  economists  both  within  and
outside  government  and  it  was  possible  to increase  the  numbers  of well-trained
ones  faxrly  quickly. Emissaries  of the  Ford  Foundation  to  Argentina  in  1965
were  able to  report  "enormous  success"  within  the  four  years  since  1961  in
developing  Argentina's  corps  of able  and  well-trained  economists. 32 A 1970
survey  in Peru  found  only  10  or 12 economists  with  Ph.Ds  and  perhaps  100
trained  at the  master's  level,  with  demand  so strong  that  as many  more  could
be newly  employed  each  year for  the  next  five  years.33  The  development  of
research  institutes  provided  both  opportunities  for  professional  employment
and for  impact  on national  policy  formation. In Brazil,  the  Va.e,as  Foundation
and  the  IPE  at Sao  Paulo  were  emerging  as strong  and influential  centers  of
economic  analysis. It  was from  the  latter  that  Delfim  Neto  and  his team
launched  into  the  Brazilian  government  to guide  the  "economic  miracle"  of the
late  1960s  and  early  1970s. In  Mexico,  El  Colegio  was  emerging  from  its
beginnings  as a  humanistic  and  historical  research  center  to engage  in
economic  and  demographic  research. In  Argentina  there  was a Center  for
Economic  Research  in the  Torquato  di Tella  Institute  from  the  early  1960s  and
there  were other  research  institutes  related  to the  business  community  and
32  William  Carmichael  and Joseph  Grunwald,  "Economics  in Argentina,"  Report
No.  000026,  p. 6.
33  Janet  Ballantyne,  "Review  of Economics  Programs  in Peru,"  December  1970,
Report  No. 001968,  FFA,  p. 7.- 66 -
political  parties  which  were to  be followed  by others  after  the  political
upheavals  of the  Sixties  and  Seventies.  34
While  often  precariously  funded  and  at first  with  little  support
from  governments,  such  institutions  were relatively  abundant  on the  Latin
American  scene. They  gave  professional  employment  to  economists  and  others
outside  government  and  outside  the  universities  and  they  often  made  possible
the  promotion  of ideas  and standards  resisted  by the  universities.  We shall
deal  further  with some  of these  institutions  in Part  3  of this  paper. Suffice
to say  here that  they  emerged  over  most  of the  continent  as  new sources  of-
competence  that  could  make  their  influence  felt  and  supply  new talents  to
government.
The contributions  of the  Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America
under  the  leadership  of  Raul  Prebisch  in  these  developments  are  properly
celebrated. By 1977  staff  of ECLA  and its  associated  research  institute
(ILPES)  could  boast  of training  more than  6,000  people  and to  have  brought
economic  planning  to  a point  where  they  no longer  had to send  out  planning
teams  but  could  devote  themselves  to  new functions.35  Whatever  the
controversies  over  the  wisdom  of the  policies  ECLA  promoted,  it  gave impetus
34.  Cf.  Carmichael  and  Grunwald's  comn-nts  on the  Fundacion  de Investigaciones
Economicas  Latinoamericanas  (FIEL)  and the Instituto  oara el Desarrollo  de
Eiecutivas  en  Argentina  (IDEA)  in  the  report  cited  in  n.  34  above. Both  of these
centers  had, incidentally,  acquired  their  research  directors  from  Di Tella.
35  Author's  conversations,  Santiago,  November  1977.- 67 -
to technocratic  competencies  within  governments  that  could  be intelligently
responsive  to ideas  and  research  from  elsewhere.
Training  abroad  has  undoubtedly  had a  quite  massive  role  since
1960  in improving  professional  competencies  in Latin  America. In a study  for
the  Ford  Foundation,  Robert  G. Myers  reviewed  the  estimated  $250  million  that
Foundation  had  committed  on  more th&in  11,500  awards  for  post-graduate  study
abroad  between  1960  and  1980.3' In  consultation  with  USAID  officials  he
estimated  that  USAID  had supported  five  times  as  many third  world  nationals  in
the  same  period. In this  period  Ford  supported  about  4,000  Latin  Americans,
23  percent  of them  in  economics,  18 percent  in the  non-economic  social
sciences,  24 percent  in science  and  engineering  and  16 percent  in
agriculture.3"  He made  a particular  study  of Peruvian  grantees  with a
follow-up  questionnaire. 38 Although  Ford  supported  less  than  six  percent  of
the  approximately  6,000  Peruvians  who  did  post-graduate  study  abroad  in this
period,  he found  a  detectable  impact,  at least  in  economics. In that  field,
Ford  helped  80 PeruvIans  study  abroad  between  1963  and  1980. Candidates  were
found  in  the  Central  Bank,  the  National  Planning  Institute  and  other  branches
of government  as  well  as in  the  universities.  There  was some  "brain  drain"
36  Robert  G.  Myers,  "Ford  Foundation  Support  for  Education  Abroad  of.  Third  World
Nationals,  1960-80,"  A  Report  to  the  Ford  Foundation,  September  1,  1983,  pp.  108
with  extensive  unpaged  appendices.
37  OP. cit.,  pp.  31,  35.
38  Robert  Myers,  "Training  Abroad,  A Case  Study  of Ford Foundation  Assistance
in  Peru,'  The  Ford  Foundation,  September  1983.- 68  -
but "the  contrast  with  1960,  when  modern  economics  was  virtually  absent  from
Peru  is  clear;  the  country  can  now  point  to a solid  core  of well-trained
extremely  capable  economists  of various  persuasions,  with  competence  in  a
range  of sub-fields  within  the  discipline.  These  include  agricultural
economics,  public  policy,  international  economics,  economic  history,
transportation  economics,  the  economics  of education,  labor  economics,  money
and  banking  and  finance." He could  also  claim,  "Ford-funded  economists  have
held posts  in this  government  as the  head  of the  Peruvian  Central  Bank,  as
Minister  of Trade  and  Commerce,  and  as  Vice  Ministers  in Finance,  in Commerce,
and in  Labor."  39
The  attention  to improvement  of management  and  administration,
already  noted  above,  resulted  in a strong  growth  of institutions  for  training,
both  pre-  and in-service,  consultation,  and  research. As in  Asia,  early
efforts  in  public  administration  were  gradually  overtaken  by management
institutes  with  strong  or primary  attention  to  the  private  sector. Older
establishments  like  the  Vargas  Foundation  in  Brazil  were followed  by newer
models  like  IESA  in  Venezuela  and  INCAE  in Central  America.  (Cf.  3  below).
It is easier  to  describe  institutional  and  reform  initiatives  than
to tell  what they  have accomplished.  Efforts  to  bring  Latin  American
competencies  from  the  feeble  states  described  above  for  the  early  1960s  had  to
be a long  slog  with  no evident  ending. (One  has  recently  heard  an Argentinian
39  O.  cit., Appendix G,  "Economics:  Growth of a  Discipline  in Peru,"
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leader  declaring  that  the  number  of government  employees  needs  to  be reduced
by 20 percent.) Great  differences  exist  between  countries  and it  would  be
foolhardy  to attempt  a general  summary. But  it is  unmistakable  that  in some
countries,  Brazil  and  Mexico  being  particularly  notable,  there  have  been  high
rates  of economic  growth  accompanied  by sharp  improvements  in the  professional
competencies  available  for  policy  formation. The  problems  in the  structure  of
government  that  were found  in  the  1960s  have  by no  means  been overcome4 0 but
they  have  not  proven  to  be insuperable  barriers  to  progress. The  existence  of
research  and  policy  analysis  centers  outside  government  has  apparently  been
important,  both as sources  of ideas  and  research  findings,  and  as reservoirs
for  talent  that  may  from  time  to time  be available  to government.
III. Building  Competence  for  Policy  Formation  and  Execution:
Types  of Programs  and  Institutions
The account  in the  preceding  section  of this  paper  of the
governmental  and  national  contexts  in  which  policies  are  made and  executed  has
sought  some  broadly  common  elements  in the  vast  diversity  of  national
situations  and  experience. In  the  enthusiasm  and  optimism  that  independence,
40  Cf. Alan Riding, "In Brazil,  Battle  of the Bloated  Bureaucracy"  on the
continuing  problems  of wholesale  political  appointments,  N. Y. Times,  p. 15,
April 1987,  p. A-13.  Concerns  about  legitimacy  of governments  persist  twenty
years  after  Tannenbaum's  remarks  cited  above. Thus  Anthony  Padgen  in a review
of  volumes  3,  4,  and  5  of the  Cambridge  History  of  Latin  America  (Times  Literary
Supplement).  April 17,  1987, p. 406 comments that the difficulties  in
establishing  viable  new states  after  the  separation  from  Spain  "were  more than
how to construct  a viable  polity  out of the old regime;  they were far  more
complexly  how to make that  polity  legitimate,  a task  which  few, if any,  Latin
American  states  hsve  yet fully  realized.'- 70 -
economic  progress  and  hopes  for  development  brought  there  was  an idealistic
simplification  of the  benevolent  devotion  of governments  to  national  welfare
and the  possibilities  of reconciling  diverse  interests. In such  optimistic
simplification,  performance  could  be made critically  dependent  on professional
competencies,  correct  ideas,  and  appropriate  organization.  The  history  of
development  efforts  has  been  marked  by rationalistic  and  positivistic  faiths
that  frequently  look  naive  in  retrospect  and that  have been  much  battered  by
the  experience  of recent  decades.41  At the  present  time,  we have a chastened
sense  of the  possibilities  of controlling  national  development  and  the
effectiveness  of deliberate  efforts  in  enhancing  competencies  for  it.  But in
latter-day  sophistication,  we should  be in  a position  to judge  more  wisely
what sorts  of efforts  can  be productive.
In this  era  of enthusiasms  for  liberalization  and  privatization,
there  are  temptations  to despair  of governments'  effectiveness.  But  national
policies  must  be the  business  of government  and  the  long  established  concern
to  build the  necessary  competencies  within  government  has  not  been  misplaced.
It is never  easy  to sort  out  the  contributions  of competence  to  progress.
Political  leadership  always  involves  decisions  that  are  based  on  more than
sound  technical  analysis. Luck  and  natural  endowments  may sometimes  triumph
over folly  and incompetence.  But  the  complexities  of the  situation  and  the
demands  modern  governments  face  makes  some  endowment  in technical  competence
41  A fuller  account  of the author's  views  on this  evolution  can  be found  in
"Rationality,  Development  and Scholarship,"  Social  Science  Research  Council
Items,  v. 36,  #  4, December  1982,  pp.  49-57.- 71  -
indispensable  and it  would  be an  eccentric  judgment  that  gave  no credit  to the
growth  of such  competencies  in the  successes  of development  in  Asia  and  Latin
America.
Professional  economic  competencies  have  been  particularly
evidently  needed  and  been the  focus  of solicitous  attention. My account  of
the  poorly  equipped  state  of civil  services  in such  competencies  at the
beginning  of the  development  era  reminds  us  how  much  needed  to  be done. The
record  of Indonesia  is  a striking  and instructive  one  which  may  be carried  on
from the  point  where  we left  off  above.
The recovery  of Indonesia  from  the  economic  chaos  of the  last
Sukarno  years  under  the  new government  formed  by Suharto  in 1968  was  marked  by
a  recourse  to the  small  band  of economists  who  had  been trained  in  the  1950s
and  1960s. Dr.  Sumitro  Djojohadikusumo  was recalled  from  exile  to  be Minister
of Trade  in  the  new  government  and the  group  of  economists  who  had  nurtured  in
the  University  of Indonesia  Faculty  of Economics  and  the  Institute  of Social
and  Economic  Research  were  brought  into  government. I  have  noted  above  that
several  had  become  ministers  by 1971  and  by 1975  Gillis  found  that  all  the
Ph.D  holders  in the  Faculty  were in  high governmental  posts  while  holding  onto
their  academic  appointments.-
The.  contributions  of this  "Berkeley  Mafia"  have  been  celebrated  by
friends  of the  Suharto  government  and  deplored  by its  foes. The  existence  of
a quite  small  number  of  well-trained  Indonesian-economists  unquestionably  made- 72-
a great  difference  at a critical  time. As Gillis  summarizes,  "Only  a  handful
of capable,  well-trained  economists  is required  to  make  a correct  diagnosis  of
the  factors  underlying  severe  economic  decay  and  dislocation  such  as that
experienced  in Indonesian  from  1964-1967,  and  to  prescribe  bold  remedial
measures  for  arresting  the  problem."A 2 The  achievements  of this  Gideon's  band
offer  much  en:.ouragement  for  other  countries  that  have  suffered  from
mismanagement  of their  economies  and  a  dearth  of  highly  qualified  indigenous
economists  to  guide  them  into  better  ways.  The  numbers  of people  required  are
small  enough  that  even  quite  small  countries  should  be able to  acquire  them.
And the  discouraging  circumstances  in  which  the  Indonesian  group  was  built  up
around  the  Faculty  of Economics  is  a reminder  that  bleak  immediate  prospects
need  not deter  ultimately  important  efforts. Frank  Miller,  the  Ford
Foundation  representative  in Indonesia  in the  early  1960s  recalls  Widjojo
Nitisastro,  then  dean  of the  economics  faculty  and  later  to  be Indonesia's
chief  economic  planner  saying,  "We  cannot  do anything  now. We can  only  build
for  the  future.'n4
The  basis  of sound  national  economic  policy  can  thus  be found  in
small  numbers  of  well-trained  people. Effective  execution  of  policy  requires
much  more.  In the  Indonesian  case  great  natural  resources,  political
stability  and  much international  assistance  were important  to  subsequent
42  Report  cited  in  n. 17  above,  p. 8.
43  Frank  Miller,  "The  Ford  Foundation  and  Indonesia: 1953-69,  Retrospect  and
Prospect,"  Ford  Foundation  Archives.73-
successes. The  generally  weak  capacities  of government  and  inadequate
supplies  of  well-trained  Indonesian  talent  have  continued  to  be serious
problems  to the  present  day. Gillis  in  his  1975  survey  went  on from
recognition  of how  much  Indonesia  owed  to  a few  to  say,
"A  much larger,  more specialized  group  of economists  is  required
to  deal  effectively  with the  more  mundane  types  of on-going
problems  for  which  the  skills  of the  economists  have elsewhere
been found  to  be of some  value (project  selection  and
implementation,  program  design,  longer  run  agricultural  policy,
natural  resource  issues,  international  trade  policy  and the  like).
However,  an adequate  supply  of such  specialists  has  not  been
forthcoming  to  date,  in spite  of the  vigorous  efforts  of the
national  government  and  a  number  of donors,  in  particular  the
(Ford)  Foundation.""
The formidable  and  persisting  challenge  of supplying  such  competencies  has
continued  to  be faced  by the  Indonesians  with  major  training  programs  and
continuing  recourse  to foreign  advisors. The  Harvard  Institute  for
International  Development  has  been  engaged  in Indonesia  since  1968  and  has
been notably  active  in arranging  training  programs. A perusal  of the  HIID
1982-85  triennial  report  shows  whole  series  of training  programs  for  Ministry
of Finance,  State  Bank,  urban  development  and  other  officials. In the  Finance
ministry  program  alone,  there  were 29 officials  in  graduate  degree  programs
abroad  in 1984-85.45
"4  Frank  Miller,  "The  Ford Foundation  and Indonesia: 1953-69,  Retrospect  and
Prospect,"  Ford  Foundation  Archives.
45  HIID 1982-1985  Triennial Report, Harvard Institute for International
Development,  1737  Cambridge  St.,  Cambridge,  MA  02138,  p. 27.- 74 -
Economists  are  indispensable  but  only  a small  part of  what it
takes  to  develop  a country. When the  University  of Indonesia  Faculty  of
Economics  was  starting  to train  talent  for  the  country  it  busied  itself  with
accounting  and  business  administration  as  well  as with  general  economics."
Indeed,  there  was  a disposition  around  1960  to shift  the  emphasis  in  training
faculty  away  from  economics  and  toward  these  subjects. The  concern  to improve
and  reform  Indonesian  management  has  been almost  constant  in the  government
and  in external  agencies  since  the  early  resolutions  we noted  above. But  the
task  looked  Augean  and  deterred  massive  efforts  until  the  current  one in  which
the  World  Bank  is  playing  a major  role.  The  Ford  Foundation  engaged  a  very
senior  American  administrator,  Philip  J. Hughes,  in 1970  to  advise  on what it
might  do.  He looked  back to  a 1954  report  by Litchfield  and  Rankin  on
"Training  for  Administration  in Indonesia"  and  found  neither  much  change  in
the  basic  problems  or much  reason  t9 think  that  training  could  make  major
improvements.  He concluded  that "the  most significant  and  basic  cause  of
Indonesian  Government  public  administration  problems  is  the  weakness  of the
personnel  management  system,  both in  detail  and  in  overall  concept,"  and
addressed  his recommendations  to this  subject,  not to tra.ning.4 7 The
principal  burden  of change  clearly  hed to  be the  responsibility  of the
46  Cf. Richard  W. Dye, "The  Jakarta  Faculty  of Economics,"  Report  # 000374,
1964,  FFA.
47  Consultant  report  of  P.  S.  Hughes  re  Improvement  of Public  Administration  in
Indonesia,  addressed  to  Hr.  John Bresnan,  report  # 004691,  March  20,  1i70,  FFA.
Quotation  from  p. 3.- 75 -
Indonesians  themselves.
The  will to change  and  improvement  has  clearly  been strong  and  an
enormous  array  of efforts  have  been  made in  the  last  two  decades. They  have
characteristically  been  made  within  government  and  without  significant  growth
of independent  policy,  research,  or specialized  training  institutions.  The
enormous  growth  of universities  has  been  accompanied  by close  control  and  the
absorption  of academics  in governmental  posts  and  consulting  activities  has
gravely  restricted  the  time  and  effort  that  could  be put  into  university
duties. The  Gillis  review  pondered  the  wisdom  of diverting  economists  and
others  from  training  new generations  of Indonesian  professionals  while  they
devoted  themselves  to  urgent  current  work  of the  government. The  dilemma  is a
assic  one that  hardly  admits  of clear  solution,  but it is  clear  that  the
consequences  of the  Indonesian  choices  have  persisted. One  found  the  USAID
director  in  Jakarta  in 1983  sufficiently  distressed  at them  to  be considering
schemes.for  salary  supplementation  that  would  enable  economists  to  devote  more
time  to  university  teaching. The  Institute  of Social  and  Economic  Research
that  had  been started  with the  Jakarta  Faculty  of Economics  was  gravely
weakened  by the  absorption  of its  leaders  into  government  and  subsequent
efforts  to  develop  research  have largely  remained  within  government. Such
have  been the  Center  for-Policy  and  Implementation  Studies,  the  earlier
Development  Program  Implementation  Studies,  and  the  Center  for  Financial
Policy  Studies  and  Training,  in  all  of which  HIID  has  collaborated..- 76 -
Indonesia  thus  presents  a record  in  which  a great  deal  has  been
attempted  in the  improvement  of policy  formation  and  execution,  with  some
notable  accomplishment.  What  has  been done  has  been  overwhelmingly  within
close  governmental  control  and there  has  been little  growth  of external
research  and  policy  planning,  in  universities  or elsewhere. In  a continuing
atmosphere  of nervous  control  over  public  debate  and  sensitivity  to  criticism,
this  situation  shows  little  likelihood  of early  change.
On the  Asian  scene,  the  strongest  contrast  to the  Indonesian
record  is,  of course,  to  be found  in  India. There  have  been some
vicissitudes,  as in the  Emergency,  but the  persistence  of democracy  and  a
remarkable  openness  in  public  debate-has  given  space  for  a substantial  growth
of independent  institutions  and for  interplay  between  academics  and
government. The  strong  heritage  from  the  colonial  bureaucracy  was leavened  by
the  devotion  to planning  and  Nehru's  openness  to ideas. The proud  and
unspecialized  traditions  of administrators  have  posed  barriers  to specialists
and  outsiders  and  complaints  about  the  incapacity  of government  to make  use  of
research  and ideas  from  outside  have persisted  through  the  years.' 8 But  there
was  early  Planning  Commission  blessing  and  support  to  Ford's  1958  efforts  to
48  Thus Lewis in the 1975 report  cited above,  p. 21,  "..the  weak link in
institute-government  relations  may lie  on the  side  of government's  capacities
to use institute  product. The government  economists  were by no means  wholly
admiring  in their  appraisals  of the  usefulness  and  reliability  of the studies
the  institutes  make  available." Or the  comments  of a Ford Foundation  officer
on  the  inability  of  ministries  to  utilize  research  because  of  lack  of  appropriate
staff: Peter  Geithner  in  Program  Action  69-67,  FFA,  where  references  are  to  the
Economic  Cell  in  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  ,  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the  Trade
Development  Authority  of the  Ministry  of Commerce.- 77  -
strengthen  the  Institute  of Economic  Growth  at the  University  of  Delhi,  the
Department  of Economics  at Bombay,  the  lndian  Statistical  Institute,  the
National  Council  of Applied  Economic  Research  and  the  Gokhale  Institute  at
Poona. A decade  later  when  the  central  government  was less  attentive  to
external  ideas  and  research,  there  was a growth  of institutes  closer  to the
state  governments,  as in the  Sardar  Patel  Institute,  Ahmedabad,  or the
Institute  of Social  and  Economic  Change,  Bangalore,  with  support  from  both
central  and state  governments.
While  there  has  been  a strong  decline  in  recourse  to foreign
advisors  since  the  1950s  and  cycles  in the  "policy  dialogue"  with  major
donors,49  experienced  observers  have  found  growing  interaction  between
government  policymakers  and  the  economics  profession  throughout  India. In
1975,  John  Lewis  found  that "Tle  Indian  profession  remains  segmented..  .Yet
there  is  much  more intercourse  between  government  and  the  strong  academic
centers  than  was observable  15-20  years  ago. No longer  are  academic
economists  cut  off  from  the 'cyclostyled'  government-memorandum  world  of
serious  policy  economics  as they  were then,  and  no longer  is it  uncommon  for
leading  economists  to  move  back  and  forth  between  official  and  academic  and/or
research  institute  posts." 5 0 Other  observers  believe  the  interaction  has
continued  to grow.
49  Cf.  Robert  Cassen  and  associates, Does  Aid  Work?/ReRort to  an
Inter-Governmental  Task Force,  Oxford,  1986,  pp.  88-89  for  a brief  summary.
50  Lewis,  report  cited  above,  p. 13.- 78 -
The  development  of the  Indian  Institutes  of  Management  at
Ahmedabad,  Calcutta,  and  Bangalore  and  the  Administrative  Staff  College  at
Hyderabad  have  brought  new  resources  both for  management  training  and  policy
formation. As in  other  narts  of the  world,  the  emergence  of  management
institutes  with  a strong  or primary  orientation  to private  business  has  been
one of the  most successful  institutional  developments  of recent  decades  in the
developing  countries. These  institutes  have  been able  to attract  students  and
staff  of  high quality  while  avoiding  weaknesses  that  have afflicted  strictly
governmental  institutes  of public  administration  on the  one  hand,  or those  of
universities  on the  other. Their  viability  has  clearly  depended,  in  India  and
elsewhere,  on the  existence  of a  sufficiently  extensive  private  business
sector  to  provide  attractive  careers  to graduates. Given  such  a  base,  they
could  become  an important  resource  for  public  management  and for  the  great
range  of policy  problems  in  which  organizational  development  and  change  are  of
central  importance.  A full  discussion  of the  experience  of these  institutions
is  not feasible  within  the  scope  of this  paper,  but counterparts  in  Latin
America  will later  require  our  attention.
The extraordinary  progress  of South  Korea  since  the 1950s  makes
its  experience  of particular  interest. The  heritage  of its  bureaucracy  has
been  briefly  described  in  Part  II above. While  there  was  only slow  progress
in the  1950s  in  bringing  new  competencies  into  the  governmental  services,
extensive  training  and  educational  development  were  preparing  the  way for
rapid  progress. Large  numbers  of  Koreans  were  receiving  higher  education  in- 79 -
the  U. S. in  economics  and  other  fields,  and  advanced  training  institutions
began  to  appear  in  Korea. The  military  was in  the  lead  with the  National
Defense  College  and the  ROK  Army  Logistics  School  (both  1956);  the  National
Officials  Training  Institute  began  in 1959  in-service  training  for  higher
civil  servants;  the  Graduate  School  of Public  Administration  at Seoul  National
University  (1959)  brought  together  civil  servants,  militacy  officers,  and
graduate  students;  and  Business  Administration  Programs  were established
(1958)  in  the  private  Yonsei  and  Korea  universities. 5 1 T'he  basis  for  serious
economic  planning  was  being  laid  in  the  Research  Department  of the  Bank  of
Korea,  the  Budget  Bureau  of the  Ministry  of Finance,  and  various  ministries.
In the  words  of  Hahn-Been  Lee,  "the  April  Revolution  (1960)  put  a
stoo  to the  dominance  of the  Japanese-educated  elite  in the  political-
administrative  structure  of  Korea." 52 The subsequent  military  government  had
been prepared  by a decade  of training  and  had  acquired  a "store  of  managerial
capacity  which  was not  matched  in  scope  or  depth"  elsewhere  in  Korea
(Ibid.  p. 149). After  assuming  power  they  were  able  to introduce  their
methods  and  procedures  into  the  civil  bureaucracy. 53 During  the  1960s,  both
at the  ministerial  and  civil  service  levels  strongly  equipped  technical
leadership  developed  in  government  that  has  been  able  to guide  policy  and
S1  Lee,  op.  cit.,  pp.  88-89.
52  Ibid.,  p. 120.
53  Ibid.,  pp. 149,  173.- 80 -
planning  for  the  great  upsurge  that  cowuntry  has achieved.
The  Korean  Development  Institute  emerged  in 1971  and  has  become
the  outstanding  example  (outside  Japan)  of a research  institute  outside  but
closely  related  to  government.  The strategy  for  its  development  involved
attracting  back to  Korea  well-trained  economists  who  had remained  abroad.
According  to one  knowledgeable  observer,54  there  were 6nly  six  or seven  Ph.D
economists  in  Korea  in 1969  (not  counting  people  who  had  Japanese  Ph.Ds  from
the  1930s  or 1940s). The  experience  of several  years  of boom in  Korea  and the
contracting  academic  market  in the  U. S. made  return  to  Korea  attractive  and
12  economists  came  back  when  KDI  began  in 1971. Subsequently  there  has  been
rapid  growth  in  KDI  and in  the  numbers  of highly  trained  Korean  economist.
(Several  hundred  Ph.Ds  now,  many  of them  very good,  and  excellent  training
available  in  Korean  universities).
KDI  has  managed  to  keep  reasonable  autonomy,  though  close  to
government  and funded  by government.  Much  has depended  on strong  leadership
and  personal  relations  to top  figures  in  government.  There  has  been some  use
of KDI  as an operational  arm  for  government  or as a  means  of dealing  with
international  agencies  and  visiting  delegations.  But such  use  appears  not  to
have  been  excessive  and  KDI's  international  professional  linkages  have
strengthened  its  commitment  to long-term  and  professional  interests. The
Harvard  Institute  for-  International  Development  provided  much  assistance  to
54  Dwight  Perkins,  Director  of  HIID. Perkins  spent  several  months  in  Korea  not
long  before  the  establishment  of  KDI.- 81 -
KDI's  development  through  the  1970s. Some training  was instituted  in the  late
1970s  but  KDI  has remained  primarily  a  research  institute.
Other  Asian  experience  should  also  be noted. The importance  of
the  Pakistan  Planning  Commission  as  a locus  for  the  growth  of economic  and
technical  competence  in  that  government  has  already  been  noted. The  Planning
Commission  began  in  1953  with  heavy  technical  assistance  from  a  Harvard
Advisory  Group.  In the  pattern  then  feasible  this  Harvard  group  engaged
directly  and  actively  in  advisory  functions  but  was  quickly  engaged  in
providing  training  abroad  for  Planning  Commission  and  other  governmental
economists  abroad. The  policy-making  efforts  in the  Planning  Commission
stimulated  a demand  for  a research  unit removed  from  day-to-day  decisionmaking
and  the  Pakistan  Institute  of Development  Economics  was established  in 1959.55
This  institute,  supported  by the  Pakistan  government  and  by Ford  Foundation
grants  of almost  $3  million  between  1959  and  1969  56 became  vigorous  and
highly  regarded  during  the  1960s,  as  Lewis  tells: "Pakistan  in  general  and
PIDE  in  particular  became  the  darling  of the  international  development
economics  community;  almost  everyone  who  was  anyone  in the  American  and  West
European  branches  of the  trade  seems  to  have served  (in  many cases  actively)
ss This  account  draws  heavily  on two  sources:  George  Rosen,  Western  Economists
and  Eastern  Societies/Agepts  of  Change  in  South  Asia,  1950-1980,  Baltimore  and
London  (John  Hopkins  University  Press),  1985,  and  John P.  Lewis,  "Economics  in
Pakistan  and the  Ford  Foundation,"  Report  #  002553,  November  18,  1975,  pp.  34.
FFA.
56  Rosen,  pp.  66-67.- 82  -
on PIDE's  advisory  board.""  By 1964  the  Institute's  Pakistan  Development
Review  was  being  read  outside  Pakistan,  its  national  income  course  was  thought
to  be the  best  in the  world,  and  it enjoyed  good  and influential  relations
with the  Planning  Commission,  the  State  Bank,  and the  Central  Statistical
Office,  as well  as with  the  Harvard  Group  and  with  USAID. 58 PIDE  became  a
launching  pad for  Pakistani  economists  intd  international  respect  and
prominence  and it  was  beginning  to  become  a locus  of training  when  Ayub Khan's
government  fell  and  East  Pakistan  broke  away  to  become  independent  Bangladesh.
There  can  be little  doubt  that  Pakistan's  record  between  the  early
fifties  and the  late  sixties  shows  a remarkable  growth  of economic
policy-making  competencies.  John  Lewis  could  write  enthusiastically  in 1975
that "Ford's  record  in Pakistan  probably  is  the  classic  case  of successful
promotion  of applied  developing-country  economics  by an external  aid
agency." 59 But  by that  year  he saw  that  most  of  what  had  been  built  would
have to  be built  again. A full  account  of what  happened  in the  turbulent
years  after  1967  is  beyond  the  scope  or  needs  of this  paper  but it is
important  to try  to  understand  how this  achievement  fell  apart. In the  first
place,  the  identification  of the  Planning  Commission  and  PIDE in Pakistan  with
57  Lewis,  report  cited  in  n. 57.  p.4
58  Rosen says that Pakistan  government  agencies  trusted  PIDE more than one
another  and  would  release  data to it,  on.  cit.,  pp: 212-213.
59  Op.  cit, p. 2.-83-  D
the  Ayub government  and  its  policies  made them  vulnerable  to strong
antipathies,  whatever  the  technical  quality  of their  performance. Secondly,
the  PIDE  came  to  be viewed  with  hostility  because  of its  leadership  and its
attention  to the  troublesome  resource-allochtion  issues  between  East  and  West
Pakistan. Thirdly,  the  professional  quality  that  had  been achieved  gave  great
opportunities  for "braindrain'  which  has  continued  and  has  made  very difficult
rebuilding  of competencies  within  government  or ir.  PIDE.  Like  all  history,
Pakistan's  has  unique  features  that  affected  what  happened,  but  both the
successes  of the  early  years  and  later  retrogressions  show  the  feasibility  or
rapid  increases  in  comperencies  and  their  precariousness.  The  heavy  role  of
technical  assistance  in the  early  years  is  hardly  likely  to  be replicable  or
desirable  in  contemporary  circumstances  but there  can  be little  doubt  that
strong  and  continuing  international  inputs  were  important. And the  dissidence
of Bengali  economists  in  PIDE  was  important  to the  independence  and  quality
which  PIDE  achieved. (A  Ford  Foundation  representative  in Pakistan  commented
on n...the  absence of a critical tradition (in  Pakistan], of an intellectual
environment  of which  the  Institute  should  have  been  only  one  small
constellation.  Therc,  at  PIDE,  it  was a steady  stream  of foreigners  and  a
clump  of angry  Bengalis  that  kept  the  place  alive.")" 0 The  comment  was  made
anent  the  Institute  of National  Planning  in  Egypt,  which  had failed  to achieve
vigor  and influence  comparable  to that  of PIDE  in its  years  of flourishing.
60  Memorandum,  Edwards  to  Bell,  July  17,  1976,  in grant  file  59-472,  FFA.-4-
Competence  Building  in Latin  America
The instability  and  uncertain  legitimacy  of Latin  American
governments  at the  beginning  of the  Sixties  and  their  poor  equipment  for  the
tasks  of  policymaking  and  development  have  been  depicted. The  efforts  of
recent  decades  have  brought  notable  increases  in  competencies,  both  within  and
outside  governments,  amid  many continuing  deficiencies.  The  growth  of
professional  economic  competencies  for  policymaking  has  been particularly
notable  and  has  been much  dependent  on training  abroad  as described  in Part  2
above.
The  growth  of economic  competencies  in  Latin  America  has  been
fostered  in some  countries/by  the  rise  of strong  research  and  graduate-level
training  centers. The role  of some  of these  centers  deserves  our  attention.
Brazil  has  had several  strong  centers  beginning  with the  Vargas
Foundation  and the  Instituto  de Pesquisas  Economicas  (IPE)  at the  University
of Sao  Paulo.  IPE  began  in  1964  when the  Faculty  of Economics  of the
University  organized  it to  house  graduate  teaching  and  research. It  had
modest  support  from  the  state  government  of Sao  Paulo,  starting  at $55,000  in
1964,  and  quickly  attracted  strong  external  support  from  the  Ford  Foundation
and  USAID.  In the  early  years,  it  was  dependent  on this  external  support  for
75  percent  of its  financing,  but then  attracted  Brazilian  support  so that  by
1973  the  Ford  Foundation's  support  had  declined  from  50 percent  to 5 percent- 85 -
of the  annual  funding.6 1 The  departure  of Delfim  Netto,  its  original  founder,
along  with a team  of followers  to assist  him  as Minister  of Finance  in  1966
did  not  arrest  the  progress  of IPE  and  began  a pattern  of movement  back and
forth  between  IPE  and  government  service  which  has continued. The  Brazilian
support  IPE  attracted  came  from  several  sources  - a Special  Fund  to Develop
Technical  Training  of the  Brazilian  Development  Bank  (FUNTEC-BNDE)  and  a Fund
for  Research  of the  State  of Sao  Paulo  (FAPESP)  along  with research  contracts
from  the  National  Planning  Ministry,  the  Sao  Paulo  Planning  Ministry,  and
BNDE.  External  support  provided  overseas  training  and  a flow  of distinguished
economists,  including  Tobin,  Harrod,  Machlup,  Schultz,  and  Georgescu-Roegen  as
visits  and  collaborators.  In 1974,  Ford  could  boast  that  between  1966  and
1973  it  had funded  graduate  study  in  Europe  and  America,  principally  at the
doctoral  level  for 75 individuals,  many  of them  from  IPE.2 There  was also  a
vigorous  growth  of graduate  training  at IPE  with Inter-American  Bank  and  other
support. A later  evaluation  proclaimed,  "With  the  exception  of the  Vargas
Foundation  and, to  a lesser  degree,  Brasilia,  no graduate  economics  program  in
all  of Latin  America  comes  even  close  to  matching  this 'center  of
excellence'". 63 At the  time  IPE  had 32  professional  staff,  all  full-time
except  six  who  were  partially  on the  Faculty  of Economics  budget,  and  of  whom
12  had Ph.Ds  from  the  U. S.  with 6  more  completing  them.
61  Baer  to  Nicholson,  June  7, 1974,  p. 2, in  grant  file  65-7,  FFA.
62  Request  for  grant  action,  Sept.  3,  1974,  in grant  file  65-7,  FFA.
63  Reynold  Carlson,  May 28,  1976,  p. 5 in  65-7,  FFA.-86-
The growth  of this  impressive  institution  was clearly  dependent  on
the  rapid  economic  progress  occurring  in  Brazil  and  its  competencies  made
contributions  to that  progress. There  were  some  costs  as  well  as gains  from
economic  progress. A booming  non-academic  demand  for  professional  economists
from  both  public  and  private  sectors  brought  the  distractions  of consulting
opportunities  and  difficulties  in  holding  promising  youngsters. Heavy
dependence  on research  contracts  brought  familiar  problems  of  narrowness  and
budgetary  precariousness  and  pleas  for "free"  research  funds. Arnold
Harberger  in 1975  thought  IPE  needed  such  funds  and  continuing  support  for
overseas  training  despite  the  "flourishingn  state  of  economics  there.64
IPE  was  not  alone  in this  rise  of  Brazilian  research  and  graduate
training  centers. Vargas  and  the  University  of Brazilia  have  been  mentioned,
and  others  at the  Federal  University  of  Minas  Gerais  (the  Center  for  Regional
Development  and  Planning,  CEDEPLAR),  Recife  and  Fortaleza  could  be added,
along  with centers  devoted  to agricultural  economics. Most of these
institutes  had  university  connections  and  Ford  Foundation  officers  were firmly
persuaded  that  their  strategy  of concentrating  on "university  programs,  rather
than  governmental  planning  agencies,  had  paid off  handsomely."6 5 Brazilian
universities  were in this  period  in  a  phase  of strong  growth  in resources  and
the  institutes  were relatively  insulated  from  some  of the  pressures  of
64  Harberger  to  Nicholson,  Sept.  17,  1975,  in  65-7,  FFA.
65  Nicholson  to Carmichael,  March  12,  1974,  in 65-7,  FFA.- 87 -
university  settings  by their  research  income  and  external  support. This
attraction  to  universities  was  to  be perturbed  by political  pressures  on them
of the  sort  that  have  afflicted  universities  very  widely  in the  Third  World.
But  the  hope of a 'regenerating'  capacity,  whereby  Brazil  could  reduce  its
dependence  on foreign  graduate  training  was a strong  motivation  among  both
Brazilians  and  their  external  supporters  to favor  research  institutes  linked
thereto. The  remarkable  development  of graduate  study  in  Brazil  has continued
to the  present  day  and  surpasses  efforts  elsewhere  in  Latin  America.
While  Brazil  can  illustrate  the  successful  development  of policy
research  in  university  settings,  it  has also  displayed  conditions  leading  to
the  establishment  of independent  research  institutes.  Among  these,  the  Centro
Brasileiro  de  Analese  e Planeiamento  (CEBRAP)  has  been conspicuous. Its  image
was described  in 1975  as "Brazil's  sole  beacon  of academic  liberty  and sole
channel  of exchange  with  liberal,  progressive  or socialist  scholars  and
institutions  abroad."66  The  origins  of this  institute  lay  in the  severe
political  and  ideological  dissension  in  Brazil  in the  late  1960s. It  was
founded  by a group  of forcibly  retired  professors  (aposentados)  from  the
University  of Sao  Paulo  under  the  leadership  of the  political  sociologist,
Fernando  Enrique  Cardoso,  and  a group  of active  colleagues  who produced  a
series  of widely  noted  and  well-regarded  studies  on  political  subjects,
population,  rural  and  urban  subjects,  and religion. CEBRAP  became  a leading
exponent  of dependencia  theories  and  won accolades  as "the  outstanding  social
66  Morse  to  Venezian,  May  21,  1975,  p. 2 in  grant  file  75-593,  FFA.- 88 .
science  research  institute  in  Brazil."" The  establishment  of this  center  by
a group  of scholars  evidently  mistrusted  by the  ruling  government  and critical
of its  actions  was  made  possible  by a margin  of tolerance  in  Brazil  and  by
external  support. In the  period  1970-72,  CEBRAP's  funding  was 70  percent
dependent  on the  Ford  Foundation,  but it  was  able  rather  quickly  to diversify
its  external  support  and  gradually  to secure  research  contracts  within  Brazil.
I.ts  engagement  in  population  studies  in  particular  gave it  access  to
international  sources  of support  in this  field. By 1980  it  acquired
economists  and  was able  to  establish  Groupo  de Coniunctura  with financing  from
the  Planning  Secretariat  of the  State  of Sao  Paulo,  and  thus  to  engage  more
widely  in  issues  of current  economic  policy. The  1980s  have  brought  familiar
problems  from  the  constraints  of dependency  on research  contracts,  crises  from
shifting  levels  of funding,  and  uncertainties  of direction  as changing
leadership  and the  evolution  of the  Brazilian  political  setting  inevitably
brought. But  CEBRAP  continues  to this  day  as an important  exemplar  of the
viability  of independent  and influential  research  centers  in  Latin  America.
Its  location  in the  burgeoning  metropolis  of Sao  Paulo,  the  quality  of its
staff,  and  a margin  of freedom  that  made it  viable  under  an authoritarian
government  have  evidently  been important  reasons  for  its  success.
Another  successful  Latin  American  institutional  development  that
deserves  our  attention  is  presented  by El Colegio  de Mexico. This institution
67  Raymond  Carr  in  letter  to  Morse,  April  7, 1975,  75-593,  FFA,  which  file  also
contains  (solicited)  laudatory  letters  from  Victor  Urquidi,  Albert  Hirschman,
Richard  Fagen,  Albert  Fishlow,  and  Thomas  Skidmore.- 89 -
was  established  in 1940  as a literary  and  humanistic  research  center. Under
the  leadership  of the  historiani,  Daniel  Cosio  Villegas,  it  won  respect  and
international  recognition  but remained  small  until  the  1960s  when it  began  a
major  expansion. Its  budget  rose  from  US$200,000  in 1962  to  $1,300,000  in
1971  with support  from  UNESCO,  the  Mexican  government  and  the  Ford  Foundation.
An Economics  and  Demographic  Studies  Center  was  established  in  1963  with Ford
Foundation  funding  and  has grown  into  a  major  resource  for  training  and
research,  with good  links  to government,  Mexican  and  other  Latin  American
universities.  It  has  confined  itself  in  this  field  as in  most others  to
graduate  training  and  has  been  able to  attract  more  high  quality  students  than
it  can  accommodate. 68  While  the  initial  expansion  of El Cole&io  in the  1960s
depended  heavily  on external  support,  both financially  and  through  visiting
professors,  it  won increasing  Mexican  government  support  which  was  providing
80  percent  of the  budget  by the  early  1970s  and  has since  provided  a  handsome
new campus  on the  outskirts  of  Mexico  City. Good  relations  with government
have  been sustained  by graduates  serving  in government,  by appreciation  of El
Colegio's  research  contributions,  and  by the  distinguished  leadership  of its
longtime  president,  Victor  Urquidi. While  El  Colegio  has grown  it  has  managed
to avoid  the  vast expansion  that  Mexican  universities  have  undergone,
restricting  its  admissions  severely  and  confining  its  training  largely  to
graduate  levela  though  it  does  offer  licentiaturas  in international  relations,
and (since  1982)  in  public  administration.
68  This account  of El Colegio  is based largely  on materials  in th: FFA, in
particular  the  grant  files  70-224  and 73-0874,  and  report  # 001514,  Calvin  P.-
Blair  and  Kalman  H.  Silvert, "El  Colegio de  Mexico--An Evaluation,"
December  4, 1969,  pp. 70.- 90  -
El Colegio  thus  presents  many  of the  features  of indepeneent
institutions  that  have served  successfully  elsewhere  in  building  competencies
for  policymaking  and  governmental  functioning. It  has  been  able  to maintain
good  standards  in  graduate  training  and  research,  avoiding  excessive
expansion,  and  keeping  good  relations  but some  independence  from  government.
Its  role  in  economic  policymaking  has  been somewhat  more limited  than  the
leading  Brazilian  institutions,  perhaps  because  of initial  concentration  on
demographic  and  urban  development  studies,  and it  has  been criticized  in
recent  years  for  neglecting  analysis  of  Mexico's  macroeconomic  adjustment
nroblems. It  has  had difficulties  at times  in  holding  its  staff  who  were
lured  by more lucrative  opportunities  elsewhere. But  it continues  as the  sort
of resource  other  developing  countries  have  envied  and  needed.
The  enthusiasm  for  reform  and improvement  of  public  management
that  rose in the  1960s  hardly  survived  that  decade,  and it is  difficuit  to
find  parallels  to the  rise  of economic  competencies  in other  fields. Faith  in
the  subject  of "development  administration"  declined  sharply  after  that  decade
and  hopeful  titles  like  Development  Administration  in Latin  America  69  became
rare.  Schools  of public  administration  have persisted  but  without  the.
stimulus  of  much international  interest,  and in  tehe  present  mood of  -
liberalization  and  privatization  it is fashionable  to deplore  the  intractable
69  Eds.  Clarence  E.  Thurber  and  Lawrence  A.  Graham,  Duke  University  Press,  19t3.- 91  -
weakness  of public  services  and  to look  to the  private  sector  for  wall-managed
activities.
The institutions  we have  noted  in  Asia  which  combine  management
training  for  private  and  public  sectors  have  had their  counterparts  in  Latin
America. Two  notable  examples  are  the  Instituto  Centroamericano  de
Administracion  de Empresas  (INCAE)  originally  based  in  Nicaragua  and  latterly
in  Costa  Rica,  and  the  Instituto  de Estudios  Superiores  de Administracion
(IESA)  in  Venezuela. The  former  of these  began  in 1964  with  major  support
from  USAID  as a business  administration  school  on the  model  of the  Harvard
Business  School. The  pattern  of its  development  is  one that  closely  followed
the  pattern  of similar  schools  in  Turkey,  the  Philippines,  and  India. The
initial  period  from  1964  to 1967  was  devoted  to research,  preparation  of case
materials  and  advanced  management  seminars. An M.B.A.  program  in  business
administration  started  in  1968,  which  had  enrolled  a total  of 120  students
from  13 countries  by 1971.70  While  the  initial  development  was directed  to
the  private  sector,  special  concerns  with  agribusiness  (funded  by the  Central
Bank  of  Nicaragua)  and  development  banking  led  toward  public  management
interests. It  was found  that  many  students  were in  fact  preparing  for  public
service  and  by the  mid-Seventies  several  ministers  in Central.American
70  A brief summary  account  of INCAE  and IESA  may be found  in eds. David  C.
Corten and  Felipe B. Alfonso, Bureaucracy  and the Poor/Closing  the Gap,
Singapore,  etc. (McGraw-Hill  International)  1981. This  volume  includes  papers
by INCAE  and IESA staff. The files  on Ford  grants  to INCAE,  72-406,  73-647,
74-652  in  FFA,  contain  much instructive  material.- 92  -
governments  were graduates." There  were  also increasing  requests  from
governments  for  consulting  services. In 1971  the  interests  of the  Ford
Foundation  in  improving  the  management  of  family  planning  programs  stimulated
a  program  in social  service  delivery;  by 1974  there  was a  course  in  public
corporation  management  and  seminars  were  being  held for  public  officials.
This increasing  engagement  with  public  management  and  policy  was encouraged  by
external  support.7 2 Since  the  Nicaraguan  revolution  of 1979,  INCAE  has
engaged  very  actively  in the  efforts  of the  new  government  to reorganize
ministries  and  public  services.
INCAE  has  special  interest  as perhaps  the  most  international  of
the  group  of management  institutes  and  one  that  has served  small  countries.
Points  made  earlier  about  Asian  institutes  are  relevant  to its  successful
development: its  initial  sponsorship  by the  private  sector  and  the  capacity
to attract  good  students  with career  prospects  in that  sector;  the  important
role  of external  assistance,  both through  initial  staffing  and  through
financial  support  for  training  of its  own  staff  and  much  else;  the  gradual
asaumption  of consulting  and  training  roles  for  the  public  sector. It has  not
been  a larZ&  institution--by  1980  it  had 180  students  in its  two-year  MBA
course  and  a full-time  faculty  of 30  members  of  half a dozen  different
71  Cf.  the  Request  for  Grant  Action,  #  ID-2345,  August  4,  1975,  for  a  supplement
to  74-652,  FFA.
72  FF grant 74-652  had  this purpose and USAID supported  a Rural Sector
Management  Project  in  1976-1978.- 93  -
nationalities. 73 Quite  aside  from  the  political  vulnerabilities  lts  strong
U. S. linkages  and  its  private  sector  beginnings  gave it,  there  were  problems,
not  unknown  elsewhore,  in extending  its  work into  public  policy  and
management. For  example,  at the  final  evaluation  the  Ford initiative  in
family  planning  and  social  service  delivery  had  not institutionalized  these
concerns  at INCAE,  because: (1)  the  project  personnel  were  all  North
American;  (2)  the  governments  were  not  especially  interested;  and (3)  the
field-was  too  specialized  for  a regular  program  at INCAE. 74 These  problems
were subsequently  overcome  in the  design  of  programs  in  both the  management
and  policy  areas  for  high-level  government  officials,  but  problems  persist  in
the  institutionalization  of  programs  involving  grassroots  developments.
These  varied  examples  of research  and  training  institutions  could
be extended  with others  such  as Di  Tella  in Argentina,  FEDESAROLLO  in
Colombia,  or CIEPLAN  in  Chile. But  they  may  suffice  to demonstrate  the
significant  roles  such  institutions  have  been  able  to  play in  Latin  America  in
the  past  couple  of decades. Their  emergence  and  evident  utility  have
apparently  depended  on  a number  of conditions.  Among  them  we  may discern:
(1)  the  relative  openness  and  fluidity  of Latin  American  governments  which
were  noted  in Part  II  of this  paper;  (2)  private  sectors  strong  enough  to
provide  support  for  both training  and  research  activities;  (3)  the  growth  of a
cadre  of economists  and  other  social  scientists  to  provide  the  necessary
73  Corten  and  Alfonso,  p. 242.
7' Nagel  to Drysdale,  February  10,  i977,  p. 9, in 72-408,  FFA.- 94 -
talent,  combined  with (4)  a tolerance  for  social  science  publication  of
considerable  critical  diversity;  and (5)  substantial  international  support,
both financial  and intellectual,  coming  from  various  sources  (Sweden,  Canada,
the  Netherlands,  etc.,  as  well  as from  the  United  States). In addition  to
their  contributions  through  research,  policy  analysis,  public  debate,  and
training,  these  Institutions  have  provided  reservoirs  of talent  which  have
from  time  to  time  been  brought  into  public  service. Their  flourishing  has in
turn  been  dependent  on the  strong  growth  of economies,  the  continuing  rise  of
educational  levels  and  professional  competencies  in  government  and  elsewhere.
IV.  The  Role of  External  Assistance
External  assistance  has  certainly  played  a major--and  frequently
critical--role  in the  development  of  competencies  for  policy  formation  and
management  we have  been surveying  in  Latin  America  and  Asia.  The  beginnings
of most  of the  institutions  we have  described  or the  training  of the
professionals  to  staff  them  have  been  dependent  on external  aid.  In  many
instances,  as for  examples  El  Colegio  in  Mexico  or IPE  in  Brazil,  there  has
been rapid  progress  away  from  dependence  on external  financial  support. In
other  cases  much  more  protracted  dependence  on such  support  has  existed  or  new
needs  have arisen  because  of  political  conditions  and  instabilities.
Countries  like  Indonesia  that  began  with  very thin  cadres  of professionally
trained  talent  have felt  the  need  for  long  support. In  Latin  America,  many  of
the  private  and  independent  research  institutes  have  had long  struggles  in
finding  adequate  local  support,  particularly  if  they  took  critical  views  of- 95 -
prevailing  government  policy  and  embraced  fields  other  than  economics.
Argentina  and  Chile  have shown  such  conditions  in recent  years.7 5 The  sharp
reductions  in  external  assistance  that  appeared  in the  1970s  in  Latin  America
and  have  persisted  have  been the  cause  of great  concern,  stimulating  the  Joint
Committee  on Latin  America  Studies  of the  SSRC  and  ACLS to a  major  review  of
the  situation  (with,  of course,  heavy  participation  of  Latin  Americans).
Important  as external  financial  support  has  been,  it  may  be more
readily  reduced  than  the  international  professional  contacts  which  it
initially  fostered,  and  which  are  often  difficult  to  maintain  without  it.  The
importance  of these  contacts  in the  development  of PIDE,  KDI,  and  most  of the
Latin  American  institutions  we have  surveyed  has  been  evident,  and  the
influence  of overseas  training  has  been  very  great. In a 1980  review  of the
state  of economics  in  Latin  America,  Venezian  commented:
"Institutions  and  scholars  can  rapidly  fall  behind  in the  science
if they  do not  maintain  close  contact  with the  leading  economics
centers  in the  world,  which  means  mainly  certain  North  American
universities.  Reading  the  journals  is  probably  not enough,
especially  if the  local  libraries  are  not  well supplied. Thus,  a
broad  program  of sabbaticals,  attendance  at seminars,  faculty
exchanges,  Joint  research,  and  the  like,  involving  selected
institutions  from  outside  the  region,  is  essential. Although  some
of these  activities  now  occur  through  various  funding  schemes,  on
the  whole  they  are  extremely  limited  and  are  becoming  increasingly
difficult  to implement  since  the  traditional  international
75  Cf.  Balan,  p. 237 in  essay  cited  in  n. 33 above.- 96 -
assistance  agencies  have  cut  back their  support  In  Latin
America.
The  phasing  of development  assistance  is  always  subject  to  uncertainties  and
criticisms  of inducing  protracted  dependency  are  familiar. But  at least  for
high quality  performance  of research  institutes  it  would  appear  that  long
continued  capacity  to  maintain  international  professional  relations  is  needed,
and  not  readily  sustained  with local  resources  alone. There  have sometimes
been  doubts  about  the  consequences  of these  relationshi-s  in  promoting  brain
drain  or excessive  attention  to interr,ational  audiences  at the  expense  of
local  relevance. Lewis'  review  of the  history  of PIDE  expressed  such
concerns77  and it  is certain  that  brain  drain  has  been facilitated  in  Pakistan
and  many  other  countries  by the  capacity  to  do international  quality  work.
The suggestion  has  occasionally  been  made t..at  deliberately  lower  standards
should  be the  norm in  building  national  cadres,  but typically  rejected  as
offensively  condescending.
Whatever  the  level  and  extent  of external  assistance,  it  has
typically  been  found  that  there  is a serious  problem  of sustaining  the  staffs
of institutions  that  are  the  targets  of effort. In its  years  of fostering  the
Pakistan  Planning  Commission  and  PIDE,  the  Ford  Foundation  was repqatedly
distressed  at the  continuing  need  to train  new  generations.  A similar
76  Eduardo  Venezian,  "The  Economic  Sciences  in  Latin  America,"  p. 209,  In Social
Sciences  and  Public  Policy  in  the  Developing  World,  n. 33  above.
77  Cf.  n. 57 above.-97 
instability  has  marked  the  staffing  of Latin  American  institutions,  either
because  of departures  to international  organizations  or to other  positions  in
Latin  America.7 8 In some  other  places  (Korea,  Indonesia)  the  problems  of
replacement  seem  to  have  been less  serious,  but there  must  be a general
expectation  that  substantially  larger  numbers  of  people  must  be trained  than
the  scale  of the  relevant  institutions  would  auggest. Much  of the  early
effort  in  counterpart  trainirg  through  technical  assistance  was frustrated  by
rotation  and instability,  as  have carefully  tailored  programs  of academic  and
professional  training. The  retention  of good  professionals  is  much  helped  by
national  progress  (as  Korean  and  Brazilian  experiences  have shown)  and  one
must  expect  the  challenge  to  be particularly  severe  where  there  is stasis  or
deterioration.
Finally,  a  word should  be said  in favor  of high  quality  in  the
agents  of external  assistance. Reviewing  files  and  evaluations  on proj.cts  of
the  past  brings  constant  reminders  of  progress  that  has depended  on  high
quality-in  ovarseas  training  and  in the  talent  that  could  be mobilized  for
institution-building  in the  developing  countries  themselves.  It  was  probably
easier  to  mobilize  talent  for  such  efforts  when  development  was a  new and
exciting  interest. But  with the  greatly  increased.numbers  of resources  and
talented  people  in  many countries  nowadays  the  means  to  sustain  high quality
exist  and  merely  adequate  performance  need  not  be accepted.
78  Venezian,  oR.  cit.,  n.i82,  p. 205.- 98 -
V.  Some  Conclusions  from  Asian  and  Latin  American  Experience
1)  A relatively  small  number  of competent  economists  can  make  rmajor
differences  in the  quality  of  economic  policy  formation. The requisite
numbers  are  not  beyond  the  reach  of quite  small  countries.
2)  Overseas  training  to  the  Ph.D.  level  is typically  needed.
Training  within  the  countries  has  been inadequate  and  has long  remained  so,
even  in large  and  relatively  sophisticated  countries.
3)  Problems  of turnover  and  brain  drain  mean that  numbers  of highly
trained  economists  in  excess  of a feasible  minimum  are  required. In  some
cases,  attractive  opportunities  can  bring  repatriations  (Korea).
4)  "Reservoirs"  of talent  outside  operating  ministries  are  important.
These  may  be found  in  universities,  research  institutes,  or consultir.g  firms.
The  extent  of the  private  sector  is important  to their  existence.
5)  A large  array  of specialized  competencies,  in  economics  and  other
fields,  is  needed  for  sound  development. Such  competencies  have  been only
slowly  acquired  and  it  has  not  been easy  to incorporate  them  effectively  in
public  services  that  have  been  slow  to reward  them  satisfactorily.  Purely
internal  government  reforms  are  likely  to require  supplementary  resources  like
some  mentioned  below.-99- 
6)  Public  employment  has  been  sufficiently  attractive  that  public
services  become  seriously  distended  and  are intractable  to reform. The
experience  in general  administrative  training  and  reform  is  not encouraging
when confined  to government.  More encouraging  experietce'  has come  in
combinations  of public  and  private  management.
7)  Management  institutes  with a strong  orientation  to the  private
sector  have  been successful  and  effective  in  botih  Latin  America  and  Asia.
They  have  become  an important  resource  for  public  management  training  and  for
research  and  public  policy  formation.
8)  Since  policy  formation  requires  attention  to  questions  of
organization  and  management,  institutions  devoted  to these  questions  have
evident  potential  in  dsalir.g  with  them. The combination  of policy  formation
and training  has  not  been  without  problems  but experience  is  sufficiently
encouraging  to  give  hopes  for'such  combination  in  other  countries.
9)  The  need  to supplement  analysis  of  policy  issues  in  working
ministries  by research  from  other  sources  has  been  almost  universally
rpcognized,  and  has grown  with  understanding  of the  complexity  of  development
problems  and  of current  economic  management. Such  research  has  been sought  in
various  arrangements,  some  closely  integrated  with  government  and  some  more
clearly  independent.  The  forms  depend  on such  contextual  factors  as the
extent  of the  private  sector,  the  tolerance  of government  for  independent
institutions,  the  stability  of  universities,  and  the  extent  of international- 100
assistance.
10)  Some  conditions  for  effective  utilization  of research  and  policy
analysis  may  be identified  as follows:
a)  The  capacity  and  readiness  of civil  servants  to  use ideas  and
analysis  generated  elsewhere. Much potentially  useful  work  has
been ignored,  neglected  or rejected. An effective  research
institute  needs  counterparts  who  understand  and  value  its  work.
b)  Some  autonomy  or approach  to an "arms-length"  relationship  between
research  institutes  and  operating  ministries  is  needed. It  may  be
achieved  in  quite  authoritariani  settings  if  some  of the  following
conditions  are  present.
C)  Personial  leadership  by trusted  and  respected  figures  has  been
important  in  most  cases  (Mexico,  Brazil,  etc.).
d)  Diversified  funding  and  active  linkages  to international  agencies
and  professionala  has typically  been  helpful  to  the  autonomy  and
quality  of  work  of institutes.  As in  any field  of intellectual
endeavor,  the  maintenance  of quality  depends  importantly  on
international  standards  and  stimulation,  which  may  be expected  to
be particularly  important  for  small  countries.- 101  -
e)  A vigorous  private  sector  can  be very  helpful  though  it  may  make
difficult  the  retention  of research  staff. But  there  have  been
instances  in  Asia  where  this  has  not  been  critically  important.
11)  Relations  between  universities  and  governments  have  been  uneasy
over  most  of the  Third  World  and  may  be expected  to remain  so.  There  has,
nevertheless,  been  an important,  and in some  cases,  growing  interchange
between  academics  and  the  civil  services. University  professorships  provide
onie  of the  "reservoirs'  mentioned  above,  and  make  possible  a turnover  in
policy-making  positions  that  responds  to  changing  conditions  and  needs.
12)  Full-scale  universities  largely  devoted  to  undergraduate
instruction  have  been less  propitious  settings  for  policy  research  and
advanced  training  than  more  selective  institutions  emphasizing  graduate
training..  Instances  are  El Colegio  de Mexico,  the  Vargas  Foundation,  the
institutes  of management  in  India  and  the  Philippines.  There  are,  however,
examples  of effective  developments  within  major  universities,  given  strong
leadership  and  support  from  both domestic  and international  sources  (IPE  at
Sao  Paulo,  the  School  of Economics  in the  University  of the  Philippines).
13)  The  history  of Third  World  countries  in  the  past decades  makes  it
appear  that  there  will inevitably  be ups  and  downs  in  the  effectiveness  of any
means  of promoting  good  policy  formation  and  execution. Institutions  that
have  been influential  and  effective  in  one  period  suffer  decline  in others  and
one  should  not  be discouraged  if  restoration  and  renewal  are  regularly  needed.- 102 -
APPENDIX  B
THE  AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
Introducti
This  paper  describes  the  history  and  present  state  of capacity
building  for  policy  analysis  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. Policy  analysis  is
defined  in this  case  as macro-economic  policy  analysis  with intersectoral
implications  and  policy  analysis  in  major  sectors,  particularly  agriculture.
The  objectives  of the  study  is twofold: to  review  the  experiences  of selected
donor  agencies,  excluding  the  World  Bank,  in  supporting  institutions  engaged
in  policy  analysis  and  research;  and,  to assess  the  state  of  policy-making  in
African  countries  based  on donor  experiences.
The analysis  emphasizes  capacity  building  in institutions,  such  as
research  centres  withir.  universities,  which  enjoy  an arms-length  relationship
with governiment  and  which  potentially  can  provide  solid  empirical  economic
analysis  for  policymakers.  The review  also  describes  the  experience  of
certain donors  in  strengthening  government  ministries  since  a large
percentage  of donor  support  for  policy-making  has  gone  directly  to  ministries
such  as finance  and  planning.
The review  analyses  the  lessons  donors  have  learned  in terms  of
those  activities  which  have  proven  especially  significant  in  building-103-
institutional  capacity  and in increasing  the  level  of demand  for  policy-
relevant  research  and  analysis  within  African  countries. The  ana.ysis,
therefore,  looks  at the  different  approaches  or strategies  used  by donors,  and
the  differing  results  that  these  strategies  have  yielded  within  various
national  and institutional  contexts  in  u'b-Saharan  Africa.
The  paper  begins  with  a desciiption  of the  general  context  for
policy  analysis  in  Africa. This  description  raises  the  major  generic  issues
facing  African  governments  and international  agencies  interested  in
stimulating  bvth  policy  analysis  and  the  demand  for  it from  different  national
clients. The  next section  describes  the  activities  in this  area  of the  three
major  types  of-donors: multilateral  donors  and  technical  assistance  agencies
such  as  UNDP;  bilateral  donors  such  as SIDA,  USAID  and  the  French  government;
foundations  and semi-autonomous  government  agencies  such  as the  Ford
Fotndation,  International  Development  Research  Center  (IDRC),  and the  Swedish
Agency  for  Research  Cooperation  with  Developing  Countries  (SAREC). The
description  highlights  the  particular  approach  of each  donor  and its
implications  within  the  context  as defined  in  the  first  section. African
organizations  such  as the  ECA  and  the  Afr'_an  Development  Bank  have  not  been
surveyed.
Section  3 describes  and  analyses  several  particularly  relevant
examples  of institutional  development  and  the  donor  strategies  that  fostered
those  initiatives.  Examples  chosen  are the  Economic  Research  Bureau  (ERB)  at
the  Univ3rsity  of Dar-es-Salaam,  the  Centre  Ivorien  de  Recherches  4conomique- 104 -
et sociale  (CIRES)  in  Abidjan,  and  the  macro-economic  research  program
developed  by IDRC  in  East  and  Southern  Africa.
The  concluding  part  highlights  the  lessons  and implications  of the
study  and  emphasizes  the  remaining  challenges  and  how they  could  be addressed
by the  donor  community.'
I.  The  Context  for  Economic  Policy  Anallsis
In the  preparation  of this  study  a great  deal  of material  has  been
accumulated  from  donor  agencies  on the  contextual  factors  that  prevail  in
individual  African  countries,  in regions  and  generally  in sub-Saharan  Africa.
These  factors  influence  economic  policy  analysis  within  government,  parastatal
organizations,  universities  and  the  private  sector. The  aim  of this  section,
therefore,  is to outline  the  generic  issues  from  the  donors'  point  of  view
without  overly  simplyfing  a complex  topic. As a result  the  the  reader  will
better  understand  the  context  within  which  donor  programmes  (described  in  the
next  section)  have provided  support  to  economic  policy  analysis  and  research.
The  Political  Context:
A dominant  factor  is  the  difficult  political  concext  in  which
* policies  are  made.  It  colours  all  initiatives  and  is  held responsible  for
'  In  carrying  out  the  study,  the  author  met  with  officials  of the  agencies
involved  and read  cocuments  available  in the  files  of donor  agencies,  such  as
evaluations,  trip  reports,  grant  proposals  and  other  similar  material.*.  - 105
many inadequacies,  including  the  lack  of demand  for  policy  advice,  the  low
morale  that  prevails  in  many  ministries  of planning  and  finance,  and the
widespread  neglect  of statistical  services  and  other  elements  of  basic
fin&neial  management.
The attitudes  of those  in  power  within  increasingly  authoritarian
political  systems  are  the  root  cause  of the  lack  of  demand  for  rational  data
collection,  analysis,  financial  management  and  planning  --  let  alone
independent  policy  advice  from  outside  government.  The  elite  in  charge  tends
to be intolerant  of scientific  production  in  general  and  of policy  analysis  in
particular. In addition,  in  most  countries,  no supportive  public  exists  to
provide  recognition  and  to create  a demand  for  social  or economic  research.
This issue  must  be faced  squarely  because  it is serious  and
long-term. The  only  major  consumers  of policy  research  in  many  African
countries  are the  government  and  international  organizations.  There  are  no
mediating  forces  such  as opposition  parties,  unions  or informed  groups  of
intellectuals  or opinion-makers  who  discuss  and  debate  policy  options.
Economic  research  focussed  on the  political  economy  of the  country  and  its
future  directions  can  survive  in Chile  or  Argentina  under  repressive  r6gimes
because  those  societies  have long  traditions  of  political  and  intellectual
pluralism. Such  is  not  generall.y  the  case  in  Africa. In effect,  the
spontaneous  creation  of independent  centres  of research  and  opinion  is
impossible  in  the  context  of  most  African  societies  today.,  ,  - 106-
Moreover  the  demand  from  the  government  itself  is  often  weak,
although  there  are  obvious  exceptions.  The  major  consumers  of  policy  research
and  analysis  remain  international  aid  agencies  and  private  consulting  firms
and  banks.  In  many cases  those  same  organizations  also  set  the  agenda  and
produce  the  research  on  behalf  of governments  with the  help  of expatriate
experts  or local  consultants.  As a result,  the  inqtitutional  production  and
consumption  of  policy  analysis  often  bypasses  government  agencies  or other
potential  producers  of research  such  as  university-based  institutes.
Both  censorship  and  self-censorship  are  common. Researchers
outside  government  stick  to  relatively  protected  subjects  such  as  programme
evaluation,  micro  sectoral  work,  etc. Therefore,  one  general  result  of the
political  climate  in certai zountries  is that  economic  research  tends  to
avoid  controversial,  macro  or national  level  issues  which  are  simply
politically  taboo  in  the  more  repressive  environments.  Donors  who  want to
support  such  research  in those  countries  have three  options. Either  they  have
to  encourage  it  within  line  government  agencies  only;  they  have to accept  the
fact  that  they  must  encourage  research  in  a  policy  vacuum  in  the  long-term
hope that  the  capacity  will stay  in the  country  and  be used;  or they  have to
abandon  support  for  national  economic  policy  or other  sensitive  areas  such  as
agricultural  policy,  and  concentrate  on strengthening  institutions  in  less
controversial  sectors  like  health  or  education.- 107
The Supply  of Policy  Analysts:
A second  major  issue,  about  which  there  is  a  broad  general
consensus  among  donor  agencies,  is  the  need to  keep  training  as  many
economists,  statisticians  an-'  other  social  scientists  as possible. Some  donor
staff  argue  that  the  real  challenge  is  to  better  use  existing  talent  since
there  are  plenty  of good  African  economists.  Most  would  agree,  however,  that
as  well  as better  using  the  current  pool,  the  lack  of  a critical  mass  will
continue  for  a long  time  in  Southern,  Eastern  and  Francophone  Africa
especially.  This lack  will  necessitate  a continuing  expatriate  presence  for
many  years.  In addition,  leakage  or  brain  drain  to other  countries  and
international  organizations  will  continue,  aggravated  by the  private  gains
accruing  to  Africans  wdorking  abroad  and  to  expatriates  in  Africa. Finally,
institutional  stability  is inconceivable  as long  as demand  for  good  economists
so outstrips  supply. The latter  is  lower  in  macro-economics  than  in  other
areas,  so that  building  institutions  will  be  harder  in the  area  of nationaL
economic  policy  than  in  agricultural  economics  and  rural  development.
Individuals  who  enter  government  economic  positions  ink  the  context
of an obvious  under4upply  of  highly  trained  people  often  are  quickly  promoted
from  policy  or analysis  jobs  to  administrative  positions,  loso  their  skills,
or move to the  private  sector. The  government  must then  turn  to expatriates
for  advice  and  the  vicious  cycle  continues. The institutional  environment  in
government  service,  moreover,  is  often  demoralizing.  Low  pay,  a lack  of other
incentives,  neglect  by the  political  powers  and  the  generally  bad physical- 108 -
working  conditions  discourage  talented  career-orianted  economists  from
remaining  in  ministries  of finance  or planning. Thus  circumstances  often
militate  against  the  long-term  sustainability  cf strong  policy  analysis
institutions  within  the  central  government.
Bureaucratic Constraints*
Institutional  stability,  undermined  by indifference  or  hostility
from  governments  and  battered  by the  rapid  turnover  of staff,  is further
threatened  by the  difficult  working  conditions,  authoritarian  management
styles  and  administrative  constraints  prevailing  in  many  agencies,  institutes
and  university  departments. In the  universities  of Eastern  and  Southern
Africa,  university  regulations  about  administering  research  funds  deposited  in
central  accounting  offices  for  the  use  of researchers  are  enforced  in such  a
bureaucratic  fashion  that  donor  agencies  have  begun  increasingly  over  the  last
ten  years  to channel  funds  to individuals.  The  latter  have sought  out
consulting  contracts  on a private  basis,  avoiding  the  university
administration.  Yet  while  they  facilitate  their  own  access  to consulting
funds  in  order  to supplement  their  own  low  salaries,  they  undermine  the
viability  of the  institutional  frameworks  within  which  they  had  originally
hoped  to function. Furthermore,  by accepting  contracts  to  do individual
research  commissioned  by outside  agencies,  they  dilute  their  efforts  in  many
different  intellectual  directions  and  deprive  both  themselves  and  their
institutions  of  coherent  research  programmes  and intellectual  continuity.  The
more successful  institutions  have struggled  to integrate,  with the  help  of- 109  -
flexible  donor  support,  research  and  consulting,  university  salaries  and
consulting  income,  within  the  research  programme  of the  institution,  in  sucn  a
way that  individuals  receive  a fair  share  of consulting  income.
Other  institutional  factors  triegered  by the  general  environment  and  by donor
apgroaches:
a)  Financial  management  of research  institutions  is  often  very  weak
(see  below  re the  AGIR  project  of IDRC). In  certain  cases,  international
accounting  firms  have  been  retained  by donors  to train  accountants  and  set  up
a  proper  book-keeping  system.
b)  Most donors  do  not  provide  core  funding. This lack  forces
institutions  to  live  off  project  funding  and  often  entails  the  neglect  of
their  core research  agenda  and  their  physical  infrastructure.
c)  The general  economic  deterioration  of  many  countries  in  the  last
ten  years  has  had a  devastating  effect  on the  physical  reso.-,rces  of many
institutions.  Programmes  of wholesale  rehabilitation  of equipment,  libraries,
and  computer  services  are  needed  in  government  services,  research  centres  and
universities.  Technical  support  staff  need  to  be recruited  and  trained  for
maintenance,  etc.- 110  -
Institutional  Fragility:
Given  the  above  context,  it is  hardly  surprising  that talented
individuals  engaging  in  policy  analysis  often  have  very tenuous  institutional
links,  especially  if they  are  engaged  in sensitive  macro  policy  analysis.
Despite  the  weakness  of institutions,  key individuals  do play
important  roles  in  many  African  countries  as advisors  and  analysts  to  external
agencies  and  their  own  governments.  With the  recent  upsurge  of international
involvement  in  African  national  economic  planning,  professional  economists
from  Africa  are  increasingly  sought  after  to  participate  in  World  Bank  and  IMF
missions  and  especially  to  provide  macro-economic  analysis  and  research  as
part  of structural  adjustment  or stabilization  financing. In the  c'se  of
certain  countries  --  C6te  d'lvoire,  Senegal,  Tanzania,  Ghana,  Zambia  and
Zimbabwe  for  example  --  academic  economists,  consultants,  and  a few  key
government  staff  are  playing  increasingly  important  roles  as  advisors  --
sometimes  on an informal  or personal  basis  --  or as analysts  to their  own
ministers  of finance  and  planning. Such  has  long  been the  case  in  Nigeria,
where  there  is  a considerable  pool  of trained  talent.
The essential  point  is that  these  individuals  usually  work  as
such,  not  as part  of an institute.of  economic  research  (notwithstanding
certain  obvious  exceptions  such  as ERB  or CIRES)  or a small  government
think-tank.  Thus effective  individuals  and  weak institutions  co-exist  in many
African  countries  in the  area  of economic  policy  analysis.- 111  -
This  weakness,  however,  as  explained  above,  is often  a function  of
the  general  political,  economic  and  bureaucratic  context. It  will only  be
overcome  by far  sighted  and  long-term  efforts  that  combine  institutional
development,  individual  training  and  foreign  technical  assistance  in
programmes  appropriate  to the  particular  national  context  - see  Chapters  III
and  IV.
Let  us now turn  to  what the  donors  have done  and  continue  to  do to
improve  the  supply  and  demand  of policy  analysis.
_1.  The  Donor  Agencies
This  short  review  of donor  activities  describes  work intended  to
support  institutions  engaged  in  economic  policy  analysis  and research  by means
of technical  assistance,  training,  the  provision  of funding  for  research
projects  and  other  complementary  activities.  The latter  include  support  to
statistical  offices  and  ministries  of finance  and  planning  intended  to  enhance
the  production  of statistics  and  the  routine  management  of the  capital  budget,
recurrent  costs  and  the  national  debt.
Although  the  main  emphasis  of the  analysis  is  on the  state  of
economic  policy  institutions  in sub-Saharan  Africa--institutions  which  usually
have somewhat  of an arms-length  relationship  to governments--the  review  also
mentions  government  economic  management  for  two  reasons. The first  reason  is- 112 -
that  ministries  should  play  an important  role  as providers  of data  for
researchers  and  as  consumers  of  policy  advice.  The second  is that,  since
governments  need their  own  in-house  policy  analysis,  several  donors  have
provided  considerable  support  to  central  government  agencies  in an effort  to
improve  economic  management  and  planning  and in'the  hope that in  the  longer
run  such  ministries  could  develop  analysis  units. The  experience  of such
support  has provided  certain  donors  with  considerable  insight  into  the
economic  management  of  African  economies  and  into  the  strengths  and  weaknesses
of technical  assistance  provided  to  ministries,  agencies  or specialized
units. The lessons  learned  in this  process  are  directly  relevant  to the
challenge  inherent  both in  improving  the  general  national  climate  for  policy
analysis,  especially  on the  demand  side,  and in  ensuring  institutional
stability  for  economic  analysis  groups.
BILATERAL  DONORS
French  Aid
French  efforts  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  reflect  the  organization  of
research  and  planning  in  France  itself  where  statisticians  and
macro-economists  are trained  at the  Ecole  nationale  de la Statistique  et  de
l'Administration  Economique  (ENSAE)  for  careers  in the  public  service  --
especially  at the  Institut  national  de la Statistique  et des  Etudes
Economiques  (INSEE),  the  planning  ministry,  finance  ministry,  etc.- 113 -
Thus  in the  former  French  colonies,  almost  all  the  statisticians
and  economists  in  comparable  institutes  and  ministries  were trained  at the
Centre  Europ4en  de Formation  des  Statisticiens  Economistes  des  pays  en voie  de
d6veloppement  (C.E.S.D.).  This  Centre  is  an integral  part of ENSAE,  most  of
the  curriculum  is identical  and  students  take  the  same  common  core  of  courses
as their  counterparts  at ENSAE,  followed  by specialized  offerings  on
developing  country  problems
A tracer  study  of about  four  hundred  C.E.S.D. graduates  of the
years  1963 to  1981  was carried  out in  1982.  It revealed  that  a large  majority
of the  former  students  were  working  in  the  public  sector  within  their
countries  (almost  all  African  or  North  African)  as administrators  of
statistical  or economic  units,  as statisticians  or analysts;  only  6%  were in
universi-y  teaching  or  research. These  statistics  reflect  very clearly  the
French  tradition  of training  and  the  career  patterns  it  establishes.
Thus in  French-speaking  African  countries  the  pool  of
macro-economists  remains  in the  central  administration,  with  a few in
parastatal  institutes  of statistics  or applied  economics. Very  few  work in
university  economics  departments.  Those  in  public  administration  are
performing  statistical  or  applied  economic  tasks  as  well  as financial
management  within  central  ministries. On the  whole,  they  are  not involved  in
policy  analysis  or research. Independent  centres  for  national  economic
analysis  or policy  advice,  moreover,  are  rare  in  French-speaking  Africa,
notwithstanding  certain  obvious  exceptions  such  as CIRES  in  Abidjan.- 114  -
INSAE,  INSEE  and  CESD  have  been intrumental  in  developing,  on
behalf  of the  French  aid  agencies,  four  strong  regional  schools  of economics
and  statistics  in  Africa. These  schools  are located  at Abidjan,  Yaoundd,
Kigali  and  Dakar. They  have largely  taken  over  undergraduate  training  in this
field  and the  Abidjan  School  will start  MSc. level  training  in 1989. None of
these  institutions  is  presently  undertaking  research  or providing  short-term
upgrading  or technical  assistance.  These  schools  constitute  a resource  that
could  be developed,  however,  for  they  are  well  connected  to the  state
apparatus  where  their  graduates  are  employed  and  could  be as institutions
within  which  policy  research  groups  could  be established.
The  development  of  African  institutions  in the  area  of policy
analysis  has never  been an explicit  objective  of French  aid. The focus  has
basen  on training  at C.E.S.D.,  on the  development  of the  four  schools  of
statistics  and  economics,  and  on technical  assistance  to the  ministries
involved  in  planning  and  financial  management. The  latter  have received
thousands  of French  coo46rants  and  contracted  technical  advisors  in the  years
since  independence.
Most  of the  experts  sent  abroad  are  employees  of INSEE  or other
government  departments  and  graduates  of ENSAE  and they  work in  African
ministries  or in the  fours  schools  mentioned  above. In 1985,  for  example,
seventy  long-term  positions  in technical  assistance  were in  place  in  Africa.
Most  were  working  in general  statistical  services,  in training  at the  four- 115-.
schools,  in  national  accounts  and  in  ministries  of finance  and  planning. An
analysis  of those  activities  by the  French  Ministry  of Finance,  Division  of
Economic  and  Financial  Cooperation,  predicts  that  the  need for  technical
advisors  will  diminish  in  statistical  services  as trained  Africans  take  over.
It is expected,  however,  that  more  planners  and  macroeconomists  will  be
needed. The implication  is  that  technical  assistance  at the  macro-economic
level  will continue,  indeed  increase. It is  noteworthy  that  already  most
French  technical  cooRdrants  are  not  working  in  line  positions  in statistical
or economic  services,  but  rather  as advisors  (conseillers  techniques)  to
ministers  or senior  civil  servants. They are  in  a strong  position  to
influence  policy  in those  countries.
Discussions  with.senior  individuals  involved  in  the  programmes
described  above  yielded  the  following  preliminary  conclusions.
1.  A cadre  of young  African  economists  now  exists. They  are  working
in consulting  firms,  in  government  and  as professors  at the  four  schools  of
statistics  and  economics. Few  of them  are in  the  universities.
Many of those  in  ministries  have  moved  quickly  to senior  positions
in  planning  or finance  and  have  had little  chance  to  practice  their  research
skills--thus  the  continuing  reliance  on expatriate  conseillers  for  much  of the
technical  analysis  and  advice  that  feeds  policy-making.- 116 -
2.  The lack  of economic  policy  institutions  to  which  governments  may
turn  is a serious  concern. Potential  institutional  settings  for  the
development  of  policy  analysis  capacity  include  the  four  schools,  line
ministries  and "institutea"  of statistics  that  are  essentially  part  of the
state  apparatus,  a few  quasi-independent  research  institutes,  and  certain
national  or regional  schools  of administration.  The  research  institutes  are
largely  sectoral  in  nature,  however,  mainly  staffed  by agricultural  policy
researchers.  The schools  of administration  lack  a research  tradition,  and
have little  capacity  in  macro-econcmics.
3.  The  principal  challenge  is to  channel  part  of the  pool  of trained
staff  into  units  within  one  of the  institutional  settings  available. Since
most of these  people  are  now in the  public  service  of their  countries,  it is
evident  that  manpower  planning  for  the  use  of this  talent  will  need to  be
initiated  at the  highest  levels  of government  and  will  need the  active
encouragement  of multilateral  institutions  and  the  French  government. Given
the  low  level  of demand  from  policy  makers  in  many  countries  and the
subsequent  political  vulnerability  of those  who  comment  on economic  policy,  as
well as the  lack  of  private  centres  in  this  field,  French  officials  stated  it
probably  would  be most logical  to  develop  policy  analysis  in
quasi-governmental  or  parastatal  institutions  (national  or regional)  that,
like  the  statistical  schools,  have a track  record  and  credibility  already  in
economic-training  or public  management.- 117  -
SIDA  (Swedish  International  Development  Agency)
1.  Public  Administration:  Like the  French  Government,  SIDA  has
emphasized  technical  assistance  to  public  management  capacities  in several
African  countries. Those  programmes  include  activities  pertinent  to our  study
such  as:  placing  an advisor  (in  collaboration  with the  World  Bank)  in the
Ministry  of Finance  in  Kenya;  improving  budget  control,  financial  management
and  particularly  debt  management  in  Tanzania;  providing  assistance  to
statistical  cervices  in  Lesotho  and  Zimbabwe.
These  programmes  are  characterized  by heavy  involvement  of Swedish  agencies
such  as Statistics  Sweden  and the  Ministry  of Finance. A recent  evaluation
suggested  that  the  following  principles  were the  basis  of such  institutional
cooperatton:
projects  are  long-term  and  coherent,  with  an emphasis  on
developing  the  overall  infrastructure;
project  activities  take  place  in  both  countries  under  the
supervision  of coordinators  in  each;
technical  experts  (in  contrast  to,  for  example,  many French
coop_rants)  travel  abroad  for  short  periods  only.- 118 -
An evaluation  of the  experience  concludes  that  the  short  term
consultancy  is  on the  whole  preferable  to a few  long-term  consultants  and  much
more  eost  effective. Short-term  advisors  sent  to  coach  local  staff  do not  run
the  risk  of doing  the  work themselves.  In order  to  develop  permanent
capacities  in government  agencies,  such  progra-mes  must  continue  over the  long
haul  until  a large  local  talent  pool is  developed. Donors,  say  SIDA
officials,  must  be willing  to stay  with  such  programs  for  ten  or fifteen
years.
A basic  characteristic  of  -the  Swedish  i-.stitutional  development
approach  are long-term  arrangements  between  Swedish  and  African  institutions.
Thereby  strong  institutional  links  are  forged.  These  provide  continuity,
stability  and thus  effectiveness  in  training,  technical  assistance  and  the
general  capacity  building  process.
USAID
AID  support  for  economic  policy  analysis  and  financial  management
has  been  concentrated  on the  agricultural  sector. This  has  been done  by means
of support  to  agricultural  universities  through  Title  XII and  other.programmes
and through  support  to  agricultural  policy  and  planning  institutions  in
eighteen  Sub-Saharan  African  countries.
A recent  evaluation  of policy  and  planning  projects  since  1970
reviewed  40 African  activities  that  had cost  almost  130  Million  to  AID.ahd  60M- 119  -
to  other  donors;  the  sums included  funds  spent  for  data  collection,  survey
implementation  and  training,  as  well as technical  assistance,  plant  and
equipment.
These  projects  had capacity  building  as  an objective  and  included
training  of  personnel  as a major  purpose. The  evaluation  reveals,  however,
that  very few  projects  were  designed  specifically  to analyze  and  bring  about
changes  in defined  areas  of agricultural  policy,  and that  policy  reform  itself
was  not  usually  identified  as  a key  project  purpose. Although  important
reforms  were proposed  and  followed  in  certain  cases,  generally  the  rate  of
policy  impact  was low  in  Africa  (22%  of the  projects). Reasons  given  included
general  neglect  of agriculture  by policy  makers,  difficult  logistics,  and
especially  the  fact  tha:  the  African  projects  were  generally  intended  for
institution  building  rather  than  policy  analysis  or implementation.  Some  of
the  lessons  learned  from  these  experiences  included  the  following:
real  demands  from  decision-makers  must  be identified  before  the
project  begins  and  addressed  as  part  of the  project. Many
projects  suffered  from  a lack  of contact  with  policy  makers  and
tended  to operate  in a  vacuum.
alaalytical  units  must  be built  around  decisi)n-makers  who  have  the
ability  and influence  to  bring  about  real  change. Assistance  to
statistical  services  or other  such  functions  may  not  result  in
contact  with  policymakers.- 120 -
incentives  to  keep  qualified  staff  must  be built  into  the
project. Otherwise,  qualified  people  will leave.
AID is now  moving  away  from  building  up long-term  planning
capacity  for its  own  sake  and  beginning  to  orient  assistance  towards  the
demand  for  specific  reforms. AID  hopes  that,  thereby,  policy  analysis  will
have a stronger  impact,  in part  because  policy  makers  will  have  been involved
from  the  beginning  in identifying  the  issues  to  be addressed.
MULTILATERAL  DONORS
In the  70's  and  early  80's,  UNDP  funded  a series  of technical
assistance  programmes  in  planning  ministries  in  Africa..  As some  of these  were
carried  out  by the  World  Bank,  they  are  not  discussed  in this  review.
The  UNDP  has  been  considering  the  implications  of further  efforts
to improve  planning  in  the  least  developed  countries,  most  of which  are  in
Africa. Several  preliminary  studies  were carried  out in 1986,  including  two
general  analyses  of planning  in the  anglophone  and  francophone  African
countries.-121  -
The  report  on English-speaking  Africa  raises  several  basic issues
that  are  essential  for  an understanding  of the  needs  of  planning  ministries
and  other  central  economic  units  and  relevant  to the  economic  policy  making
context  in general. It stresses  that  generally  macro-level  policy  analysis
has  weakened  in the  last  ten  years,  partly  because  of a relative  neglect  until
recently  of capacity  in this  area,  and  partly  because  of a deterioration  in
macro-level  data  collection  and  analysis. Certain1  economic  characteristics,
moreover,  have developed  in  recent  years,  such  as high  rates  of inflation  and
the  increase  in  parallel  markets  and  informal  sector  activities,  which  have
made it  more  difficult  to interpret  national  data.,  so that  the  basis  for
planning  and  for  policy  analysis  within  or outside  gove.rnment  remains  weak.
This is  a serious  concern  that  obviously  needs  to  be addressed  at the  same
time  as donors  consider  how to  rehabilitate  policy  research  institutions.
It is  especially  noteworthy  that  the  report  laments  the  lack,  in
most countries,  of a "think-tank,  brains  trust  or council  of economic
advisors". The report  goes  on to suggest  ways in  which  highly  trained
nationals  could  be recruited,  motivated  and  maintained  in  such  units.
Commonwealth  Secretariat
1.  The technical  assistance  arm  of the  Secretariat,  the  Commonwealth
Fund  For  Technical  Cooperation  (CFTC)  responds  to requests  from  member
governments  for  technical  assistance  and training  in a  number  of sectors. The
work of the  Fund  is divided  into  various  programmes,  groups  and  divisions,- *  122  -
several  of  which  undertake  work  relevant  to the  subject  of this  study. Even
though  the  CFTC is  not a research  donor  in  the  sense  of the  Ford Foundation  or
IDRC,  several  programmes  are  pertinent  to  economic  management  and  policy
making,  especially  the  Fellowships  and  Training  Programme,  the  Technical
Assistance  Group,  the  Management  Development  Programme  and  the  Economic
Affairs  Division.
The latter  undertakes  research  on economic  policy  within  the
Commonwealth  and  is a source  of considerable  expertise  on Africa;  its  staff
includes  several  well  known  African  economists. The  Technical  Assistance
Group (TAG)  has  developed,  with the  assistance  of IDRC,  its  own  software  for
recording,  analysing  and  controlling  the  national  debt  of small  economies;  it
is  being  implemented  in  Botswana  and  Mauritius. The  TAG  is  also advising
Botswana  on the  restructuring  of the  Central  Statistical  Office,  and  on the
reform  of its  macro-economic  model.  TAG  is assisting  several  African  countries
in  other  related  areas,  including  providing  advice  on petroleum  contracts,
mining  policy,  foreign  investment  codes,  the  rehabilitation  of statistical
departments,  and  the  reform  of the  banking  system.
The  CFTC supports  training  in  many fields,  including  statistics
training  at the  East  African  Statistical  Training  Centre. In the  management
field,  the  CFTC  provides  technical  assistance  by sending  about  sixty  long-term
field  experts  to  many  countries  in  various  areas  including: finance,
accounting,  and  tax  administration;  MIS and  statistics;  project  management,
economics  and  planning.- 123 -
Several  general  conclusions  emerged  from  discussions  with senior
staff  responsible  for  these  activities.  The first  was that  little  research  of
any  kind,  sectoral  or  national  level,  is  being  conducted  at  management
institutes  in  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa. The  second  is  that  the  staff  has
been trained  in  management  and  sectoral  analysis  so that  their  strengths  are
in  micro-economics.  Yet,  there  is an obviQus  dearth  of macro-economists  in
most  national  and  regional  institutions.  The  few  that  exist  are  scattered
among  universities,  central  banks,  consulting  firms  and  government  ministries.
2.  A related  but separate  activity  is  carried  out  by the  Overseas
Development  Institute. Its  Fellowship  scheme,  funded  by the  ODA in  Britain,
places  each  year  twelve  young  economists  for  two  years  in the  public  sectors
of developing  countries. Between  1963-1985,  239  had  been  placed,  and  as of
October  1985,  twelve  were serving  in  five  Eastern  and  Southern  African
countries,  mainly  in  national  or agricultural  planning  positions.
FOUNDATIONS  AND  SEMI-AUTONOMOUS  AGENCIES
The  Rockefeller  Foundation
Volumes  have  been  written  about  the  ambitious  programmes  of
Rockefeller  (and  Ford  --  see  below)  in che  developing  world. Rockefeller
itself  produced  in 1982  a book  entitled  Social  Sciences  and  Public  Policy  in
the  Developing  World  which  contains  a case  study  of its  own  experience  as well- 124  -
as articles  on the  state  of social  science  in d,fferent  regions. In the
period  1961-1973,  Rockefeller  invested,  under  its  University  Development
Programme,  $7.1  million  in institution  building  grants  to the  universities  of
Makerere,  Nairobi  and  Dar-es-Salaam.  Institutions  which  remain  today
important  potential  resources  for  economic  policy-making,  were first  launched
by these  grants. These  include  the  Institute  of Development  Studies  at
Nairobi  and  the  Economic  Research  Bureau  at  Dar.
The  University  Development  Program  set  out to  create  centres  of
excellence,  largely  staffed  by indigenous  scholars  and  engaged  in  research  and
teaching  relevant  to local  needs. Strong  universities  were  needed,  in the
opinion  of  RF, in order  to  create  new  social  and  economic  understanding  of
complex  national  issues. The  Foundation's  approach  deliberately  stressed
long-term  staff  development,  temporary  appointment  of expatriates,  and  support
to  applied  research. These  cooperative  initiatives  were seen  in each  instance
as long-  term  Foundation  commitments.
In  recent  years  RF  has  not supported  policy  research  institutions
in  developing  countries  in  a major  way.  It  has,  however,  been exploring  for
several  years  how it  might  make  an effective  contribution  to the  building  of
capacity  in international  economics  in  Africa. RF recently  agreed  to fund  the
secretariat  for  the  consortium  of donors  created  to  continue  the  work  begun  by
the  IDRC  macro-economic  research  programme.125  -
SAREC  (Swedish  Agency  for  Research  Cooperation  with  Develoging  Countries)
The  bilateral  research  programme  of SAREC  in  Africa  has channelled
support  to research  institutes  in  many  scientific  fields. In all  cases,  the
funds  were sent  to national  research  councils  which  undertook  the
responsibility  of distributing  them  to  local  scientists  and institutions.  The
recent  evaluation  which  marked  SAREC's  tenth  anniversary  recommended  that  this
policy  be changed  and  SAREC  staff  are  now  putting  into  effect  mechanisms  for
supporting  research  directly.
Discussions  with SAREC  staff  centered  on their  plans  to develop  a
new  programme  of support  in social  science  for  Africa  and  their  assessment  of
the  potential  of various  institutions.  The  main  general  points  that  emerged
were  as follows:
1.  A sustained  effort  at training  is  needed  in the  region,  in the
expectation  that  training  as  many  people  as  possible  will  eventually  pay  off
for  these  countries. It  was  pointed  out  how  valuable  many  highly  trained
Zimbabweans  have  been to their  country  since  independence.  Hopefully,  similar
groups  of skilled  economists  and  other  social  scientists  will  evenutally  be
able  to  play comparable  roles  in  other  countries  where  political  conditions
have rendered  their  influence  virtually  til in  recent  years.
This approach  raises  an important  point  concerning  demand. The
assumption  of SAREC,  and to  a certain  degree  that  of IDRC  and the  Ford  and- 126 -
Rockefeller  Foundations,  is that  demand  will remain  low.  Eventually,  however,
as trained  people  enter  positions  in the  private  sector,  the  universities  and
government,  an increased  understanding  of the  nature  and  uses  of research  will
begin  to transform  attitudes.
One  must accept  the  reality  that  low  capacity  and low  demand
coexist. Donors  need to  develop  innovative  responses  that  build  capacitv  (or
the  supply)  of policy  analysis  within  certain  institutions  at the  same  time  as
they  devise  strategies  to enhance  national  (as  opposed  to foreign)  demand.
The  Ford  Foundation
In the  early  days  of Foundation  activity  in  Africa,  in  the  1960's
and  early  70's,  activities  centered  around  two  principal  thrusts: improving
the  planning  capacity  of governments  by the  provision  of  high level  policy
advisors,  and  building  institutions  of  higher  learning  to  strengthen
independent  research  and  analysis. In the  last  ten  years,  Foundation  support
for  ambitious  capacity  building  activities  within  government  ministries  has
ceased. Support  continues,  however,  for  training  and  research  in agriculture,
rural  development  and  economics  in  universities  and  research  institutes  in
many  countries,  especially  the  Sudan,  Kenya,  Tanzania,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and
Senegal.
In the  beginning  at Ibadan  in  Nigeria  and in  Kenya,  as  well as in
Uganda  and  Tanzania,  Ford  support  complemented  that  of the  RF University- 127
Development  programme. The two  Foundations  essentially  created  many  -of  the
university  institutions  that  remain  today  key centres  of expertise,  such  as
the  agricultural  faculty  at Ibadan,  the  University  of Nairobi,  and  the  ERB  at
Dar. The  work in  more recent  years  has stressed  both training  and  research
and  considerable  investments  have  been  made.  Ford  continues  to  support
research  and  staff  development  in  the  rural  social  sciences  and  economic
policy  making,  often  in  cooperation  with IDRC  and  other  donors  and  using  other
strategies.  Two of the  six  programme  areas  that  emerged  from  the
reorganization  of the  Foundation's  activities  in the  early  1980's  are  rural
poverty  and  resour.ces,  and  international  affairs. Within  these  programs,  the
Foundation  continues  to support  research  in the  rural  social  sciences  and  in
macro-economic  policy.
At the  University  of  Nairobi,  the  Foundation  is  currently
supporting  a staff  development  programme  in international  economics. Like
IDRC,  the  Foundation  stresses  how important  macro-economics  have  become  for
the  region  and  how  poorly  equipped  local  institutions  are  to  deal  with  such
issues.
In Nigeria,  the  Foundation  supported  institutional  capacity  for
economic  analysis  by providing  training  and  technical  assistance  to economic
planners  from  1973  to  1981  under  a grant  to the  Ministry  of Economic
Development. The  University  of Ibadan  received  grants  in support  of food
policy  analysis  in 1979  and  a grant  enabling  the  economics  department  to
develop  an econometric  model  of the  Nigerian  economy-was  also  made.- 128 -
Subsequently,  the  Foundation  helped  the  University  establish  and  develolp  the
Centre  for  Econometric  and  Allied  Research  (CEAR)  where  the  modelling  exercise
was centered.
The  bulk of Foundation  support  for  economic  research  and  policy
analysis,  however,  is still  channelled  to the  support  of research  and training
on rural  and  agricultural  issues. Current  grants  include,  fot  example,
support  to the  University  of  Nairobi  in  order  to improve  the  quality  of local
graduate  degree  programmes  by funding  a  visiting  professor,  fellowships,
seminars,  etc.
The  most  significant  recent  development  in  this  area  is Ford's
decision  to support  the  training,  research  and  networking  activities  of
Winrock  International  in  Africa. The  Nairobi  programme  includes  funding  for  a
Winrock  associate  in  the  department  of  agricultural  economics  for  three  years,
in the  hope that  enough  donor  funding  will  be forthcoming  to  maintain  the
programme  for  ten  to  fifteen  years. On the  basis  of the  A/D/C  experience  in
Asia (Winrock  has absorbed  A/D/C),  Ford  officials  are  convinced  that  a similar
effort  at institutional  development  through  networking,  technical  assistance,
research  grants  and  training  will  yield  good  results  in  Africa,  if it is
sustained  over  the  long  haul.  Ford  therefore  provided  in  1985  an initial
three  year grant  to  Winrock  for  a rural  policy  network  in  Africa. Research
themes  include  macro-economic  issues  in  agriculture,  pricing  policy  and
international  trade. The  networks,  like  those  of IDRC,  hope  to encourage
comparative  studies,  foster  communication  among  isolated  researchers  and.- 129
develop  case  studies  and  course  materials  on  African  problems.
The  International  Developm_ent  Research  Centre  (IDRC)
The International  Development  Research  Centre  is a  Canadian  public
corporation  whose  mandate  is the  support  of research  on applied  development
issues  in  developing  countries  by scientists  from  those  countries. The
Economics  Programme  of the  Social  Science  Division  has  supported  approximately
fifty  projects  in sub-Saharan  Africa  over  the  last  eight  years,  mainly  in  the
agricultural  sector.
In order  to overcome  many  of the  institutional  and  other  barriers
to  carrying  out  good  policy  research  in  Africa,  IDRC  has  concentrated  its
support  increasingly  on  net orks  of two  types.
The  first  model  is the  small  grants  scheme  where  individuals  are
supported  and  provided  with technical  coaching  to  undertake  small  research
projects  within  a fairly  broadly  defined  field,  such  as rural  economy. Since
many individuals,  especially  recently  returned  graduates,  are  working  by
themselves  without  colleagues  in their  field  in small  or  weak institutions,
these  programmes  attempt  to sustain  their  skills  and  to prepare  them  for  more
ambitious  work.
The second  type  of network  is  exemplified  by the  macro-economic
analysis  programme  described  below. This initiative,  and  another  one in- 130  -
contract  farming,  provide  support  to  groups.of  researchers  working  on one  or
several  topics  within  a region. The researchers  in  the  macro  network  are
studying  exchange  rate  policy,  financial  instruments  and  modelling;  as
outlined  below,  conside  able  technical  and  other  support  is  provided,
including  workshops,  bibliographical  material,  meetings  with  government
officials  and  the  involvement  of internationally  recognized  experts  in the
field.
IDRC  has found,  therefore,  that  the  typical  project  mode  of
funding  applied  research  often  does  not  produce  results  in  Africa;
institutions  often  lack  the  capacity  to  provide  environments  conducive  to
research. Individuals  and  groups  therefore  require  from  the  donor  agency
imaginative  approaches  that  provide  many  of those  elements,  such  as access  to
recent  literature  or peer interaction,  that  research  centres  in other  regions
are  equipped  to supply. Funding  Per se,  therefore,  is  not  the  main
requirement  in  many  cases;  it  must  be accompanied  by other  inputs,  as
required.
A major  conclusion  that  emanates  from  the  IDRC  portfolio  of
economic  policy  projects  is  that  the  strongest  research  base,  whether  of
individuals  or in institutional  capacity,  is  undoubtedly  in  agricultural
policy  and  often  at a sub-sectoral  or relatively  micro-economic  level. This
general  situation  obviously  reflects  national  priorities  and  past  donor
training  support. In the  case  of  certain  countries  where  policy  research  on
-crucial  national  or sectoral  issues  like  prices  for  cereals  or inputs  would  be- 131 -
politically  impossible,  researchers  concentrate  on  micro  issues,  on programme
evaluation  or on descriptive  analyses  of broad  issues  like  rural  development.
Thirdly,  IDRC  has  provided  substantial  support  for  CIRES  in the
Ivory  Coast. The  rationale  for  this  programme  of institutional  support,
shared  with the  Ford  Foundation,  is outlined  below.
Another  IDRC initiative  that  deserves  mention  is a  project
designed  to improve  the  management  of research  institutions  in the  Sahel,
known  by its  French  acronym  AGIR.  This  ambitious  undertaking,  pioneered  by
IDRC  but now  involving  ISNAR,  CIDA  and  other  agencies  as well,  is  now in its
second  phase  at a cost  of almost  three  million  Canadian  dollars. Essentially,
it is  based  on the increasingly  evident  conclusion  that  many  research
institutions  in  the  Sahalian  region  do not  have the  management  capacity  to
administer  donor  funds. The  programme  set  out  therefore  to analyse  the
weaknesses  of 23 institutions  and  in its  second  phase  will  provide  technical
assistance  and  training  in  order  to revamp  the  internal  administration  of 12
institutes  in the  following  areas: general  research  administration;  budget
and  accounting  systems;  internal  administrative  procedures  and  procedural
manual;  personnel  management  system;  purchasing  and  supply  system;  and  overall
structural  reform.132  -
III. Experiences  in Institutional  DeveloZment
The  Macro-economic  Analysis  Programme. A very  enlightening
experiment  at capacity  building  and  networking  of small  groups  in
macro-economics  on  a regional  basis  is the  IDRC  "Macro-economic  Analysis
Programme.  It is a  very important  initiative  in that  it  has  met the
perceived  needs  of researchers  in the  region  for  continuity,  collegiality,
dissemination  and  even  impact  on policy  that  they  cannot  obtain  under  present
circumstances  in their  own  institutions.  An analysis  of it reveals  therefore
the  kinds  of programme  elements  that  would  be needed  if an effort  were
launched  to build  institutional  capacity. Although  the  network  operates  only
in iastern  and  Southern  Africa,  the  example  is  also  highly  relevant  to  West
Africa.
An examination  of the  project  documentation  and  a recent
evaluation  indicate  that  its  original  aims  were  successfully  met in  the  first
phase. The  objective  is  to support  research  on issues  such  as  macro-economic
and  financial  instruments,  modelling,  institutional  factors  like  parallel
markets  and  underlying  "structural"  factors  in  the  economy. In order  to
reinforce  the  rigour  of the  projects  undertaken  by the  small  groups  asnd
individuals  in  the  network,  an array  of technical  assistance  and other
complementary  activities  has  been  organized  for  the  benefit  of the  network.
These  inputs  include:- 133 -
Administration  of the  programme  from  the  IDRC  Regional  Office  in
Nairobi,  freeing  the  researchers  from  the  bureaucratic  and
political  constraints  of their  own institutions.
Technical  and  logistic  support,  based  in  Nairobi,  from  a  network
coordinator,  and  from  the  IDRC  economist  responsible  for  tne
project.
Provision  of survey  papers  on  key issues  and  of current  published
research  not usually  accessible  in the  region.
Periodic  meetings  to  prepare  proposals,  discuss  results  and  share
experiences. These  permit  peer  review,  discussion  of methodology
and the  definition,  by local  researchers,  of their  own  agenda  and
methodologies --  a very important point in a region where the
agendas  are  usually  set  by international  agencies.
Senior  researchers  knowledgeable  of the  region  attend  periodic
meetings  of the  network,  as do senior  World  Bank  and  IMF  staff.
Policymakers.are  involved  as  much  as  possible,  especially  by
attending  national  workshops.
The revival  of the  Eastern  Africa  Economic  Review  as  a means  of
stimulating  discussion  and  diffusing  results  in  a region  where- 134 -
national  journals  have  all  but  disappeared.
The  programme  has recently  been  reorganized  under  the  aegis  of a
consortium  of donors  and  Rockefeller  has  taken  over  the  role  of implementing
agency  from  IDRC.
.The  Economic  Research  Bureau. The  Economic  Research  Bureau  of the
University  of Dar-Es-Salaam  constitutes,  in  combination  with the  Department  of
Economics,  one  of the  strongest  sources  of economic  policy  research  and
analysis  in Eastern  Africa.
A  recent  evaluation  traces  three  main  phases  of Bureau
development. The  years  1965  to 1971  were  characterized  by vigorous  research
activity  and a close  working  relationship  with the  government. The  Bureau
fell  on  hard times  beginning  in  1971/72: RF phased  out its  support,  senior
staff  left  and  research  output  declined  dramatically.  Then  began  in  1979/80  a
period  of reconstruction  that  continues  today. SIDA  provided  substantial
resources  for  technical  support  and  PhD training  at  Lund  University  of 14
economists  from  the  Bureau  and  the  Economics  Department.  As those  staff
return,  they  and their  colleagues  at the  Department  will  constitute  a
significant  pool  of talent.
Officials  at SIDA  and  at the  University  of Lund  emphasized  that
the  programme  is taking  considerably  longer  than  originally  planned  and they
expect  it to  continue  till  1990  or longer. In short,  they  emphasized,  donors- 135  -
must  be prepared  to  undertake  long  term  programmes  of staff  development.
The Swedish  officials  also  stressed,  as did  the  evaluation  team
that  reviewed  the  ERB in  1984,  that  it is  not  enough  to train  one  cohort  or
even  generation  of economists.  Policies  must  be put in  place  to  maintain  this
nucleus  of  highly  trained  but inexperienced  economists,  to  develop  and
motivate  it and  to use  it as  much  as possible  in  productive  research.
A basic  challenge  is to institutionalize  permanently  some  of these
elements  provided  for  the  short-term  by Lund  or the  IDRC  macro  network:
access  to recent  literature;  interaction  with colleagues  in  other  institutions
such  as government  agencies  and  other  universities;  sabbaticals  or periods  of
retraining;  secondments  to  parastatal  organizations,  national  banks,  etc.;
opportunities  to attend  conferences  in  neighbouring  countries  or abroad.
Given  the  lack  of senior  Tanzanian  economists  working  at the  University,
senior  expatriate  personnel  should  be provided,  probably  for  short-term
assignments  to  give  courses  on  methods,  review  specific  problems,  provide
state-of-the-art  lectures,  etc. Many  of these  elements  are  now  provided  at
Dar  by the  Lund  programme. The latter  will end  eventually,  however,  and  some
mechanisms  must  be found  to  provide  such  inputs  from  the  international  donor
and  academic  community  concerned  with the  development  of  permanent  national
analysis  capacity  in  African  countries.
If the  recently  returned  graduates  are  to  remain  in  research,  they
also  need to  enjoy  sufficient  incentives  to stay  within  their  institution  as  a- 136 -
part of a ieam  of professionals  working  on serious  research  that  in the  medium
term  will  provide  a useful  source  of knowledge  and  advice  for  their
governments.
One  way  of ensuring  institutional  stability  with individual
incentive  is to  employ  an income-sharing  scheme,  as does  the  ERB.  Thus
consulting  assignments  are  only  accepted  if they  involve  serious  work of
relevance  to the  institution's  criteria  and  current  priorities. Consulting
income  is divided  among  the  researcher  doing  the  work (20%),  other  individuals
(30%)  and 50%  goes  to the  Self-Reliance  Fund  of the  Bureau  (or  t'ie  Economics
Department,  where  the  same  system  prevails). The fund  thus  constitutes  an
important  group  source  of support  for  institutional  priorities  generated  by
the  ERB  itself.
The Lund  programme  has  provided  an increasingly  important  source
of both  staff  support  to replace  those  on training  leave  (two  Lund  staff  are
at Dar  on a regular  basis),  and  essential  material  resources  such  as the
printing  of research  papers  in Sweden,  the  publication  of proceedings,  journal
subscriptions,  office  equipment  and  stationary,  two  vehicles,  as  well as a
general  fund  for  the  support  of research.
Finally,  it should  be stressed  that  all  the  above  points  are
especially  relevant  to the  training  and  support  of researchers  in
macro-e.conemics  and  financial  management.  The  dea;th  of  high quality  research
on macro-economic  management  issues,  despite  their  crucial  importance  in- 137 -
recent  years,  has led  the  ERB  and  the  department  into  this  area. The
evaluation  team  suggested  a new  relative  concentration  upon  macro-econoific  and
financial  research  of the  type  most useful  to the  Treasury,  Planning  Ministry,
etc.
C I R E S
Achievements
The  Centre  Ivoirien  de Recherches  4conomique  et sociale  was
founded  in  1971  as a research  centre  within  the  Universit6  Nationale  of the
Cote  d'Ivoire. In 1987  it  had seventeen  researchers,  six  with  American  PhD's,
tihe  rest  with  higher  degrees  from  France;  several  others  were  still  working
toward  PhD  degrees  in  the  U.S.  Fourteen  other  staff  called
'teacher-researchers"  are  also  associated  with  the  Centre,  six  of whom  hold
American  PhD's.
A  consortium  of donor agencies, essentially Ford and IDRC, has
channelled  support  directly  to  CIRES  and  via an intermediary,  Winrock
International.  The  activities  of  Ford  and  IDRC  have  constituted,  since  1979,
a deliberate  attempt  at institution  building  by providing  integrated  support
with the  following  components:
support  to  doctoral  and  post-doctoral  field  work studies. These
individual  awards  were instrumental  in  developing  a  cadre  of- 138-
highly  trained  staff. Fifteen  studies  were  completed.
support  for  a Winrock  associate,  a  Canadian  agricultural
economist,  whose  presence  has  been  very important  to the'
development  of CIRES.
funding  for  the  journal  Cahiers  du  Cires.
forthcoming  support  for  the  library  and the  establishment  of a
regional  documentation  centre  in  economic  research.
flexible  and  rapid  provision  of support  to other,  related
activities  when  needed. Examples  of initiatives  include: a
national  seminar  on the  organization  of the  1983  triennial  meeting
of the  West  African  Association  of  Agricultural  Economists;
translation  of the  review  of literature  on agricultural
development  in Sub-Saharan  African  prepared  by Carl  Eicher  and  D.
Baker;  a curriculum  development  workshop  to  plan the  recently
implemented  regional  3iLme  cycle  graduate  programme  ir rural
economy.
Present  development  plans  call  for  CIRES  to  continue,  despite
certain  constraints  and  problems,  doctoral  training  begun  in 1985. This
rigorous  three  year  programme  of study  includes  extensive  course  work  and
field  research. It,it  intended  for  students  from  the  region  as  well as- 139 -
nationals. In the  first  year of  operation,  seven  Iyoiriens  and two  others
were  accepted.
CIRES  staff  members  are  active  over  a  broad  range  of
socio-economic  issues. In  July 1987,  research  activities  were  reorganized
into  three  programmes: Rural  Economy;  Human  Resources;  Development  Strategies
and  Macroeconomic  Problems.
CIRES  therefore  has  made  remarkable  prog.ess  as an institution.
It  has  managed,  in  addition,  to achieve  two  measures  of success  rare in
Africa: regional  influence  and  policy  impact.
It  has  had a  regional  impact  by involvement  in the  coordination  of
research,  its  translation  of the  book  cited  above,  its  technical  assistance  to
other  centres,  and its  participation  in  networks  co-ordinated  by IPPRI  and
UNRISD. Its  bilingual  staff,  trained  in  both European  and  North  American
traditions,  constitutes  a unique  resource  and  a strong  potential  base for
research  and  training. Given  the  weakness  of social  science  generally  and
economic  research  in  particular  in  most  French-  speaking  countries  of the
region,  it  makes  eminent  sense  for  CIRES  to  develop  as a regional  centre  of
excellence. The  problem  of the-small  relative  size  of  most of the  countries
in the  region  and  the  weakness  of existing  institutions  would  seem  to  militate
in favour  of one  or two  strong  regional  centres  in the  French-speaking
countries.- 140 -
The  Centre  has also  developed,  thanks  largely  to its  own  lobbying,
a sound  relationship,  if  uneven  at times,  with its  own  government. Its
influence  has  been especially  felt  in  the  area  of food  marketing  and  pricing
policy  where  government  practices  now  benefit  from  basic  research  and  policy
advice  from  CIRES. It  has also  developed  for  the  World  Bank  and  the  Ministry
of Planning  a general  equilibrium  model  of the  Ivoirian  economy  and  is  working
on an industrial  sector  study  for  the  Bank  and  the  Ministry  of Industry.
The  Present  Challenge
Despite  the  above,  difficult  problems  remain  which  will  require  the  same
patience,  care,  sensitivity  to local  needs  and  donor  collaboration  that  have
parmitted  it to  grow into  its  present  strong  position.
Personnel: Motivation  is the  main issue  here.  There  is no
established  career  trajectory  for  researchers  within  CIRES. They  retain  the
status  of chercheur,  are  promoted  slowly  and-depend  on outside,  international
funding  for  their  access  to research  funds  and  thus  intellectual  stimulation
and  professional  rewards. Since  research  donors  do  not  usually  pay salary-
supplements,  they  must turn  to  consulting  for  this. The Centre  is  now
considering  how to  pool its  consulting  income  in  order  to  reward  its  more
productive  members.
Such  strategies  are  difficult  to implement,  however,  since
personnel  planning,  the  selection  of  new  staff  and  salary  levels  are- 141 -
determined  by the  University  and  the  Ministry  of Scientific  Research  and  are
largely  out  of the  hands  of CIRES. As well as its  core  of chercheus, who do
research  full-time  and  constitute  its  stronger  members,  CIRES  also  has
enseignants  chercheurs  who are  members  of the  University  staff  and  whose
career  path is  well  delineated.  The latter  path,  moreover,  is  preordained  by
goverment  norms;  promotion  is  largely  automatic,  and  independent  of one's
research  track  record. There  are  few  career  incentives  for  the  better
re.earchers  to remain  in the  institution  in the  long  run  and  levels  of
personal  commitment  may  become  dangerously  low  unless  key issues  such  as the
lack  of a research  career  pattern,  low  remuneration  and few  rewards  are
addressed  squarely  soon.
Rasources: Every  two  or three  years  the  major  grants  to  CIRES
are  renegotiated  and  renewed  with  Ford  and  IDRC. Moreover  other  donors  do not
provide  core funding,  only  contracts  for  specific  research  projects. It is
thus  very difficult  for  CIRES  to  plan  a long-term  coherent  research
programme.
The  Research  Program: The institution  has  experienced
difficulties  in  recent  years  in  defining  the  relative  importance  that  should
be accorded  to  agricultural  policy  in its  pro-rammes.
Infrastructure:  Suppott  is still  needed  to improve  the  library
and  documentation  centre,  the  physical  infrastructure  generally,  the  computer
system  and  budget  management.142-
IV.  Lessons  and  Implications
Given  the  difficult  and  at times  hostile  environment  facing  policy
researchers  as individuals  within  many  African  countries  and  the  problems  that
tend  to  undermine  institutional  stability  within  core  ministries,  parapublic
bodies  and  academic  institutions,  it is  obvious  that  there  are  no simple
answers  to the  continuing  need for  institutional  development. Some  basic
lessons  do emerge,  however,  from  an examination  of the  approaches  of donors
and  from  their  own  evaluations  of their  successes  and  failures.
a)  All the  donors  agree  that  there  is  a continuing  need for  support
to institutions  of policy  analysis  and that  this  need  will  prevail  for  many
years  to  come.  It is  evident  that  the  high  expectations  of the  1960s  and
early  1970s,  namely  that  a  concentxated  effort  at training  and  technical
assistance  over  a few  years  would  yield  strong,  self-sufficient  and  stable
institutions,  have  not  materialized.
b)  Although  many individual  researchers  are  receiving  support  and
quite  a few  university  departments  and  centres  receive  project  financing,  only
a few  arms-length  institutions  are  receiving  long-term  core  support  from
donors. With the  exception  of SIDA  and to  a certain  extent  AID,  bilateral
donors  have concentrated.on  technical  assistance  to government  policy  units.
Foundations  and  semiautonomous  agencies  have  developed  policy  analysis
institutions  but  very few  in  number. Present  donor  plans  foresee  continuing- 143 -
support  to those  centres  such  as CIRES  and  ERB  with  which  they  are  presently
involved  as  well as  continuing  programs  of small  grants  to individuals  and
modest  project  funding  to  university  departments.
c)  In  continuing  to  provide  support  of  various  kinds  over  the  long
run,  however,  donors  run  a  very serious  risk  of institutionalizing  dependence
upon technical  assistance.  Therefore,  programmes  must  be created  which  foster
local  policy  analysis  capacity  at the  same  time  as they  phase  out technical
assistance.  Generally  speaking,  Foundation  support  to  arms-length  institutions
has  been  more  effective  at long-term  capacity  building  than  bilateral  or  UNDP
support  to  government  policy  units.
d)  Demand  for  policy  analysis  is  often  low. This  occurs  in  part
because  policy  is  often  perceived  exclusively  as  part  of a political  process
and  technical  inputs  are  often  ignored. In  order  to  build  bridges  between
politicians  and  senior  civil  servants,  therefore,  donor  support  to research
needs  to involve  policy-makers.  If  possible,  the  process  of consulting  and
briefing  politicians  and  permanent  secretaries  on the  uses  of policy  analysis
should  influence  the  setting  of  priorities  and  should  be  built  into  all
efforts  to improve  policy-making.
e)  Notwithstanding  the  above,  there  will  be political  circumstances
within  which  such  a  process  is impossible  in the  short  term.  In  such  cases,
donors  need to  accept  the  value  of capacity  building,  or at least  the
maintenance  of  existing  talent  within  the  country,  as a useful-exercise  in- 144 -
itself. Indeed  the  need to  prevent  the  destruction-of  existing  capacity  must
remain  a  priority  for  the  donor  community.
f)  The  approaches  of different  donors  in  various  countries  and
regions  reflect  both the  diversity  of circumstances  across  countries  and
institutions,  and  the  varying  agendas  and  constraints  of donors. The
international  donor  community,  therefore,  has at its  disposal  a broad  spectrum
of instruments  which  can  be brought  to  bear to improve  and sustain  policy
analysis  institutions.  Donor  coordination  is  needed,  however,  to  ensure  that
each  agency  uses  effectively  its  own  comparative  advantage  and
that  donor  activities  do not  operate  at cross  purposes. Pooling  of resources
also  yields  intellectual  pluralism  within  the  recipient  institution.  If a
spectrum  of donors  is  involved  in  helping  a  young  institution,  it is  easier  to
stress  the  process  of policy  formulation  and  choice.
It is especially  important  that  in the  area  of  macro-economic
analysis,  where  competent  researchers  in  most  countries  are  few  indeed,  that
donors  not lose  sight  of the  long-term  objectives  of institutional  improvement
and  continuity. Institutional  research  programmes  need to  be carefully
planned,  coherent  and intellectually  rigorous. If individuals  are  constantly
tempted  away  by short-term  consultancies  for  international  organizations,  then
institutional  viability  will  suffer  accordingly  - and  the  results  of the
research  will  influence  the  donor,  rarely  the  African  policy-maker  or  his
government. Donors  need  to support  the  generation  of policy  analysis  within
African  institutions  for  use  by African  governments  rather  than  the- 145 -
commissioning  of research  by donors  for  donors.
g)  The  discrepancy  between  the  presence  of talented  indiviudals  and
the  weakness  of institutions  has  been stressed  in the  study. There  are
obviously  many  ways to  support  research  and  policy  analysis  and  many inputs
that  can  be integrated  into  programmes,  including  various  forms  of training
and  technical  assistance.  The  most  successful  in  current  circumstances,  are
initiatives  which,  taking  all the  factors  and  circumstances  outlined  above
into  account,  include  some  or all  of the  following  elements:
Long-term  coordinated  commitments  by the  donor  and the  recipient
are  crucial. The  Swedish  conaitment  to ERB  and  to statistical
services  in  Tanzania  and  Zimbabwe  is  based  on an assessment  that  a
long-run  programme  is  essential  in  order  to  build  and  above  all
maintain  capacity;  the  experience  of IDRC  and  Ford  at  CIRES
confirms  this  analysis. Success  ful  long-term  initiatives  often
take  the  form  of quasi-permanent  twinning  arrangements  that  create
strong  institutional  links,  mutual  confidence  and  stability.
Highly  trained  staff  need  to  be mptivated. Incentives  can  be
built  in,  like  the  income  sharing  scheme  at ERB  and  other
nonfinancial  incentives  like  interaction  with international  peers,
provision.of  current  literature,  a proper  physical  environment  and
support  services. If the  necessary  incentives  cannot  be provided
by the  national  government  because  of civil  service  constraints,
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then  donors  could  provide  salary  supplements  and  other  perquisites
in  order  to  maintain  individuals  in a sound  institutional  base.
Training  of new  generations  of policy  analysts  is an .a.tbgral  part
of the  programme. One  shot  approaches  to training  a single  cohort
have  usually  failed  both at  producing  enough  people  and  at
ensuring  that  long  term  training  programs  are  continued  by African
governments  themselves.  Donors  therefore  must  continue  to
buttress  local  M.A.  training  and  to support  Ph.D.  training
abroad.
The  programmes  include  provision  for  publishing,  dissemination  and
other  means,  euch  as seminars  on research  priorities  with  poli-y
makers,  to stimulate  demand. The interventions  are  explicitly
based  on the  premise  that  only  nationally  generated  policies  have
the  potential  to  be taken  seriously  and implemented.
Foreign  technical  assistance  in the  short  term  to advise
government  policy  units  remains  essential. It is  best  designed,
however,  to  enhance  the  process  of policy  making,  not to  make
policy. Foreign  advisors  are  to  be integrated  into  local
institutions  as trainers  or coaches. Given  the  failure  of many
such  attempts  in the  past,  it is  noteworthy  that the  more
successful  examples  are  often  part  of the  institutional  twinning
arrangements  referred  to  above. Technical  assistance  is  only  part-147-  a.
of a larger,  carefully  considered  programme  of institutional
development,  tailored  to loc'al  needs,  with the  emphasis  placed  on
ensuring  that  local  policy  analysts  themselves  do  an increasing
share  of the  work and  that  long  term'de'pendency  on foreign
advisors  is  avoided.
Donors  ha've  had  more  success  when  concentrating  their  resources  on
a small  number  of institutions  or types  of programmes. It is
especially  evident  that  only  a few  countries  can  sustain  large
centres  of excellence,  given  the  difficulties  inherent  in the
general  political  and  economic  climate  and  the  formidable
challenge  of long-term  institutional  stability. Smaller  countries
should  perhaps  be thinking  above  all  of emphasizing  the
rehabilitation  of statistical  services  and  economic  and  financial
management.  A small  policy  analysis  unit  within  a planning  or
finance  ministry  would  be sufficient  and  could  interact  wich large
regional  or  national  centres  nearby.
Donors  have  had little  success  with  regional  institutions  in
Africa  and tend  to feel  that  the  stronger  national  centres,  such
as CIRES,  can  de facto  play  a significant  regional  r6le,  even  if
they  remain  de jure  national  institutions.
Other  institutions  that  bilateral  donor  agencies  feel  could  play
an important  role  are  the  four  schools  of statistics  and  economics-148-  ...
in the  French-speaking  countries  and  several  institutes  of
management  and  administration.  The  atter  are  perceived  as closer
to government  than  universities  and  less  politically  vulnerable.
They could  be encouraged  to breate  broader  economic  analysis
capacity,  expanding  on their  present  micro  and sectoral  skills.
Foundation  staff  feel  that  a  combination  of a few  large
institutions  playing  a regional  r8le  in  coordination  with  networks  of research
and  technical  asisstance  (cf.  Winrock,  IDRC),  constitutes  the  best strategy
for  building  local  capacity  and  for  addressing  national  and  regional  research
and  training  needs.  Considerable  donor  coordination  of assistance  in  the  form
of technical  support  and  logistics  is  still  needed  to sustain  these  networks;
e.g.,  Ford,  IDRC,  Rockefeller,  the  Bank  and  others  are  supporting  the
macroeconomic  consortium.
It is evident  that  the  donor  agencies  which  have  been supporting
policy  analysis  institutions  share  many  of the  same  concerns  and  are  searching
for  ways to overcome  the  failures  of the  past.  There  is  broad  agreement  on
the  nature  of the  problem:  that  despite  25  years  of technical  assistance,
support  for  training  at all  levels  and  provision  of facilities  and  hardware,
the  continent  still  lacks  qualified  economists  to staff  existing  institutions
and that  many  of the  latter  remain  weak  and isolated  from  policymaking.  Now
is the  time  to  exploit  the  lessons  inherent  in past  successes  and  failures  and
to  encourage  new  actors  in  this  area,  such  as the  World  Bank to  consider  how- 149  .
they  can  facilitate  coordination  and  match  their  considerable  resources,
experience  and  leverage  with the  historical  perspective  of the  foundations  and
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